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Yugoslavia

Bosnia-Hercegovina—Zagreb radio reports that Mirko Boskovic, chairman of the republic's electoral commission, stated that voter turnout for the weekend referendum on the republic's independence was 56.31 percent. "This implies that the legal conditions have been fulfilled for the referendum vote to be considered valid." Initial results are expected tomorrow and the final count will be announced about 1300 GMT on 3 March.

Zagreb radio reports that the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] has claimed responsibility for barricades set up in over 20 locations in Sarajevo to hinder the referendum. The SDS stated that conditions for taking down the barricades include "an immediate end to all further activities geared to the declaration of Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence." Belgrade radio says the Ministry of Internal Affairs "has distanced itself from all appeals to the citizens not to leave their homes that were issued by the media this morning." Labeling media information as "rumors and various disinformation," the ministry calls on the citizens of Sarajevo to help "calm the city" and "get to their workplaces."

Federal—TANJUG reports that 25 out of the 31 countries asked by UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali have agreed to commit troops to the peacekeeping force. Included in the list are "three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—France, Russia and Great Britain." This is a first in the history of UN peacekeeping operations.

Croatia—Vienna TV reports that "an attempt was made on the life of Paraga," chief of "extreme-right" Croatian Party of Rights, in Vinkovci on 29 February. Three people were killed and seven injured in the failed "bomb attack" on Paraga.

Bulgaria

President Zhelev issued a declaration expressing his "negative view" on the Union of Democratic Forces' [SDS] proposal to place the National Intelligence Service under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sofia radio reports. In his declaration, Zhelev states: "Communism in Bulgaria has been buried but the communist thinking has remained." "The subordination of the National Intelligence Service to the president... is a guarantee that this service fulfills and will continue to fulfill all-national tasks." According to BTA, the SDS believes the declaration is aimed at turning the presidency into a "center of power."

Albania

In response to the "catastrophic economic situation... and chronic food shortages... crowds pillaged and burned" various cities, AFP reports. The situation remains "tense" after a week of rioting. Sali Berisha, leader of the Democratic Party, accused the government of provoking the incidents "to prevent the elections going ahead under normal conditions." Tirana party leader Ylli Vejsiu backed Berish's theory, calling it an "organized plot." However, Fatos Nana, Socialist party leader, denied the rumors and claimed the riots took place in cities held by both the Democrats and the Socialists.

National Situation 'Tense' After Week of Rioting

Pillage Leaves Five Dead, 120 Injured

AU0103151592 Paris AFP in English 1457 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] Tirana, March 1 (AFP)—The situation in Albania remained tense Sunday [1 March] after a week of rioting and pillage left five people dead and 120 others injured, including 30 policemen. The opposition charged the ruling former communist Socialist Party with responsibility for the violence that disrupted the country just three weeks before parliamentary elections.

The former communist party, which won three-quarters of the seats in Albania's first multi-party elections last year, is in danger of being unseated in the face of an explosive situation which police seem increasingly unable to control. The leader of the opposition Democratic Party, Sali Berisha, a cardiologist, in a Tirana television interview accused the government of provoking the latest unrest "to prevent the elections going ahead under normal conditions."

Another Democrat, Tirana party leader Ylli Vejsiu, supported Berisha's theory suggesting it was all part of an organised plot. "We have to deal with a scenario well prepared by the leaders in power who are practising a scorched-earth policy and provoking tension to make the stabilisation of the country and the reestablishment of order more difficult after the victory of the opposition," Vejsiu said.

The Socialist Party leader and former prime minister, Fatos Nano, denied the charges, pointing out during a television interview that the unrest took place both in cities held by the Democratic Party, such as Lushnja, and in Pogradec, held by the Socialists. Responding to the catastrophic economic situation, coupled with general poverty and chronic food shortages, rampaging crowds pillaged and burned Pogradec, Lushnja and Pecinje last week.

Prime Minister Vilson Ahmeti had to call in the army Thursday [27 March] to help police try to quell the riots. Defense Minister Alfred Moisiu visited the Librazhd garrison, near Elbasan, to boost troop morale with a speech about "strengthening discipline within the army and preparation of the military to handle the situation in the region," the ATA news agency said Sunday.

Thousands of people who gathered Saturday [29 March] in the Adriatic port city of Durres, hoping to seize a ship and sail to Italy, were finally dispersed, informed sources in Tirana announced Sunday. After police sealed off the city, Albanian and foreign ships in Durres finally left the port temporarily to prevent attempts to force passage to a foreign port. The scenes were similar to those last year when tens of thousands of Albanians seized cargo vessels and sailed to Italy's east coast in a mass exodus bid which peaked last August. The refugees were rounded up and flown home.

Since elections last April, the government formed by President Ramiz Alia has faced a groundswell of discontent as inflation has soared to 600 percent, products of almost every kind have vanished from the shops and national production has fallen by around 50 percent. As conditions in what was already Europe's poorest country continued to deteriorate, food riots, looting of shops, repeated strikes and a snowballing external debt has seen increasing signs of a breakdown in social order. Crime has increased sharply, and some demonstrations have taken on a xenophobic character, with expressions of hostility against the country's Greek ethnic minority, numbered at 60,000 by Tirana but at 400,000 by Athens.

Tirana Hospital Staff Strikes

AU0103211392 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1830 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] An unpleasant incident happened in the Emergency Department of Tirana Polyclinic at about 2230 GMT last night. A group of armed individuals came to the Polyclinic to rob emergency instruments. They threatened and attacked the department's personnel and an ambulance driver. These cases have occurred more than once recently, and the emergency doctors and personnel have therefore suspended work since last night. They are not to blame. They demand first that the hospital where they work be considered a facility of special importance and that their lives be made safe, because their duties continue night and day. They will to resume work only when their safety is guaranteed.

Social Democratic Party Opens Campaign in Elbasan

AU0103203992 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1830 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] Professor Dr. Skender Gjinushi, chairman of the Albanian Social Democratic Party [PSD], took part in the opening of the electoral campaign in Elbasan District. The meeting, organized by the PSD district branch, was attended by the party's members and supporters. A delegation of the Austrian Social Democratic Party headed by Hannes (?Weminger), deputy secretary for lower Austria, was also present. Mr. Bahri Myftari, chairman of the PSD's Elbasan branch, opened the meeting.

Skender Gjinushi then spoke and first stressed the difficult moments the country is experiencing. The very serious atmosphere, he said, cannot in any way be coincidental but is the result of a premeditated strategy. Not only have public life and order been violated, but democracy and the people's hopes are also victims of this strategy. The PSD denounces these attempts by those in power and appeals to all its members and supporters and to all democratic forces to make their contribution on the eve of the great victory. Albania is faced with two alternatives: Either the old regime and the dictatorship will continue to exist, which means renewed isolation, uncertainty, and regression, or Albania will embark on

the true path of democracy, which means prosperity, calm, and progress. The PSD expresses its conviction that 22 March will be a day of great hope.

Mr. Hannes (?Weminger) greeted the meeting on behalf of the delegation of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. He said, among other things, that Europe would not be Europe without the presence of social democracy. Albania cannot be a part of Europe without social democracy.

Professor Dr. Skender Gjinushi then answered numerous questions from those present.

Socialist Party's Nano Holds News Conference

AU0103150892 Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] Tirana, March 1 (ATA)—On February 29, the chairman of the Socialist Party [SP] of Albania, Fatos Nano, gave a press conference at the Palace of Congresses in Tirana.

Mr. Fatos Nano said, among other things, that we are interested in responding to the public opinion on the current developments in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Albania, problems which were treated of, in the meeting organised in Italy by the Institute of Economic Political Studies of the Italian Socialist Party and the Institute "Karl Renner" of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. The invitation from the foreign minister of Italy, Gianni de Michelis in the meeting presided over by him and from the minister of state of Austria, Peter Jankowitsch, in which Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha was invited as well, was a great commitment for our party, because in this meeting, the democratic, reforming forces of Eastern and Central Europe would exchange opinions and discuss on the present stage of the political and economic developments and the perspectives to be opened to them in the context of the democratic developments.

In continuation, Mr. Nano pointed out that the meeting considered as the correct pattern of solving the contradictions in the new democratic states, the version of the West European states. The extension of the European Community for the next 20 years was considered the most significant event. He confirmed once again that in this conference, the participants committed themselves that the European Community will continue its aid, despite the fact that which political party will win in the coming elections.

Then, Fatos Nano responded to the numerous questions of the journalists present regarding SDP's [Social Democratic Party] membership to the Socialist Internationale, the circulation in some districts of a booklet with his biography, the membership in the ranks of the SP, the meeting with Craxi, the problem of elections, other allies of the SP, except Italy and PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] of Greece, etc.

Responding to these questions, Mr. Nano underscored that he wanted to confirm once more that the Chile meeting did not decide on SDP's membership to the Socialist Internationale, and added that the reaction of left-wing personalities in such questions, is not useful. The Socialist Party wishes that many political forces of our country be accepted in international forums, because this contributes to the Aibanian civilization. The SP, he said further on, does not raise cults, but has fought since the very beginning to down them. The SP is the author of the booklet and it is being distributed with the program of the party in the context of all the other propaganda materials of the new election campaign.

120 thousand people have joined the ranks of the SP, he said. The SP, he said, is able to form several governments and it has proved such a thing. The Socialist Party demands a joint governing of the country. We do not wish a fragile government and will combat for making democracy forge ahead. The Socialist Party has not confined the alliances with the Italian Socialist Party, PASOK of Greece, Mr. Nano said, but it has extended the relations also with political and democratic forces in Austria, Hungary, Israel, Turkey, Switzerland.

Unity Party Not To Run Candidates for Deputy

AU2902145392 Tirana ATA in English 1011 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Tirana, February 29 (ATA)—A report of the Albanian National Unity Party reports that on February 26 and 27 the conference of this party convened. The chairman of the party, Idajet Beqiri, spoke of the work to cope with the election campaign.

The conference defined the stands of this party towards the elections of March 22 and underscored that the National Unity Party worked with devotion for the preparation of the election campaign, where with the contribution of the people and the branches of this party in the districts there were chosen outstanding intellectuals of the juridical, economic, historic fields, etc., for 100 election zones. But the state and political parties did not respond to our seriousness .

Further on the report points out that this party was not helped materially and financially. Hence the cases of its isolation from its electorate in various districts from the working people of the [word indistinct], lack of correspondence and other informations of the party in districts were mentioned, at a time when the newspaper "KOMBI" is not published due to lack of paper. Under such conditions, for the sake of the interests of the people and nation, we deem it righteous not to put up any candidate for deputy in these elections. On this occasion, says the report of this party, we appeal to the members and sympathizers of our party to appreciate by themselves whether they should vote or not, suffice they avoid confrontations.

Radio Director Foresees Possible Closure

LD2802123392 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 2231 GMT 25 Feb 92

[Commentary by Micho Zima, director of External Service of Radio Tirana]

[Text] As you might know, general elections will be held in Albania on 22 March. It is true things have changed since the first multi-party elections were held in March last year. The breeze of democracy is blowing all over the country. The Albanian's have long since realized that the road to Europe passes through the respect for law, tolerance, and (transference).

The media, the radio and the television have a major role to play. The role they played in the democratic processes in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and especially in Romania must not be ignored. All these countries had a far less painful transition period than in Albania where the people are getting disappointed.

The journalists of the Albanian radio television [as heard] are keen on presenting the Albanian reality in its true colors. The leading council of the radio television, comprising distinguished Albanian intellectuals, has played a major role in the unbiased attitude of these organs.

We are at the initial phase of the restructuring of the radio television from the organizational and technical point of view. But as it seems, this process of restructuring cannot take effect, and even be conceived, unless there is a powerful and concrete material support.

All broadcasts of the Albanian radio television risk being closed down at any moment due to pronounced shortages in spare parts and even for lack of printing paper. We've made the government and the parliament known about this grave situation, but they seem to forget that currently information is equivalent to everyday food. The government promised to allocate a special fund to meet all these exigencies, but an absurd excuse followed suit: The bank has no hard currency to afford it.

The situation is getting worse and worse and the staff of the radio television are right to ask: How long will it take? However, being cautious of the situation they are living through, none of the staff have abandoned work. All journalists are trying to make their best despite all these difficulties. They are doing the utmost to convey to the audiences the Albanian reality, however shocking it might be.

Almost all our colleagues from other countries that have visited the studios of the Albanian radio television and have met us have more or less stated: You are heroes. But the staff of the radio television does no more get satisfied with estimations only and empty words. What they need is the most necessary equipments and normal working conditions.

Much is promised but not a single move is taken to meet their demands.

It is a fact we have had quite a number of requests for cooperation, even by very authoritative broadcasting stations such as the BBC, France International, American, and Dutch TV channels and radio stations. Reaching an agreement with them could be of mutual benefit but all these have not been given due consideration and have almost run into oblivion due to lack of experience of the Albanian side in this lucrative business. The Italian Rai network, for example, had a surplus of five billion dollars last year. Of course, we have no intentions whatsoever to be competitive to this authoritative station but on the other hand, we must not deny the real potentials of the Albanian radio television, at least to be self-financed.

We must make the initial step in this direction. It must not be experimental, as before, but well conceived and courageously taken on due time [as heard].

For the sake of truth, we could say that moves forward have been made both in form and content of our mass media. New features are opened, (modest) advertisement introduced and different spectacles organized. Suffice it to mention that all these have been realized with great difficulty since they demand great investments and new conceptions.

The fact that in the current phase, when new consumptions have been created but which are covered by the old financial system we can say that in the near future the Albanian radio television broadcasts are threatened to be suspended.

The new way of conceiving the radio and television programs demands a new fully democratic organizational basis which, in fact, is very difficult to be conceived beyond the material means and the new financial resources.

In these circumstances there are only three ways which can emerge this important institution of mass media from this difficulty—the awarding by the government of an immediate credit to cover the post- election period, the establishing through concrete activities of the relations with the radio television stations of other countries and the backing by the Albanian Diaspora.

Controversy Over Intelligence Service Transfer Plan

Zhelev Expresses 'Negative View'

AU2902192092 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 29 Feb 92

["Declaration of the President of the Republic" read by presidential spokesman Valentin Stoyanov; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] As a political ideology, communism in Bulgaria is irrevocably buried, but communist thinking will continue to weigh down our society for a long time to come. It is high time for the political forces in Bulgaria not to be guided by narrow party considerations during the development of the new structures of state government.

The new state structures must serve the interests of all the people. Parties and governments come to power and then disappear, but the state institutions remain and serve the interests of Bulgaria. It is a matter of common interest for these institutions to be stable.

The proposal submitted for the restoration of the old totalitarian structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, when foreign intelligence was subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is dictated by political motives. Anxiety is aroused by the fact that regarding the proposal that has been made, unanimity is expressed between representatives of different political forces in parliament. The adoption of a decision to return the National Intelligence Service to the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is a sure way to restore the whole of the police system of the old state structures.

It is well known that the various special services in Bulgaria are charged with many tasks: the acquisition of information, and the protection of national interests, national security, and sovereignty. The unification of these services into one common structure will lead to distortion of information in the pursuit of specific political goals of the ruling party, whichever it may be.

The adoption of a decision on the basis of short-term political advantage on an issue of such importance for the state by one group today may turn out tomorrow to be a boomerang for others to be used against that first group.

The subordination of the National Intelligence Service to the president of the republic, who for the first time in Bulgaria's history was elected by direct ballot, is a guarantee that this service fulfills and will continue to fulfill all-national tasks.

The proposal of the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces on transferring the National Intelligence Service to the Ministry of Internal Affairs conflicts with the Law on Political Parties and constitutes a step backward in the process of democratizing sociopolitical life.

The depoliticization of the Armed Forces, of which the National Intelligence Service forms part, requires, on the one hand, that employees should not engage in party activities at work and, on the other, that parties should not attempt to use the Armed Forces in their own interest.

Under the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Armed Forces guarantee the country's national security, being guided solely by national interests. It is well known that all the political parties and movements represented in parliament and outside it reached a consensus on this issue, but the present proposal represents a retreat from this accord. It contravenes the principle of division of powers, which forms the bedrock foundation of any parliamentary democracy.

This is why the president holds a categorically negative view regarding the submitted proposal to transfer the National Intelligence Service to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The president will use all the powers at his disposal to resist the adoption of such decision, including making an appeal to the Bulgarian people for support.

Bulgaria is a homeland for all Bulgarians, and all must work to preserve and develop it along the road to democracy.

Zhelev, SDS 'Conflict' Develops

AU0103201592 Sofia BTA in English 1933 GMT 1 Mar 92

["President and SDS Come Into Conflict"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 1 (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev and the ruling Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) have come into conflict on the problem of who should be in charge of the National Intelligence Service.

"The president disagrees with us," SDS MP [member of parliament] Edvin Sugarev said on the national radio today. President Zhelev yesterday issued a strongly-worded declaration expressing his disagreement with the SDS intention to place the Intelligence Service under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. "Presidency does not exist under the Bulgarian Constitution, we are a parliamentary republic," Mr. Sugarev stressed. For him the declaration is an attempt to turn the Presidency into a centre of power. "Communism in Bulgaria has been buried but the communist thinking has remained," President Zhelev wrote in his declaration yesterday.

Edvin Sugarev called this declaration the president's "latest political gaffe." The conflict between President Zhelev and the SDS coalition, which was founded and for some time headed by him, broke out in the summer of last year when he started to yield to the pressure of the Centrists. Dr. Zhelev supported the adoption of an "unworkable," according to Mr. Sugarev, constitution drafted by the Centrists and the Bulgarian Socialist Party while at the same time the SDS Radicals went on hunger

strike demanding new general elections. In the direct presidential elections Dr. Zhelev was nominated by the SDS but conducted his election campaign as if he were an independent candidate. Edvin Sugarev pointed to yet another presidential gaffe: his statement for EL PAIS that the exiled Bulgarian Monarch Simeon II is a "petty trader" and his father, Boris III—a war criminal.

The SDS has accused the president of provoking the scandal involving Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev and Ahmed Dogan, leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria), who were accused of handing over to Turkey lists of Bulgarian diplomats, some of them spies. This is part of a scenario for a nationalist campaign aimed at banning the movement, at provoking a series of government crises and at establishing a coalition government, Mr. Sugarev said.

According to him, after the scandal there may be is a flirt between the Bulgarian Socialist Party (formerly communists) and President Zhelev.

It became clear from the discussion between Edvin Sugarev and Rumen Danov that Minister of the Interior Yordan Sokolov also knew about the discrediting material.

The Green Party, which is a member of the Centrist Bloc, today demanded the resignations of Mr. Ganev and Mr. Sokolov.

Democratic Center Backs Declaration

AU2902210892 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 2030 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] The Bulgarian Democratic Center has issued a statement regarding the declaration issued by the president of the republic. The document states as follows: The interests of the country stand above party interests, and Bulgarian Democratic Center condemns the attempts to put the National Intelligence Service under the control of a political force.

Ganev Remarks on 'Allegations'

AU2902210792 Sofia BTA in English 2038 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 29 (BTA)—Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev and the ruling Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) have come into conflict over who should be in charge of the country's intelligence services.

"We are a parliamentary democracy and not a presidential republic," Minister of Foreign Affairs Stoyan Ganev said on the Panorama weekly news roundup, one of the most popular TV programmes. "Bulgaria has a Constitution and a legitimately elected parliament and whoever plans to change this situation actually plans a coup," Mr. Ganev said. According to him, certain forces in Bulgarian society are getting ready for this. "Troublemakers should not always be sought among the members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party," Mr. Ganev said.

The minister of foreign affairs said that details on the discrediting materials against him and Ahmed Dogan, leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (of the ethnic Turks) will become known over the next few days. "I can speak of sinister people in the secret services who are not controlled," Mr. Ganev said. "We are for open diplomacy, we cannot afford to hide facts." According to him, many people will be shocked by the disclosures.

President Zhelev today circulated a declaration expressing his disagreement with the SDS proposal that the National Intelligence Service be brought under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. The Bulgarian president says he will use all his powers to counter such a decision. If necessary, he will turn for help to the Bulgarian people.

In his declaration President Zhelev says that he is alarmed by the unanimity of all political parties on this issue. According to a survey published in today's "TRUD" the SDS proposal is backed by both the DPS and the BSP.

President Zhelev believes that only the presidential control over the National Intelligence Service could guarantee that the service engages in tasks of national importance.

As an ideology communism has been buried, but the communist way of thinking will oppress the Bulgarian society for a long time for come, President Zhelev says in his declaration.

On February 25 the SDS parliamentary faction submitted a draft resolution repealing the 1990 Decree on the Establishment of the National Intelligence Service with the then State Council headed by Communist Leader Petur Mladenov. Under the resolution, a new National Intelligence Service with an independent status will be set up with the Ministry of the Interior. The SDS submitted this draft resolution shortly after the scandal that involved Mr. Ganev and Mr. Dogan. SDS leaders and Mr. Dogan denied allegations that a list of Bulgarian diplomats, some of them spies, had been handed over to a foreign country. Tonight the allegations were refuted by Mr. Ganev as well.

The list that provoked the scandal between the president and the SDS includes people who are to be dismissed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ganev said on the national television and added that he himself had not seen the list.

Mr. Dogan once again demanded that a parliamentary enquiry commission be set up to investigate the source and authors of the discrediting material against him and Mr. Ganev. "The masterminds will surely be punished," Mr. Ganev said.

Socialists Deny Provoking Crisis

AU2802150092 Sofia BTA in English 1137 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 28 (BTA)—Asked by the BTA whether the Bulgarian Socialist (ex-communists) Party [BSP] is trying to provoke a government crisis and form a coalition cabinet with extraparliamentary centrist groupings, as claimed by leaders of the ruling Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), MP's [member of parliament] of the Socialist-led parliamentary faction said that this is not true.

These assumptions about the BSP were made by representatives of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) after the emergence of materials aimed to discredit Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev and DPS leader Ahmed Dogan. The Intelligence Services informed President Zhelev that Mr. Ganev had handed over to Mr. Dogan a list of Bulgarian diplomats, some of them spies, which Mr. Dogan, on his part, submitted to the Turkish Embassy, "DEMOKRATSIYA" writes.

"DUMA," the daily of the opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party, accused the ruling coalition of fabricating and denying stories. It criticized the SDS for charging the BSP and the extraparliamentary opposition with weaving alleged plots. "DEMOKRATSIYA 91," the daily of the centrist forces, carried a statement by the presidential spokesman headlining a phrase he had never uttered: "Police files are provocation."

BSP regards the centrists as possible partners in the future when voters will realize that the SDS is trying to restore the pre-communist social model instead of replacing the totalitarian system with a democratic one. For all ideological movements within the BSP and for some of the centrists SDS represents the extreme right. Voters may be seized with disappointment after the end of the mandate of the National Assembly but it is still unknown when exactly this will happen, according to representatives of the BSP. The Social Democracy Union within the BSP has called on all true democrats to take joint action emphasizing, however, that it does not intend to oust the SDS government by violent and illegal means. A few days ago "DUMA" urged for joint action on the part of centrist and leftist forces.

It is the centrists that favour early elections, an MP of the Socialist-led opposition, told BTA. The centrists are former SDS members who split from the coalition and remained out of parliament because they failed to unite. Part of them supported President Zhelev, the SDS nominee in the presidential elections. Many SDS members believe that President Zhelev is very close to the centrists and that they have influence over him.

Dimitrov Notes Resistance to Property Confiscation

AU2902200292 Sofia BTA in English 1754 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 29 (BTA)—The implementation of the Act on the Confiscation of the Property of the Former Bulgarian Communist Party and Other Totalitarian Parties and Organizations is being obstructed in certain parts, Premier Filip Dimitrov told parliament today in answer to a question. The act which was adopted two months ago envisages that local officials of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] (formerly communists) declare the size of the property owned by the BSP and by party companies. According to Mr. Dimitrov, some of them have refused to do so.

The attempts to discover and list BSP property have also met resistance which is why the government has not yet decided what to do with the buildings confiscated under this act, according to Mr. Dimitrov.

In connection with BSP allegations that the government plans to confiscate the Duma Publishing House, which publishes the BSP daily "DUMA" and other newspapers, Mr. Dimitrov said that its authorized capital is over 9 billion leva. "How can we talk of equality between the parties when no other party or organization has even a portion of the resources that once belonged to the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]," Mr. Dimitrov said.

Committee To Investigate Former Communist Party

AU2902195792 Sofia BTA in English 1732 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 29 (BTA)—A parliamentary enquiry committee will investigate the activities of the former Bulgarian Communist Party, the prosecuting magistracy and the judicial and executive bodies during the forcible assimilation campaign against the Muslim, Gypsy and Turkish population in Bulgaria which started in the 1960's, parliament decided today. The committee will collect evidence and submit a report to the Chief Prosecutor's Office.

During the assimilation campaign Bulgarian Turks, Muslims and Gypsies were forced to change their names and banned from performing their religious rites and speaking their mother tongues in public. The climax of the campaign came in 1984-85. 840,000 Turks and other Muslims were forced to change their names during the last five years of Todor Zhivkov's regime.

There were only 19 votes against the decision and 23 abstentions.

The four-hour debate on the problem was initiated by Poet Edvin Sugarev, MP [member of parliament], of the ruling Union of Democratic Forces [SDS].

The Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the former Communist Party, the government,

individual statesmen and party leaders issued instructions to the Ministry of the Interior, police units took part in the campaign, protesters were sent to labour camps. There were ten victims in the 1984-85 period and other ten in 1989, Minister of Defence Dimitur Ludzhev and Minister of the Interior Yordan Sokolov told parliament last week. A special coordination centre on the problems of the assimilation campaign existed at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The Chief Archives Department and working groups from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also involved in the campaign, SDS MP Asparukh Panov said today. He made the scandalous disclosure that in 1990 a special group from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked out a national security strategy which envisaged the deployment of a Soviet military unit along the Bulgarian-Turkish border.

Minister Denies Land Contamination at Kozloduy

AU2902172192 Sofia BTA in English 1708 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 29 (BTA)—There has been no change in the radioactive situation in the three-kilometer zone around the Kozloduy N-Plant. The background radiation is within admissible limits, Minister of the Environment Valentin Vasilev told the press today in response to a BTA report based on a publication in the DUNAV newspaper.

Mr. Vasilev denied the report, arguing that it is based on outdated facts. It is absurd to talk about 800 hectares of land being contaminated. It is true that waste waters from the N-plant come to the ground in a certain area but their radioactive content does not exceed the admissible limits. There is no soil pollution from these waters. The 150 hectares of land, which have been affected only slightly, are to be afforested.

Opinion Poll on Privatization Analyzed

AU2802141692 Sofia BTA in English 1256 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Sofia, February 28 (BTA)—The "REPORTER 7" private weekly carries a signed article analysing the results of a public opinion poll conducted by the National Public Opinion Centre and published in an article headlined "Privatization Will Meet Public Opposition." The survey shows that 89.50 per cent of the respondents are ready to take part in privatization. About 49 per cent are inclined to invest up to 10,000 leva (about 400 dollars), 18 per cent up to 30,000 leva, 13 per cent up to 50,000 leva and 2 to 10 per cent more than 50,000 leva. Only 14 per cent of the respondents are ready to earmark larger amounts.

According to the author, the data prove that the majority of Bulgarians favour privatization. For them it is an essential element of the overall democratization of the Bulgarian society and not an arena for conflicting interests. The author dwells on the idea of privatization as an act in which a group of people will acquire property while a much larger group will be turned into hired labourers. He describes the intention of 49 per cent of the people who intend to invest up to 10,000 leva as "naive."

The author distinguishes three main elements in mass consciousness: attitude to property, attitude to private businessmen and attitude to the institutions defending common or group interests related to labour problems. He stresses that the mass consciousness is dominated by petty bourgeois mentality and ideological schemes inherited from the socialist past. While every other Bulgarian agrees that shops and workshops should be returned to their rightful owners, only one in three favour the restitution of factories.

The attitude to the future private owners is even more problematic, according to the author. He believes that the democratic changes in the last few years have imparted a new meaning to the fundamental socialist dogma about the equality of all people. That is why once individual people take hold of property, the Bulgarians' self-confidence will change. In the last few years private businessmen were seen predominantly in a negative light, which will further escalate tensions. The author cites the following results of the poll: Most people believe that work teams should play a key role in privatization both as an authority whose consent is needed for the start of privatization and as participants in the purchase of shares that should be given preferential treatment.

The author writes that the redistribution and consolidation of small-size property will take a relatively short time and will inevitably breed disappointment among the people. The contradiction between the demand for limited state intervention in the private sector on the one hand, and the social protection system and the widespread image of the state as a champion of workers' interests on the other will inevitably lead to conflicts.

This gives sufficient grounds to the author to believe that privatization will run into difficulties. According to him, the social significance of privatization is to lay the groundwork for economic inequality as a key to the prosperity of the entire society. While equality is identified with levelling, privatization will come across public opposition.

Kohl Continues Consultations, Goes to Bratislava

Meets With Klaus, Pithart

LD2802135892 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1130 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Excerpts] The official visit to Czechoslovakia by German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has entered its second day. In the morning, in Prague's Hotel Praha, he had breakfast with Vaclav Klaus, deputy federal prime minister and finance minister. According to Vaclav Klaus the conversation concerned party matters and affairs of state, as well as general principles of mutual economic and European cooperation. [passage omitted]

Later, Chancellor Helmut Kohl met at Prague Castle with Dagmar Buresova, Czech National Council chairwoman, and Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart. Their discussion centered mainly on regional cooperation between the Czech Republic and Saxony and Bavaria. Petr Pithart told Helmut Kohl about his plan to meet as soon as possible the ministers-president of Saxony and Bavaria to come to an agreement which he described as an extensive interpretation of the Czechoslovak-German Treaty.

Dagmar Buresova pointed out that the treaty being signed as late as yesterday would cause delay in the process leading to its ratification. She drew Helmut Kohl's attention to possible problems, and stressed that much would depend on the actions of both sides in the nearest days and weeks in imparting to the new treaty a positive and convicing content. [passage omitted]

Talks With Carnogursky, Miklosko

LD0203113392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Report by correspondent Ivan Brozik from Bratislava]

[Text] German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was welcomed at the airport by Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky and by other officials. Both the guest and the host then had a conversation in the government building after which they briefed journalists.

Jan Carnogursky said that he attaches great significance to Helmut Kohl's visit not only because it is the first of its kind in Slovakia, but also because it will facilitate relations between Slovakia and Germany. He briefed Helmut Kohl on the Czechoslovak talks on the future state administrative arrangement.

The federal chancellor said that Germany will welcome any arrangement which we agree to among ourselves. The guest from Bonn said that it is very important for him that within the framework of his visit to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic he also visit Slovakia. We will always have to think about the history of our people. There have been both terrible and also magnificent chapters. Above all, we should think about how the young generations will coexist. They will certainly coexist in a free and peaceful Europe, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said in the building of the Slovak Government.

His next stop was Bratislava Castle where he was received by Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council, and by his deputy, Jan Klepac. The atmosphere at the official reception was cordial, and the talks were held behind closed doors.

Prior to their departure for home they viewed the old town and visited the old town square. With festive fanfares, Helmut Kohl was received by Mayor Peter Kresanek.

While this was going on, a demonstration by several dozen people outside the town hall expressed disagreement with the text of the preamble of the treaty signed yesterday which speaks about the continuity of the Czechoslovak state as of 1918.

At 1613, Chancellor Helmut Kohl returned home after hearing both national anthems and viewing the honor guard.

Havel Calls German Treaty 'Historic Opportunity'

AU2802214292 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1800 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Michael Schmitz in Prague; date not given—recorded; Havel speaks in Czech with superimposed German translation]

[Text] Chancellor Kohl and CSFR President Havel signed the German-CSFR friendship treaty in Prague yesterday. At the end of the visit, both politicians expressed satisfaction. Vaclav Havel had feared that the controversies surrounding the treaty might overshadow Kohl's visit. Now there has been talk of a personal understanding between the chancellor and the president. Havel's advisers have even stated that Kohl showed warmth during his talks with Havel.

In an interview with ZDF, Havel described the treaty as a historic opportunity. At the same time, he warned against excessive expectations.

[Havel] This treaty provides a good framework for improving our relations. I hope that we will make use of this historic opportunity. It depends on us whether our efforts will be successful.

[Schmitz] What steps are necessary to implement the treaty?

[Havel] From our viewpoint, the treaty is very important, because Germany supports us on our path toward Europe and in our efforts to integrate our country into the EC. For us, this will be the basis for restructuring our economy. Both sides will benefit from this—the FRG and the CSFR.

[Schmitz] There has been criticism in your country concerning yesterday's meeting and the treaty. Do you take this seriously?

[Havel] Yes, there is a certain amount of criticism. I am convinced, however, that most of our citizens understand that the treaty opens up new prospects. They want to make use of these prospects.

Havel on German Treaty, Constitutional Arrangement

LD0103170692 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1315 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Editor Stanislava Dufkova on 29 February in Prague: "Conversations at Lany"—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Dufkova] This week you have finally signed, along with Chancellor Kohl, the Czechoslovak-German treaty on good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation. As happens with everything in our country there was chaos, calculations, fear, and slanders surrounding the treaty. You have been accused, Mr. President, of being too accomodating to the Germans and selling out to them.

[Havel] Signing the treaty and everything that happened related to it or preceding it warrant longer reflection. I should above all say this: Throughout my life I have had doubts about the postwar transfer of Germans and have condemned that transfer. Shortly after taking up office I said so publicly. My statement came as a moderate shock to our society, which I quite understand, because for the past 45 years this matter was one of the basic and unquestionable dogmas. That subject was taboo, something about which one could not talk, about which the truth could not be said, and that transfer was not allowed to be questioned. For many people that matter, however, became an absolute fact of life. I however believe that truth must prevail over lies and that we are dutybound to tell ourselves very unpleasant truths even if we do not like to talk about it. [passage omitted]

What specific objections have been raised against the treaty? The arguments concern mainly three points. First, that the word *expulsion* appears in the preamble. Many people have been saying that by not talking about *transfer* but about *expulsion* we have in fact made the whole postwar act more problematic and therefore are opening the possibility for Sudeten Germans to make claims for the return of their property and the like. I believe that when people are driven out of their homes this is not a transfer but purely an expulsion.

Nonetheless it is necessary to say that the connection in which this word is used is different. The word *expulsion*, beside the words *violence* and *war*, is used in the sentence which says that one cannot correct the wrongs of the past by new wrongdoings. This is therefore an idea aimed at the future. [passage omitted]. It is a general sentence that wrongs will not be corrected by new wrongs, which is surely an idea with which everyone has to agree. There is no mention afterward in the whole treaty of expulsion, its consequences, and the remedy for it. Czechoslovakia does not recognize property claims of Sudeten Germans. No legal consequences can follow from the moral, historical, and political condemnation of the postwar transfer. The fact is that if legal consequences follow from every historic wrong which we truthfully describe as such, we will not be able for practical reasons to reach any historical truth since history is a series of wrongs and one can hardly imagine that all these wrongs can be legally remedied.

The claims of the Sudeten Germans are claims they make as citizens, which cannot be forbidden to them. The important thing is that the German Government does not identify with these claims and does not support them in the treaty or in any other way, and we refuse to meet these claims because we are restituting property from 25 February 1948, thereby correcting the wrongs of communism; and for many various reasons we are not going deeper into the past and cannot. So much for the expulsion.

The second objection concerns the term *borders* and is entirely a pseudo-problem. The German word *Grenze*—borders—is a word generally used in treaties. [passage omitted] In German treaty-drafting practice the word *borders* means the same as what the term *state borders* means in our usage. [passage omitted] Chancellor Kohl clearly explained this during his stay here and the matter is totally undisputed. In the treaty Germany recognizes the continuity of our state from 1918 and explicitly stresses that it does not have and is never going to have any territorial claims. It recognizes Czechoslovakia as a subject of international law within its present borders, and respects these borders.

The German side does not object in any way to the use of the term *state borders* in the Czech version, which will be authorized by the German side. [passage omitted]

The third and final point about which there has been a great deal of discussion is the nullification of the Munich agreement. We argued that the treaty should explicitly state that the Munich agreement was invalid from its very inception. This is a formulation which France and Italy as parties to the agreement accepted and included in their treaties with our country. This is also our explanation of the principle which has been anchored in the treaty with Germany—that the *agreement*, or rather *Munich diktat* was void. We interpret it as having been void from the very inception. Once again we do this for reasons that are rather political and moral. This is because according to international norms a treaty which has been imposed by force or the threat of force is invalid from its very inception. We adhere to this principle and therefore we would have welcomed it had this been directly stated in the treaty with Germany.

The German side has its legal reasons why it cannot include such an explicit formulation in the treaty. Such a

formulation would probably not get through the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe because it would in effect call into question the citizenship of 3.5 million German citizens and all civic legal acts arising from it. Likewise no German government would apparently dare to express such a formulation. Nonetheless this does not mean that the German side does not recognize that Munich was a diktat and that the Munich agreement was imposed by force. The great stir about this formulation seems to me unnecessary and incogruous although I do not conceal that we negotiated very patiently and hard and that we would have preferred it if that formulation, which corresponds to our interpretation, had been included.

The last thing I should mention is the campaign concerning the treaty. Campaign is an ugly word. RUDE PRAVO wrote for years about campaigns, but it was some kind of a campaign. I do not wish to minimize or understate it at all. As a man who is open-minded through and through, I have attempted above all to understand and and analyze it factually. It would seem to me that many different factors have combined together, above all some pre-election speculation. Naturally the general state of one's mind is accessible and inclined to argument, such as thinking that one has sold out our country or betrayed the interests of our people. This line of argument is directed at people who suffered during World War II and who can succumb to such arguments. [passage omitted]

It is rather paradoxical that people who for the past 40 years did not protest against the total liquidation of our state sovereignty under Soviet rule are now pretending to be great patriots who defend national interests. It is also a fact that some older people who shared in the violence and attrocities committed against Germans after World War II suddenly feel threatened by this historical reflection. What they understood somewhere in the depths of their soul as an expression of their patriotism is suddenly questioned, suddenly they are not sure whether they are guilty of something, and for such people this is rather difficult to swallow. Then there are people who are generally dissatisfied and frustrated by the situation. They are impatient. They see things moving slowly, things not succeeding, how many problems we have and how difficult it is to tackle them, and these people use every opportunity to oppose the government, and thus they tend to express their overall dissatisfaction with the state of the world. Former members of the State Security [StB] are playing a certain role here. Their basic line is to destabilize the situation and question democratic power.

All these factors have converged together, although there are undoubtedly many honest and honorable people among those who have doubts about the treaty and about our foreign policy toward Germany, people who bear scars from World War II and who suddenly have difficulty with the fact that some fault could also be on our side. I was a bit sorry that those who, two days before the treaty was signed, questioned somewhat lightly [as heard] the treaty and our foreign policy toward Germany in general, included the chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, I understand for certain pre-election reasons, which could have played a role. In my view this was not a just voice. It seems to me that Deputy Prime Minister Klaus is on a sounder footing on economic grounds rather than on foreign policy grounds. This includes for instance the idea that we should have provided some assistance during the talks on the unification of Germany and at the two plus four conference which finally put an end to the status of Germany as a defeated state. This idea, however, reveals a total lack of knowledge of the situation because the talks between the four victorious powers with the two German states concerned the international position of Germany and above all its borders, and we had nothing do with it and they would not have allowed us to attend the talks because no one questions our borders. Poland was invited as a guest to a certain part of the negotiations for understandable reasons because the sole matter that was questioned in the past was the Polish-German border.

The totally unequivocal confirmation of Germany within the borders of the former Federal Republic and the former GDR had to be part of the entire peace settlement with Germany. Czechoslovakia expressed its support for German reunification very clearly from the first moment. Shortly after I took office I visited both East and West Germany and stressed the importance of reunification. It therefore cannot be said that Czechoslovakia was somewhat apathetic or indifferent to this entire process. On the contrary, the attitude of our foreign policy was highly appreciated on the German side and in the whole European environment, and therefore such criticism seems to me a bit unjust.

As far as the treaty itself is concerned, and here I agree with Minister Klaus, it does not show immediate concrete and tangible results. It is nothing like a contract between Volkswagen and Skoda. Nonetheless the treaty is an essential legal framework for long years to come, into the future, of everything that will happen between our two countries. Naturally it depends solely on us and of course also on the Germans whether we will fill in the framework that has been defined in the treaty, how quickly and how successfully we will fill it.

The treaty itself merely creates prerequisites and is of enormous importance for us, and moreover it is advantageous for Czechoslovakia. In a certain sense it is asymmetric because Germany in the treaty has declared assistance to Czechoslovakia in the economic field and in our entry into the European Community while we have not declared any assistance to Germany. Therefore the treaty is for us very important and forward-looking and gives us great opportunities and it only depends on us whether we will take advantage of them.

[Dufkova] Screening is an everlasting problem, scandals continue to break out. What is your view of this issue now?

[Havel] [passage omitted] We have simply always paid dearly for attempting to bypass our past, not to face it, to say to each other in a way what happened, let us forget it. This stance does not give us good prospects for the future. It is not a productive stance when facing the future. We must come to terms with our past in a civilized way, observing the laws. This means that we should not launch a witch hunt against peoeple, nor accuse them without sufficient evidence, nor scandalize them. The need to come to terms with the terrible explosive arsenal left behind by the StB is totally legitimate. [passage omitted]

I do not consider a screening rage bordering on fanaticism to be correct, but on the other hand it is equally bad to simply say that we are not going to launch a witch hunt, that we are going to forget what happened and are not going to deal with it. We must deal with it and we have to find a civilized way of dealing with it.

[Dufkova] You talked about coming to terms with the past. Mr. Marecek [hunger striker from Kyjov demanding the punishment of those who prepared the "Law of the Truncheon"] is also trying to come to terms with the past. You wrote him a letter. How about Mr. Marecek and you?

[Havel] I have already given my views on the case of Mr. Marecek several times. I was the first one to set up a special independent commission which very quickly reexamined the justification of his demands and concluded that in many respects the demands are legitimate and justified. I sent him a special personal letter. I am dealing with the case. I do care about it. It is a complex case. It is obvious that the basic moral truth is on Mr. Marecek's side. I understand the ethos of his act. At the same time, however, I cannot agree with the means he is using to fight for his truth. I cannot agree with many accompanying phenomena that surround the case, the political misuse of the affair. In my view, it is a man's natural duty to save a life in danger. [passage omitted] I think that if a doctor happens to be passing by a tree on which somebody is about to hang himself, his duty is to cut him down from the tree and not think about whether it is or is not in harmony with the law on peoples' health. [passage omitted]

[Dufkova] As the "Conversations at Lany" were not aired in the past two weeks you did not have an opportunity to explain your views on a constitutional setup to our listeners. Now you have a chance, Mr. President, to do this at the end of our program.

[Havel] Unfortunately, what I feared and what I tried to prevent up to the last moment through my constitutional initiatives in the parliament—but unfortunately I failed—has happened, and the situation has grown extraordinarily complicated. [passage omitted] In the parliament a phenomenon of obstruction has already emerged, and deputies are leaving the hall in order to render the parliament incapable of adopting decisions. Opposition parties oppose some proposals of coalition parties on principle, not because of the matters involved. In my view the situation is serious and it will be especially serious after the election. [passage omitted]

The constitution does not outline at all sufficiently the method of forming a government and how the government is going to get a vote of confidence in the parliament. Constitutional mechanisms are not drafted, it will be very complicated to form a coalition government and there will not be much time to do so. It is not clear what to do if a government repeatedly fails to get a vote of confidence in the parliament. There are no regulations for this. During a 40-day period a president has to be elected in a secret vote, by gaining three-fifths of the vote in all the three parts of the Federal Assembly. The constitution does not outlines what to do if such an election fails, which is more than probable. I am aware of the threat that we could find ourselves without a government, without a president, and that our parliament could be paralyzed following the election. I fear such a situation and I want to do all I can in this matter. I feel I cannot leave the boat when it is passing through a dangerous storm. [passage omitted]

Despite all this I have reason to believe that after various horrors which are still in front of us everything will end well. [passage omitted]

Klaus Criticizes Policy Over German Treaty

LD2802211492 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1730 GMT 25 Feb 92

[Statement by Vaclav Klaus, federal deputy prime minister and finance minister, to Czech radio on the text of the Czechoslovak-German treaty; date not given—recorded]

[Text] Dealing with the German question is a never ending task for us. At present, the unequivocal settlement of our relations with Germany is a condition of our integration in Europe and in the European Community. For this reason, the future of our country depends on resolving this problem. The process of German unification— the last time a decision about that country was made by the victorious powers in talks called Four Plus Two —was an occasion to draw a thick line behind the past and prepare conditions for the conclusion of a good treaty on mutual relations.

The rapidity with which Germany unified at that time created very advantageous and truly excellent conditions for submitting our views on the matter. It is quite obvious that we would not have been rejected. Polish foreign policy was aware of the importance of that moment and by being resolutely active it pushed through its participation at least in part of the negotiations. While our foreign policy achieved merely declarative support for Polish participation in these talks, Poland acted. We viewed the process of German unification from a distance and only now are we signing a treaty which leaves open the most dangerous problems, such as the property of Sudeten Germans.

The use of the word expulsion to describe transfer should perhaps have meant a friendly gesture, a certain moral atonement for the cruelty of that process carried out after the war, under the condition that it would be part of a definitive closing of the past. The context in which that word is used in the treaty, especially because property issues have not been resolved, can lead, however, to its interpretation as a legal claim. It is also possible that we might not become members of the European Community unless we meet such claims. Instead of closing the questions of the past in our relations with Germany we have transferred their solution to the future. At the same time, it is apparent that in the future we cannot have a better negotiating position for the resolution of the problem than we had previously.

Our foreign policy makers have thus driven us into a situation in which we will have to support the treaty by our votes during ratification despite the fact that we know how little the treaty has resolved in reality. I can give an assurance on my behalf and on behalf of the Civic Democratic Party that we will not permit property rights of Czechoslovak citizens to be questioned in any way in the future.

Hungarian Parliamentary Committee Holds Dam Talks

LD2802233992 Prague CSTK in English 2037 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 28 (CSTK)—Hungary insists on cancelling the 1977 Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement on a twin-dam project on the Danube, and that Czechoslovakia stop all work on the project, a Czechoslovak parliament official told reporters today.

Ivan Rynda, chairman of the Czechoslovak parliament Committee for the Environment, was speaking during a break during the second day of two-day closed-door talks, held by the environmental committees of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian parliaments. Rynda said members of the Hungarian committee also insisted a new agreement be concluded on the future of the project. Hungary has said it is considering unilaterally withdrawing from the agreement on the project. Hungary stopped work in 1989 on the dam at Nagymaros, citing environmental concerns, but Czechoslovakia continued work on its side at Gabcikovo.

Meanwhile, in an interview for CSTK in Budapest today, Hungarian Minister Without Portfolio Ferenc Madl, who has led a Hungarian delegation in talks with Czechoslovakia, said "no state can be forced to act contrary to its basic interests, which in this case would mean that Hungary would have to observe an agreement threatening drinking water supplies for half of the country." He added that at the time of the signing of the agreement none of the sides realised environmental threats posed by the planned dam project.

In joint talks in Budapest last December, Hungary agreed that a commission, consisting of Slovak and Hungarian experts as well as impartial specialists from other European countries, would examine compromise proposals for a solution. "As soon as we get a reply that Czechoslovakia agrees with establishing a commission and stops work, we are willing to meet with Premier (Jan) Carnogursky and start work on putting the commission together," Madl said. He said Hungary was prepared to consider all alternatives that Czechoslovakia submits. "However, apart from verbal information about three or four variant plans, we have so far not received any official proposal for consideration. It is to be the task of a tripartite commission to choose the most acceptable of Czechoslovakia's alternatives," Madl said.

Bos-Habymaros Negotiations Stalemated

LD2802164692 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] There is no agreement in the Bos-Habymaros affair. The Czechoslovak delegation still insists on the 1977 treaty. Peter Nyarady reports from Prague:

[Nyarady] Originally six points were to be in the joint communique—four of which had been clarified in earlier negotiations but the two must important Hungarian proposals are unacceptable for the Czechoslovak side. These demand a stop to the unilateral Slovak works until a joint expert committee clarifies the expected impact of the operating dam. This would be clear within six months. The other is that Czechoslovakia is not willing to negotiate the abrogation of the 1977 treaty and the conclusion of a new agreement. In this respect the Czechoslovak side added that the 1977 treaty is relevant even today to the extent demanded by the situation and provides sufficient scope for the adoption of all options. The Czechoslovak side does not see adequate guarantees that if it stops the project Hungary will not want to use this merely to stall.

Nandor Rott, head of the Hungarian delegation, said that Hungarian acceptance of the continuation of the unilateral Slovak works cannot be a base for negotiation, all the more because all objective research findings will become increasingly unlikely.

Czechoslovak Environmental Minister Vavrousek added that for the time being the Hungarian side has not managed to convince the Czechoslovak partner that the Hungarian stance really follows constructive aims. In his view, they have not this time either come forward with a proposal that would help the resolution of the problem. Therefore the effect of this can only be that Czechoslovakia must stress the fact again that it was Hungary that first breached the original treaty.

Responding, Nandor Rott added that negotiations have many modes including the two countries' failure to come to an agreement and their taking the matter further to international forums or courts.

By the way, this correspondent's impression is that there has not been a real move away from the stalemate and

the logic, the inertia of the thing, suggests that nothing else is left but the international court.

Hungary Threatens To Renounce Agreement

LD2902140592 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1130 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] The commissioning of the Gabcikovo water project would represent an exceptional and drastic interference in the natural system, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall says in a letter to Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa. The letter, quoted by the Hugarian press today, says the unilateral diversion of the flow of the Danube calls into question the validity of the international agreement on the building of the Danube water barrage of 1977 and represents a stipulation of the international law, for example, the principle of the inviolability of borders. [sentence as heard]

If Czechoslovakia rejects the Hungarian proposals and continues work on the unilateral diversion of the flow of the Danube, the Hungarian side will be forced for renounce the agreement, the Hungarian prime minister stresses.

Dienstbier Urges CSCE Role in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD2802150792 Prague CSTK in English 1352 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 27 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier today said the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) must help find a generally acceptable solution to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Dienstbier, who has been chairing the CSCE foreign ministers' council since January 30, has received a report from the CSCE mission which visited Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, February 12-18. The mission was headed by Karel Schwarzenberg, head of the Czechoslovak presidential office. The issue of Nagorno-Karabkh is discussed by a two-day session of the committee of CSCE senior officials which opened here today. In his statement, Dienstbier called on the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to seek cessation of violence and opening of talks on the issue. Referring to the meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers in Moscow February 20, Dienstbier praised the peace initiative by the Russian Federation.

New Payment Method Defined for Trade With Russia

AU2802141792 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 27 Feb 92 p 3

["Text" of Document "Defining the Method of Settling Accounts for Select Commodities Between the Russian Federation and the CSFR in 1992" signed on 21 February; place not given—first paragraph is HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] An agreement defining the fundamental methods for settling the accounts regulated by the intergovernment protocol of 16 January 1992 was signed on 21 February 1992 between the Czechoslovak Commercial Bank Shareholding Company, Prague and the Russian Federation Foreign Trade Bank, Moscow.

The Czechoslovak Commercial Bank Shareholding Company (CSOB) has opened a U.S. dollar account called "A-USD-RF-92" for the Russian Federation Foreign Trade Bank. Thirty eight percent of the value of all exports from the Russian Federation to the CSFR will be paid into this account. The remaining 62 percent will be credited to the account "B-USD-RF-92" and, aside from this, to a special subsidiary account to account "B" that will be opened in the CSOB on behalf of each Russian exporter supplying goods or services to the CSFR within the framework of the Protocol of 16 January 1992.

So far, this subsidiary account to account "B" has been opened for Neftexport [Oil Export] and Gazexport [Gas Export], Moscow.

The funds accumulated in account "A-USD-RF-92" are intended exclusively for the Russian Federation's centralized purchases in the CSFR and for paying part of the former USSR's debt to the CSFR. The participation of Czechoslovak exporters in transactions within the framework of account "A" is conditional on the agreement of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade [FMZO] and of the republican industry ministries. The CSOB will require a copy of the export contract authorized by the FMZO.

The funds in the "B" subsidiary accounts belong solely to Russian exporters and their utilization will not be subject to any approval procedures by the Czechoslovak side. In this instance, it will be left entirely to Czechoslovak enterprises to quickly and successfully find a Russian partner and sign a contract with him within 30 days, or the funds in subsidiary account "B" will have to be transferred unused to Moscow.

The CSOB is prepared as of 1 March 1992 to provide information—daily from 0800-1000 on telephone No. 21 42 25 35—in order to make it easier for Czechoslovak enterprises to become familiar with this system of settling accounts.

It is envisaged that the method of payment used will be the documentary letter of credit method; the documentary collection of payments [dokumentarni inkaso] would only be agreed upon in the contract in exceptional cases. All documents concerning this system of settling accounts must be clearly marked "A-USD-RF-92" or "B-USD- RF-92" by the bank's clients.

Temporary Trade Agreement Signed With EC

LD2802134592 Prague CSTK in English 1541 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 26 (CSTK)—A temporary trade agreement between Czechoslovakia and the European Community (EC), approved yesterday by the EC Council of

Ministers in Brussels, will bring Czechoslovakia about 100 million U.S. dollars in income from trade, a Czechoslovak official said today. Czechoslovak foreign ministry spokesman Egon Lansky told CSTK that the agreement, which will be in effect until Czechoslovakia's association agreement with the European Community is ratified by the EC parliament, removes customs duties from about 70 per cent of Czechoslovak exports to Europe. "Thanks to the lowered customs duties our goods will also be more competitive", Lansky said.

Lansky said he thought it would be possible for the trade agreement to take effect March 1. He said Czechoslovakia would be willing to wait until new trade agreements are made between the EC and Poland and Hungary if it would benefit the two countries. But he added this was not likely. "This postponement would not help Poland and Hungary, but would be only a symbolic gesture, while it would bring (Czechoslovakia) only financial losses", he said.

Assembly Body Rejects Constitutional Amendment

LD2802154292 Prague CSTK in English 1546 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Prague Feb 27 (CSTK)—The Czechoslovak parliament arbitration committee dealing with an amendment to three sections of the constitution today failed to reach agreement on the most important issues, its chairman Jan Sokol told journalists today. The amendment, newly arranging the relation between the parliament, the president and the government, was voted down February 18 by the Slovak part of the parliament's House of Nations, with only three votes missing for its approval.

"The Slovak side has raised a number of demands shifting the draft amendment... to a confederation model," member of the committee Tomas Kopriva told CSTK about the committee's fourth and last session.

Sokol said the demands presented by representatives of the Democratic Left Party (SDL-former Communists) and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) were very categorical and unacceptable for other parties. He admitted that the amendment will be most likely rejected by the two houses of the parliament at their 21st joint session opening March 3. The arbitration committee will go to the session with two pending questions: whether an agreement between the Czech and Slovak republics on the state's setup should be embedded in the constitution as its basis, and whether constitutional changes should be subject to ratification by the Czech and Slovak regional parliaments.

Carnogursky, Miklosko on Milovy Treaty, 14 March

AU2702122892 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 26 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko and Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky by Dagmar Bombikova and Alena Melicharkova in Bratislava on 25 February: "We Do Not Build on 14 March"]

[Text] We tried to wind up yesterday's stormy debate in the Slovak parliament with interviews with the supreme representatives of the Slovak Republic—Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko and Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky.

[NARODNA OBRODA] How do you assess the parliamentary debate and the adoption of the resolution on the draft treaty on the constitutional setup?

[Miklosko] I consider the adoption of the resolution to be a very constructive step and the only way of bringing the process that started 18 months ago to an end. Of course, the question that arises at this moment is what kind of an end it will be. In my opinion, it is politically exceedingly important that it be a dignified and civilized end. This means exchanging quite specific comments on the draft treaty of Milovy, meeting again, and stating whether an agreement in this electoral period is possible or not.

[NARODNA OBRODA] How will the course of events be influenced, in your opinion, by the possible adoption of the treaty and by the splitting of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]?

[Miklosko] The process of splitting the KDH can no longer be halted in my opinion, regardless of whether the treaty is adopted or not. The split does not result from the view on the treaty but from the view on how to resolve the future state setup. For a part of the KDH, centered around Slovak National Council Deputy Chairman Jan Klepac, the moment has come just now to divide Czechoslovakia and seek other forms of the state setup. The other part of the KDH, represented by KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky, on the other hand, says that such a solution would be hazardous for Slovakia's population at this moment. In my opinion, the only solution is to face this conflict head on in due course, that is, before the elections.

[NARODNA OBRODA] 14 March [the anniversary of the founding of the Slovak Republic on] is drawing near and, most likely, people will be demonstrating outside the parliament once again.

[Miklosko] The people organizing the 14 March celebrations are pursuing their personal aims. They are marching under the banner of some kind of a national program without any justification. March 14 is today a matter for historians. The Slovak National Council assumed a clear position in this regard when it formed a commission of two historical institutes to examine the history of Slovakia in the 20th century. This seems to me to be the proper way of coming to terms with the past. Those who link the idea of Slovak statehood with 14 March 1939 are linking two things that do not correspond to today's reality. When we speak about Slovak statehood today, we speak about the year 1992 when the

world is heading for democracy. Moreover, the manner in which this linking is taking place is undignified. The loudmouths who use and misuse the clergy for their own ends are dragging the church into things that damage it in the eyes of the whole world. I therefore say in all seriousness that these people do not represent anyone except themselves and their problematic views. The sooner the public realizes this, the sooner they will be isolated, and the sooner it will be possible to assert in Slovakia what is called a solution to the national program under contemporary European conditions.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Today's debate in the Slovak National Council actually analyzed the idea of the treaty on the constitutional setup in all its aspects and consequences. How close is your original idea of the treaty, which was actually your proposal, to the way in which the Slovak political scene is approaching this idea at present?

[Carnogursky] This debate in the Slovak National Council plenum comes too late. It took the political parties and movements in Slovakia a long time to assimilate the idea of the treaty as the basis for Czechoslovakia's constitutional setup. However, meanwhile some opposition parties have abandoned the idea of the treaty again so as not to have their hands tied up after the elections. They hope that they may not have to conclude any treaty then.

[NARODNA OBRODA] What will be the fate of this treaty idea, in your opinion? New talks with the Czech National Council are to take place....

[Carnogursky] The framework for talks with the Czech National Council is set out in the Slovak National Council resolution [of 25 February] as well as in the stands of clubs of deputies of political parties in the Slovak National Council and the Czech National Council. It is difficult to say anything about this issue at the moment. As for the treaty itself, when I assess the situation realistically the likelihood that the treaty will be concluded before the elections is small. The nature of mutual relations between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, more than the treaty itself, will therefore become an issue for the election campaign. I am convinced that we will return to the idea of the treaty after the elections. It is possible, however, that this will happen only on the basis of new insight on both sides, the insight that linking the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic by a treaty is the optimal way of linking them and the optimal foundation for both nations. In Slovakia, even the present opposition parties may come to realize this. I hope that we will not return to the treaty again only on the basis of previous tragic experience.

[NARODNA OBRODA] The question of the approaching anniversary of 14 March comes to mind in this context.... There are certain signals suggesting that some groups are planning larger-scale commemorations of this anniversary. What do you think about it?

[Carnogursky] The KDH's political line is not in any way built on the 1939-1945 Slovak Republic. For this reason, we are not going to participate in any rallies. The 14 March 1939 is for us simply an occasion on which to ponder the problems of our history.

Czech Council Official on Slovak Milovy Decision

LD2802192192 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 2100 GMT 25 Feb 92

[Remarks by Czech National Council Deputy Chairman Jan Kalvoda on the resolution adopted by the Slovak Government on the Milovy draft; date not given—recorded]

[Text] What it roughly means is that the position of the Slovak National Council has now shifted several steps backward, from the point of view of the Czech negotiating partner. It returned to the position of before Kromeriz [where the first Czech National Council-Slovak National Council talks were held], it returned back to the base of a state treaty, to the base of casting doubt on Czechoslovakia as a united subject of international law, to the base of casting doubt on the single market and economic space; in other words to issues which each by itself rules out the concept of a united state.

And of course, all this in spite of the fact that they are developing this position by further negotiations. This makes it all relatively very transparent in my opinion and merely reflects the effort to make the Czech side seem unable to conclude the treaty. With due respect however, I must stress that the transparency of this step is so obvious that it cannot, at least I hope so, beguile even a newspaper reader of below average intelligence.

The next step in a situation when opinion is not uniform on either the Czech or the Slovak side will be toward further negotiations. I cannot imagine anybody refusing them. But I also cannot imagine that there would be anything to negotiate.

Goncz on Minorities Rights in Hungary, Romania

LD2902232792 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2200 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] The Romanian minority in Hungary belongs to Romania both from cultural and language points of view, said [President] Arpad Goncz talking to Bucharest radio. The president of the republic emphasized that Hungary respects the language and cultural independence of Romanians in Hungary, their right to self-organization, and their efforts to keep in touch with Romania. This is the realization of the principle of positive discrimination, Arpad Goncz said, adding that he considers the same to be natural in the case of the Magyar minority in Romania. The Hungarian head of state called attention to the possibility that we should not see dangers but values in being different, then Romanians in Hungary and Magyars in Romania could play a significant role in the two countries' rapprochement. [Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian at 2100 GMT on 29 February reports that Hungarian President Arpad Goncz said in his interview on Bucharest Radio that "In eastern Europe there is a danger that minorities can become tools in internal political games in the countries."]

Entz Links Romanian Charges to Elections

AU2802111892 Budapest MTI in English 1453 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] Budapest, 26 February (MTI)—It is fully possible to develop Hungarian-Romanian ties, all the more so as the bilateral basic treaty is currently under preparation, Hungarian Council of Ministers State Secretary Geza Entz said today. Entz, in charge of Hungarians beyond the border, spoke to MTI after he and Defence Minister Lajos Fur had been attacked by Romanian media for their recent statements.

In an address in Miskolc on 14 February, characterizing Hungary's security policy, Fur said: "In the Carpathian basin, the defence of all Hungarians, including those in neighbouring countries, is inseparable from the defence of the Hungarian nation. Our obligation is to help assert and protect the nation's interests solely by legal, diplomatic means."

In an interview in the Hungarian daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on the same day, Entz said "ethnic Hungarians beyond the border form an integral part of the Hungarian nation." Romanian media charges were repeated in a statement by the Romanian Foreign Ministry and a memorandum sent by the Romanian ambassador in Budapest to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

The historic significance of the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty can be compared to that of the French-German treaty, which also opened a new phase in bilateral relations. The treaty should concern the Hungarian and the Romanian nation, by definition including the Hungarian minority in Romania and the Romanian minority in Hungary, Entz said. "Hungary can only sign a basic treaty that guarantees human and minority rights to the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania," he said.

Entz feels this anti-Hungarian campaign is related to the local elections now taking place in Romania. The tone of Romanian charges recalls the Ceausescu-era official documents, he said. Entz quoted the Romanian ambassador in Budapest, memorandum to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, which criticized him of "pursuing political activity beyond the boundaries of official Hungarian-Romanian ties, and abusing Romanian hospitality, during recent unofficial visits there." Romania informed the Hungarian Foreign Ministry thier authorities will not tolerate such acts in future.

Entz said he visited Romania twice last year. He said he went first in May, at the invitation of the Democratic Federation of Hungarians in Romania. While there he held talks with Foreign Affairs State Secretary Teodor Melescanu, Minister Ion Aurel Stoica and National Liberal Party President Radu Campeanu.

The second visit took place in September, at the invitation of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Alba Iulia. All this conforms to both international practice and Romanian regulations, Entz said.

Fur Cancels Bucharest Visit for 'Health Reasons'

LD2802180792 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Defense Minister Lajos Fur cancelled his visit to Bucharest for health reasons. However, the delegations of the two armies will sit down to negotiate. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest:

[Bogdan] It is not known to what extent the fierce and hostile personal attacks by Romanian official, semi-official, and press circles contributed to his illness. However, it is a fact that Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur this afternoon unexpectedly cancelled his visit to Bucharest scheduled for tomorrow. According to a laconic Bucharest radio report the Hungarian defense minister explained his decision alluding to health reasons. At the same time he expressed hope that the good relations between the Romanian and Hungarian armies will continue to develop in the future.

The fact that the meeting between the leaders of the two armed forces scheduled for tomorrow will go ahead despite Lajos Fur's illness is a guarantee for this to some extent. It will take place according to the originally prepared protocol.

The Hungarian delegation will be led by Lieutenant General Antal Annus who, together with Romanian Defense Minister Nicolae Spiroiu, will review in detail the implementation of the agreement concluded between the two armies in 1990. He will also visit a military unit in Brasov and attend a military technology exhibition.

Defense Chief Annus Comments on Ties With Romania

Cooperation Work Plan Signed

LD0103192192 Budapest MTI in English 1810 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, March 1 (MTI)—Hungarian-Romanian military relations are developing in a very good direction. There are regular meetings between senior ministry officials and army leaders, and even commanders of some military units have established ties with one another. The two air defence systems are cooperating successfully and the two chiefs-of-staff have signed a cooperation work plan for this year, Lt. Gen. Antal Annus, state secretary of defence, told MTI in Bucharest on Sunday.

As reported earlier, the state secretary arrived in Bucharest on Saturday to hold talks with Romanian military leaders. (Defence Minister Lajos Fur, who was originally scheduled to head the delegation, has got ill.) Annus attended and addressed the bilateral "Open Skies" symposium, met Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, and held talks with Defence Minister Nicolae Spiroiu.

Annus said that he had not felt any harmful effect of the campaign the Romanian press launched in the wake of Fur's speech in Miskolc on February 14. (Characterising Hungary's security policy, the minister said "the defence of all Hungarians is inseparable from the defence of the Hungarian nation." Misinterpreting the statement, the Romanian Foreign Ministry levelled accusations at the Hungarian government. The accusations were rejected by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on February 25.)

Concerning the two countries' "Open Skies" agreement, Annus said that other states had not yet concluded similar agreements. For this reason, it could be a model for them. Furthermore, it could be a model to be followed in other fields of relations between the two ministries and two armies, Annus said.

Praises 'Good' Defense Ties

LD0203144492 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 2 Mar 92

[Text] Lieutenant General Antal Annus, administrative state secretary at the Defense Ministry, returned from Bucharest yesterday where he was received by the Romanian prime minister. Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur did not take part in the meeting because of his illness. That is why I asked Antal Annus whether certain elements of Lajos Fur's Miskolc speech, which provoked a very sharp reaction in the press of neighboring countries, influenced the atmosphere of the meeting.

[Begin recording] [Annus] I can say unequivocally that they did not. The standpoint is unequivocal. These relations between the defense ministries and the armies are to be developed. We have to take care of them and we must not permit mishearings, misinterpretations, distortions of meaning, and other procedures indicative of different intentions to harm the chances of these relations.

[Announcer] So, what you mean to say is that the meeting took place in a good atmosphere. We have been saying for quite a long time now that Hungarian-Romanian military relations are good. Are they really as good as that?

[Annus] Allow me not to qualify these relations. This is not the main point. These relations are living relations. And up till now, these relations have proved that the leaders of the defense portfolio and the leaders of the armies have been able to discuss those things which they have had to be capable of discussing within the framework of these relations. It is clear that there has been a decided advance in the acquaintance with and understanding of each other's concepts, intentions, and specific situation. In the contacts between leaders at the various levels—and these contacts have by now come into being and are alive also at the level of troop commanders—they are alive in the cooperation of the air defense system, in respect of certain tasks. [sentence as heard] A good example of this is the Open Skies agreement. Other countries have not concluded anything like this before. And there can be other fine examples before us if the will does not weaken.

[Announcer] It was no accident that I asked you just now to qualify the military relations, because, after all, it cannot be said that our foreign affairs and intergovernmental relations are really good. Could these military relations compensate for something?

[Annus] There are good relations. In a certain sense they can also serve as an example. I stress that I know that in other areas problems have arisen which are considerably more complex, which require more time, and which are harder to resolve, that have brought to the surface a series of tensions which were bottled up for decades for reasons that are known. This bottling-up has ceased. If there is no capability for the sides to discuss these things then it will hardly be possible to resolve them, and what is more, it will hardly be possible to resolve them in a European context. [end recording]

UN Peacekeeping Forces for SFRY Granted Transit

LD2802100992 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] The Hungarian Government agrees to UN peacekeeping forces passing through our country to the southern Slav republics, and UN units can also use our air space, government spokesman Balazs Laszlo states. He added that in accordance with the Constitution, a parliamentary submission has been prepared for authorization of their transit. The government has also decided that an interministry commission will be created, headed by the foreign minister, to conduct the UN troops' transit.

Agreement Reached on Return of Croatian Refugees

LD0103115492 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] An agreement has been concluded in Budapest on the repatriation of Croatian refugees who have been staying in Hungary. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] reported in Geneva about the agreement on the fate of 35,000 refugees. The realization of the agreement signed by Hungarian, Croatian, and UN officials depends on the Blue Berets's arrival in Croatia. Some 19,000 refugees have also asked the UNHCR for help to return home. The international body has to make sure before the repatriation that every refugee returns to his homeland voluntarily.

Antall Write CSFR's Calfa Over Bos Dam Issue

LD0103114792 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] In Prague talks between the Hungarian and CSFR parliamentary committees regarding the Bos dam have not finished yet. Originally the talks were planned to be finished by the afternoon.

In related news, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's letter to Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa has been made public. The Hungarian politician repeats the arguments serving as the basis for Hungary's stop to the construction. Among the reasons Antall states as the most important argument that expected ecological risks have not been revealed. In Hungary's opinion, the Bos dam would irredeemably harm the most important drinking water basis of Hungary and the CSFR. For this reason Budapest urges forming a trilateral common committee with the involvement of international experts. During the examinations Czechoslovakia should also suspend the construction works, failing which the Hungarian Government will have no other choice but to terminate the agreement, writes Jozsef Antall.

Assembly Subcommittee Agreement on Radio, TV

LD2802214392 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] In the National Assembly's press subcommittee, the government party and opposition deputies have, for the most part, reached a common denominator that public service . adio and television should operate in the form of a so-called constitutional foundation [koezjogi alapitvany]. They also agreed that the institutions of mass information, via the share companies created by them, should be able also to pursue economic activities. This is necessary, if only because it is not possible to operate satisfactorily the two institutions solely out of subscription charges and the decreasing budgetary support. The government and the opposition are of the same opinion that it is necessary to demarcate public service and commercial radio and television.

Walesa Answers Questions on Current Events

LD0103221592 Warsaw PAP in English 2136 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 1—President Lech Walesa took part in a BBC live programme "It's Your World" on Sunday [1 March] during which he answered the listeners' questions as he spoke from his home city of Gdansk.

The president was asked about 20 questions coming from Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Japan, Turkey, Belgium, and Israel. The main topics referred to included the role of the church in Poland, EC membership, strikes in Poland, the role of the media, and slow prosecution of crimes. President Walesa stressed while he answered the questions that there was no departure from economic reforms, market economy, or pluralism in Poland, and reforms have not been slowed down.

Commenting on a listener's suggestion that Polish Parliament might be dissolved, the president said that democracy offers a variety of solutions, not necessarily dissolving the Diet. As one of such solutions, perfectly compatible with democracy, the president mentioned suspension of plenary debates and continuation of parliamentary work by deputy committees.

Answering a question from Madrid, Walesa replied that the church in Poland has always been with its nation and served it. Being a major force in Poland, the church must have an insight into the backstage of politics, economy, and other spheres, though it should not convert into a political party and should not rule.

Referring to his expected visit to Russia, President Walesa said he should have gone there long ago but he and President Boris Yeltsin have both had so much to do at home that they had no time for some external activities. He added that there was no need for an immediate meeting, while sooner or later both countries will make excellent partners because "it's closer from Warsaw to Moscow than to New York," as he put it.

One of the president's reflection was that at the age of computers democracy is a must but it must have a support from some watchdog and guarantor, such as "a president, king, or emperor," which is required to ensure continuity and surety.

After the programme the president took part in a press conference. Asked whether he fears to be forced, against his will, to leave the political scene, Lech Walesa replied: "I feel like doing it long ago and I would do it with great pleasure," but for now he pleaded to "fight to protect democracy."

Walesa, Olszewski Accuse Media of Manipulation

LD2802114992 Warsaw PAP in English 2127 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 27—President Lech Walesa received Thursday [27 February] Prime Minister Jan Olszewski to discuss Poland's present situation in the context of the draft budget law as well as nominations to the key posts in central state offices. Premier Olszewski stressed during the meeting that appointment of the president of the National Bank of Poland should take place urgently as this would allow to continue the process of reforms. Both the president and the premier criticised the mass media for presenting the reforms and the economic situation of the state in a way suggesting destabilization of social life. They accused the media of manipulation and disinformation.

Walesa Says Government Needs Strengthening

LD2802155792 Warsaw PAP in English 1807 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 27—President Lech Walesa told members of the parliamentary caucus of the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN) during a meeting Thursday [27 February] that he would like every Polish organization to have the possibility of working for Poland in the name of supreme goals. "It would be wrong to have any underground opposition in Poland," he stressed.

The president also voiced a need for the broadening of the government coalition stating that "the government has to be strengthened by new arrengements". Asked for his opinion about the Centre Alliance (PC) Walesa replied by saying that "either they change or they will be changed".

According to Lech Walesa the only possible way out of the present economic crisis was by encouraging enterprise which, the president said, he had tried to do by proposing 100-million [currency not specified] loans for all Polish citizen. "Poland would be in a different situation had Walesa's proposal been accepted," he said.

Referring to opinions presented by some KPN deputies that integration with Europe may threaten Poland's sovereignty President Walesa said that integration strivings required some general plan defining which branches of national economy should be privatized, which may be wholly or partly conveyed to foreign capital and which ought to remain in the hands of the state. "Such solution would ensure that Poland is not bought out by foreign capital", the president said.

The president thanked KPN MPs [member of parliament] for giving their support to his candidate for the post of the chairman of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) Ms Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, and declared he would back a possible draft banking law prepared by the KPN and designed to counteract corruption and economic scandals.

Walesa Willing To Rebuild Political Alignment

LD2902221392 Warsaw PAP in English 1501 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 28—President Lech Walesa did not rule out that he would accept an invitation from the Democratic Union (UD) "to build political alignment from scratch." The president made the statement during a meeting with the editorial staff of the "SPOTKANIA" weekly Friday [28 February].

The president said that he did not rule out that perhaps he would have to make this move. The president termed Poland's economic condition as the "stability of a drowning man." According to Walesa, the situation could be changed by a 20-year loan from the state treasury amounting to one billion zlotys (about 75,000 dollars) for every citizen for private investments. The president said he did not believe political elites but he believed Polish society. Lech Walesa said also that after the latest appointments at the National Defence Ministry he and the prime minister agreed to "closely cooperate in these issues in the future."

Walesa States Position on Left, Martial Law

AU2802144792 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 24 Feb 92 p 3

["ML" report: "Secular Absolution"]

[Text] As we already reported, President Lech Walesa met the editorial staff of POLITYKA on 19 February. The meeting took place behind closed doors. However, we managed to get some information on what was discussed from the paper's editor in chief, Jan Bijak. The president's position on the left and martial law, which were issues raised by the paper's staff, were of particular interest to us. Below is a passage from the president's speech dealing with those very issues:

"The direction has been decided, and there should now be a struggle that is not against, but about something, and it should be about what Poland should be like, about how it should be created, and about how a particular chapter marked by a political struggle should be closed. I have to come to you, because I want absolution to be dispensed for that period, which has placed us in this situation. Without absolution for the 95 percent who made minor mistakes, the mistakes that everyone made, there will be no work that will proceed in a single direction, and that is why I am here talking to you today and that is why I am off to the OPZZ [National Trade Union Confederation] on Friday [28 February]. It will be another instance of sacrilege, but the aim is the one that I have mentioned. I was pleased that the Sejm addressed the issue of responsibility and martial law, but I thought that it was done to in order to grant absolution, to say that there were those who made the decisions, those who committed crimes, and then all the rest. Those who were responsible for making decisions need some time to shed the habits acquired under the old system and the for the time being they cannot hold positions of authority. Some must be held to account for the crimes that they committed, but as for all the rest, they must get down to work. The faster they do that, the faster we will make use of a historic opportunity. As long as there is no absolution, there will be nothing but entreaties, and we will never get out of the present situation. I want there to be absolution, so that the job of constructing can proceed forward.

"When I assess martial law, I find that what I dislike about it most is that its effects extended to the lowest units, to the factories, which is where I was. Anyone who wanted to be a foreman had to sign up as a member of the OPZZ. The director who drank, he was also put in the OPZZ. Many people took that course by chance, because that is what their lives and careers dictated. That was also the greatest loss that Poland suffered, and we cannot seem to get that out of the way now. It is the little things that are stopping us from getting everything straight, because they keep being dragged up and people are constantly being reminded of them. That is why there has to be absolution, and we have to say, it is tough, but such things did take place, but to achieve victory, what divided us in the past should no longer divide us.

"Political leaders should not look at where someone comes from. Then, if someone is a criminal, then political leaders should hold him to account. However, 95 percent or more are not criminals, but weak people, and we should stop looking in the wrong direction. The prosecutor's office and militia should check on who was doing what where. That should then be considered by a Sejm body, but what we should say to the rest is that we are making a fresh start, the past is a burden and we are not going back to look at documents, and let's be ourselves now. If you are a socialist, then be a socialist, if you are a Christian, then be a Christian, and start looking for your right place. If that does not happen, then we will not move on, and will carry on confusing ideas and grievances. Take the example of the OPZZ, its heyday is over, what was taken has to be returned, and now is not the time for quarrels, or if there are quarrels, then they should be held elsewhere. It is not a question of toppling the OPZZ, but simply of competing, of who can offer better representation, so it is about a struggle at all levels, but in a different context, not that old context, which should be closed now."

Walesa Believes Army Should Be Part of NATO

LD2802125392 Warsaw PAP in English 1129 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 28—President Lech Walesa reassured officers in the Polish Army that they need not worry about purges or mass reductions in the Armed Forces. In an interview with the Army daily, "POLSKA ZBROJNA" published on Friday [28 February] he denied that the reforms in the Army were being conducted too slowly and stressed that "the Army does not

need a revolution but planned activity". "The Army is not a game of Lego", he added.

The president stressed that Poland wanted to be a full member of a changed NATO. In the past NATO had been "a bloc opposed to another bloc. It was confrontational, defensive and protective. But when one bloc is eliminated then the second bloc is pointless and has to find other solutions. However it is impermissible to allow such a useful institution to collapse", said the president adding that NATO had to adapt itself to "the new tasks which confront humanity, states and the world".

The Polish Army also had to change since "the communist regime treated it as the mainstay of the system. There were instances where its power was used and the soldiers had to obey the orders of their commanders whether they wanted to or not". Today the task was "to defend the sovereignty and security of a democratic state".

Walesa thought the main dangers came from the economic situation, local conflicts in neighbouring countries and the "wave of migrants from the East, which may destabilise the country".

In the president's view, the Army ought to be "mainly professional, based on voluntary enlistment" and the real commander of the Armed Forces ought to be the president. Commenting on the reported conflict between himself and Defence Minister Jan Parys, Walesa stated that the conflict did not exist being merely a misunderstanding based on the fact that Parys had not been involved in formulating defence policy since he had just taken up his post.

Andrzej Olechowski Appointed Finance Minister

LD2802130992

[Editorial Report] Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish at 1145 GMT on 28 February, during a live relay of proceedings at the Sejm session, describes voting on two motions submitted by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jan Olszewski on recalling Finance Minister Karol Lutkowski and the appointment of a new finance minister, Andrzej Olechowski. An unidentified announcer points out that the motions were sent to the Sejm Economic, Budget and Finance Commission, which assessed Andrzej Olechowski's nomination positively. The announcer says the voting is as follows:

"On the recall of Karol Lutkowski as finance minister: taking part—277; absolute majority—139; in favor, 267; against, nil; abstentions, 10. "On the appointment of Andrzej Olechowski as finance minister: taking part—301; absolute majority, 151; in favor, 198; against, 48; abstentions, 55. "Karol Lutkowski is thus recalled from the post of minister of finance, and Andrzej Olechowski is appointed to this post."

Senate Approves Kaczysnki as NIK President

LD2802165292 Warsaw PAP in English 2245 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 27—The Senate accepted on Thursday [27 February] Lech Kaczynski as the new president of the Supreme Board of Inspection (NIK) with 62 votes for, 23 against and 7 abstentions. Kaczynski was elected NIK president by the Sejm, or Lower House, on February 14. He promised senators to be impartial at his post and to appoint people not affiliated to any major parties to NIK regional structures. "The NIK is a state body in which relatively few personnel changes have taken place. People who joined the (now defunct) Communist Party before 1956 dominate in it. This criterion must not be decisive but a change in mentality and the type of knowledge dating back to the period of planned economy is needed," Kaczynski stated.

Newspaper Criticizes Sikorski's Appointment

LD2602164292 Warsaw PAP in English 1424 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 26—Bad things seem to take place in Poland as British citizen, representing the interests of big international capital in Poland, was appointed national defence deputy minister, one of the highest posts, GAZETA WYBORCZA said. Perhaps Radek Sikorski is an excellent strategist and a brilliant politician but, firstly, Poles do not know anything about this and, secondly, will he as loyal subject of the English Queen be equally loyal citizen of Poland when he gains access to the strictest state secrets?

Polish public opinion learns this appointment at first from leaks from the British press (THE OBSERVER dated February 16, 1992) and the authorities of the Defence Ministry plays at hide-and-seek with journalists throughout the week, sending journalists to get reports from its press spokesman who cannot say anything. By taking such steps, the government and the prime minister ignored public opinion and did not deem it proper to explain to it in any way the motives of appointing exactly this person to the post of deputy defence minister. Is this exactly the new style of information and openness declared by Prime Minister Olszewski, GAZETA WYBORCZA asks.

Liberal Congress Criticizes Government Program

AU2702123892 Warsaw PAP in English 1953 GMT 23 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 23—The Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) criticized on Sunday [1 March] the guidelines of the government socioeconomic policy for 1992, stating they were too general, lacked instruments to boost investment and exports, and disregarded the role of the central bank and the principles of a sound monetary policy. Instead of a fresh proposal to solve the key problem of the Polish economy, connected with the low

efficiency and poor ability of state-run enterprises to adapt to market conditions, these enterprises are being offered greater protection against foreign competition, an unclear system of tax reductions, and more money, the liberals said in a statement.

In a discussion on their attitude to Jan Olszewski's cabinet, the liberals ruled out any actions that would undermine the government but pointed to some of its incompetent moves and criticised its structural and personnel decisions. But according to KLD leader Donald Tusk, a change of the government would be expedient only in case of a 100 percent certainty that a majority parliamentary coalition could be formed and a better economic programme endorsed.

The Liberal Democratic Congress, which ended its two-day convention on Sunday, took a sceptical approach to the KLD rule stating that Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's year as prime minister was a year of lost chance to put the party's principles into effect. The congress underlined that the party should regain its identity and pointed to the need to firmly oppose stereotypes whereby liberalism means financial and economic fraud.

In a resolution the liberals confirmed their intention to build a democratic capitalism and a neutral, tolerant state based on the principles of private ownership and integrated with the European Communities.

Closing the debates Donald Tusk optimistically stated that the liberals were certain to start winning again as they were convinced they fought for issues crucial for Poland. We are not a lobby but a political party facing the great task of transforming Poland. Liberalism is a chance for Poland, he said.

Solidarity Wants Economic Assumptions Reexamined

LD2802133692 Warsaw PAP in English 1817 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 26—Deputy chairman of the "Solidarity" parliamentary floor group Jan Rulewski said, after a Wednesday meeting with Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, that his caucus wants the government assumptions of the socio-economic policy to be reexamined by Sejm committees. According to Rulewski, during the Wednesday meeting the "Solidarity" caucus deputies tried to learn about concrete economic solutions, especially those related to financial and social policy.

Both sides discussed also the need to reach a broad concensus on the basic lines of the future policy. Commenting on the matter, government spokesman Marcin Gugulski said he would like to avoid expressing official optimism but he hoped the issue would be approached seriously by all sides. Gugulski was also optimistic about the Sejm's approval for the government assumptions and confirmed that the government was open to all suggestions, if not contradictory to the programme's general lines.

Democratic Union Against Government Assumptions

LD2802114492 Warsaw PAP in English 2100 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 27—The Democratic Union (UD) thinks there are no grounds to continue Sejm work on the socioeconomic assumptions presented by the government, says a communique on a meeting of the UD presidium held Thursday [27 February], conveyed to PAP.

The UD presidium deemed antimarket terms used by the prime minister in his Sejm address the most highly alarming phenomenon. The assumptions presented by the government point to the absence of the clearly defined economic concept. Passivity and the lack of abilities to make decisions can be observed in economic ministries and the steps and statements by the heads of such key political ministries as the national defence and the interior minstries are an evidence of irresponsibility. This means advancing process of disintegration of the state.

"It is imperative to start consultations between all Sejm groupings, together with the president, on a new, coherent and effective concept to rule the state. Such a concept should be built on the basis of constitutional principles of parliamentary democracy," the communique says.

Party Political Sympathies of Press Reviewed

AU2802113892 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 24 Feb 92 p 1

[Artur Siedlarek article: "Party Mouthpieces"]

[Text] Political pluralism has prompted parties to seek "appropriate," in other words, extensive coverage for politics in the mass media.

When the Christian-National Union [ZChN] began to matter, that is, after the recent parliamentary elections, the press titles that had previously belonged to the "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" Workers' Cooperative Publishing House had already long been snatched up by groupings that had achieved success sooner.

In the light of this situation, the ZChN could only count on the largess of those media instruments that were controlled by others or create its own press organs. A party that had only recently become influential could not be wealthy and that is surely why it had to choose the first option, at least temporarily. However, the Christian-national party's activists have been very lucky, because thanks to their exceptionally bold ideas, they have managed to arouse the widespread and relatively enduring interest of the mass media and not just that of the traditionally Catholic media. That does not, of course, satisfy the appetites of those who want to be the salvation of the world. This explains why the ZChN, which now occupies a strong position in the government,

has launched an intense effort to give RZECZPOSPOLITA a more "pro-government" character. If this offensive of theirs meets with success, the paper will shortly be able to speak with a just Christian, national voice.

The Center Accord, which was almost the presidential party for a time, also possesses significant influence in government circles and has succeeded in looking after its interests. The Center Accord received EXPRESS WIECZORNY, one of the country's most popular papers, from the "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" Workers' Cooperative Publishing House Liquidation Commission. Thanks to the fact that it advanced its interests at a politically opportune time, the Center Accord could even allow itself to publish a weekly of its own entitled CENTRUM for a time. The publisher of the weekly recently announced that the publication would have to fold, because it was rapidly sinking further and further into the red. It is difficult to accurately gauge the Center Accord's influence on the regional press, but it is known that its interests are represented not at all badly by the recently established "independent" NOWY SWIAT, which aims to be a nationwide daily.

Former leading figures in the Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Congress who held office have displayed less foresight than the Center Accord's activists. While in power, they did not ensure that their groupings obtained party organs and now they must rely on old arrangements among friends. GAZETA WYBORCZA is, of course, widely regarded as the Democratic Union's newspaper. Officially, however, that is denied by both the party's activists and the newspaper's editorial staff. The Democratic Union also features prominently in ZYCIE WARSZAWY, although in this case, it is the right-wing section of the party that enjoys more success.

It is harder to identify those newspaper columns in which Liberal Democratic Congress activists most frequently present their views. While they were in office, RZECZPOSPOLITA consistently printed their views. The party's views now appear in various places whenever an opportunity arises.

The KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] has never had much luck with the press, although fate has provided it with unique opportunities. K. Krol, the failed editor in chief of the KPN's OPINII, was to have become the editor in chief of SZTANDAR MLODYCH, but the paper's journalists firmly rejected the liquidation commission's decision, and they were right to. In less than a year, the KPN caused RAZEM, a paper that had at one time prospered, to run up a loss of 5 billion zlotys. Currently, the KPN is managing perfectly well without a paper of its own (it has a stake in MOTOR) and believes that it is even the darling of the press.

The Union of Real Politics [UPR] owes everything to its members and sympathizers. NAJWYZSZY CZAS! is owned by the Liberal Publishing House, that is, by J. Korwin-Mikke himself and the quarterly STANCZYK is published by UPR Vice President K. Bakowski. In addition, there are said to be several smaller regional publications and articles by the party's leading members appear in WPROST and the hospitable (for the right) NOWY SWIAT.

The Democratic Party has recently almost entirely disappeared from the political scene and would surely have been forgotten by now were it not for the latest commotion surrounding KURIER POLSKI.

Domestic Market Reacts Calmly to Devaluation

LD2802144392 Warsaw PAP in English 2127 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 26—Home market seems to have reacted calmly to the 12 percent devaluation of the Polish zloty as of February 26. At private exchange desks prices for the dollar ranged on Wednesday [26 February] between 12,700 and 12,900 at buying and between 13,120 and 13,300 at selling, that is less than the official exchange rate. There were more people wanting to sell dollars than to buy them. Prices for consumer goods have remained at the unchanged level so far, but shop owners expect their increase by 10 to 15 percent with new deliveries. Also the number of customers in shops on Wednesday was as usual although a slightly greater demand for electric and electronic devices was noted. Spokesman for the CPN fuel distributor Ryszard Gluszczyk said there was no decision yet to raise the prices for fuels but it might be expected shortly as, due to the devaluation, Polish refineries will have to pay more for purchases of crude oil abroad.

Inflationary Effect Criticized

AU2802144192 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 26 Feb 92 p 1

[Ernest Skalski commentary]

[Text] Although the principles of government economic policy have not even been discussed by the Sejm yet, they have already been violated by the government. It is true that the government envisaged promoting exports in a variety ways, but manipulating exchange rates was not among them. All that was announced was a gradual, cautious increase in the exchange rate for the dollar; what was described as a creeping increase. That is why the recent decision to devalue the zloty so substantially has come as a great surprise.

Exports can be promoted in a variety of ways. The most desirable are good marketing, a good product, and low production costs. To devalue one's own currency is a short-term method. It is true that for the foreign buyer, our goods will become cheaper, and thus more accessible and more attractive, but at the same time, for us, imports will become more expensive. This not only applies to consumer goods, whose imports the government would like to curb, but to all goods. Imports for investment needs, investment being something that the government

also wants to promote, will become more expensive too, as will all production inputs, including the basic energy source, liquid fuel. In a word, there is a surge in inflation in store for us.

The document on economic policy principles talked about overcoming the recession without increasing inflation. That the recession will be overcome still remains highly doubtful, but that inflation will increase is certain.

School Strikes Reported Throughout Country

LD2802182192 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1615 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Excerpts] This is not playing truant, this is a strike. The organizer of the national Polish action is the Union of Polish Teachers [ZNP]. The National Education Branch of Solidarity has detached itself from the ZNP action, and the Ministry of National Education is quite simply enraged by the teachers' protests. [passage omitted]

In Warsaw, 80 percent of the schools went on strike. There were no lessons in the Batory and Rejtan Schools. In Sempolowska School the strike was supported by both union and nonunion staff. All the schools in the municipal parishes, apart from Lomianki and Raszyn, went on strike.

In the Wroclaw area, there are 379 schools and 198 went on strike. In the Wroclaw Fabrycz.y district the ZNP action was supported by Solidarity. In Katy Wroclawskie, not a single one of the 700 pupils at elementary school in which all the teachers were on strike turned up. No lessons were held in every third school in Rzeszow. In the voivodship, 70 percent of schools were on strike. In many cases individual members of Solidarity joined the strike. Rzeszow teachers are angry with journalists for reporting the causes of the strike poorly.

In the Szczecin area, the strike action started at 0730. The teachers councils decided whether to join the strike. Ninety percent of the schools were on strike. Children who had no care at home were looked after by teachers. In the Poznan area, teachers in every fourth school supported the strike and that is why 170 schools were empty. In some, the protest was restricted to putting banners out on buildings. Many teachers did not take any pay for lessons given today. That was their form of protest.

The Krakow school superintendent's office has estimated that 40 percent of schools went on strike. ZNP [word indistinct] 70 percent. Thirteen vocational schools out 48 took part in the strike. Thirty-nine primary schools also went on strike. The Gdansk school superintendent's office estimated that nearly 70 percent of the schools took part in the strike. The ZNP claims the figure was over 70 percent. In every fourth school lessons were held normally because the majority of teachers are Solidarity members.

TV Programs To Begin New Format 2 Mar

LD0103223692 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Excerpts] The First and the Second television program will be in a new form from tomorrow. New titles will emerge, some will disappear, and a few will change their broadcasting hours.

The biggest changes are in the social and political journalism programs. The journalism programs' studio of the First program will be from Tuesday to Friday at around 2200. Among other programs there will be: On Tuesday—Letters on Economy, The Matter for the Reporter, or Always after 2100; on Wednesday—Reflection, and afterward Talks With Nicodemus, Interpretations, and It's Not Fair. However, the programs In the Sejm and Senate, and Journalists reveal will disappear. [passage omitted]

The changes also concern our program. The morning edition of news from Tuesday to Saturday will be at 0800 GMT; noon edition—on Mondays at 1330, and from Tuesday to Saturday at 1200. The main edition will be at 1930. The evening news will also be regular at 2245. [passage omitted] Teleexpress as always at 1715, but the latest edition of the BBC news will disappear.

Difficulties With Russian Gas Supplies Examined

PM0203141792 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 19 Feb 92 p 1

["Hen" article: "Supply Level Thirteen: Turned-off Tap Was To Be Expected—Gas in Exchange for Coal, Medicines, and Food—Government Still in Negotiations"]

[Text] According to the graduation rating at the State Gas Distribution Board [PDG], gas supply level 16 is the lowest on the scale. If this level were to be officially imposed, the whole of industry would be deprived of gas supplies, while municipal and domestic consumers would have to manage with a severely reduced supply. Fortunately, it has not come to that yet. However, by mid-January this year the PDG already imposed gas supply level 13. For several days most industrial enterprises—except for just a few special cases—were receiving as little as one-fourth of their gas supply requirement. They all found this situation profoundly disturbing.

However, such a development was to be expected, because already in September last year the Russian supplier—or, to be precise, the Gazprom concern—announced that supplies of Russian gas to Poland in 1992 would be reduced to 4.5 billion cubic meters—that is, only the basic volume contracted in agreements with Poland that has been negotiated on the strength of our participation in the construction of the Yamburg and Orenburg pipelines. Last year total gas imports from Russia amounted to 7.1 billion cubic meters—that is, 1 billion cubic meters less than the amount contracted. However, the lower supply was the result of our own

lower domestic requirement. In any case, the Russian partner was then ready to meet his obligations according to the original agreement.

Compared to December deliveries, from 1 January this year gas deliveries have been significantly reduced, which is consistent with Gazprom's earlier announcement that their annual quota of gas supplies to Poland will be cut down to 4.5 billion cubic meters. So we cannot really claim that the gas tap has been turned off unexpectedly. It is understandable that everyone will look after their own interests first. Since there has been a tremendous decrease in coal and petroleum extraction in Russia, demand for gas has grown very considerably. However, in 1991 gas extraction was lower than planned for the first time. Consequently, after assessing their own domestic requirements and their long-standing contractual obligations to West European countries (annually some 50 billion cubic meters are supplied there from Russia), the Russians found that there was not much gas left to export. Cuts in deliveries were applied not only to Poland but also the other countries of the former CEMA except for Czechoslovakia, which, owing to transit charges (since the gas pipeline supplying West Europe passes through that country), still receives regular and unaltered deliveries of Russian gas.

From early December last year negotiations between representatives of Poland's Weglokoks and Russia's Gazeksport trading agencies have been conducted in Moscow. They should be concluded with a contract agreement specifying the size of deliveries to be made this year as well as the prices and the terms of payment. At the same time negotiations between the respective governments were held in Warsaw. These negotiations were finalized 24 December last year in a signed agreement whereby the Russian side undertook to sell us 8.1 billion cubic meters of gas in return for deliveries of Polish coal, coke, sulfur, medicines, and food products.

As we soon found out, this commitment was no better than a promise to give us a piece of pie in the sky. This is because by now in Russia too the producers themselves—that is, the Gazprom company—have a decisive say in where they want to sell their gas, and they have concluded that the government agreement is not feasible. The situation has remained unchanged despite the visit to Moscow earlier this year by Minister Adam Glapinski, head of the government's foreign economic cooperation sector, who obtained from the Russian side a promise to increase deliveries to the level of 6.6 billion cubic meters this year, and also despite negotiations with the Russian ambassador in Warsaw. Russian gas continues to be delivered at the same rate as in January this year. We owe the fact that the PDG has not yet tightened its official gas supply restrictions mainly to the mild weather, which has meant that the requirements of the domestic and municipal consumers are lower than expected.

Before the end of this week a Polish government delegation will travel to Moscow to negotiate an increase in Russian gas deliveries above the 4.5 billion cubic meters. According to Weglokoks commercial dealers, there are some hopes for increasing the imports, though it is debatable whether the amounts we eventually negotiate will cover the national requirements in full.

Options for Linking Uznam to Mainland Discussed

PM2802115492 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 10 Feb 92 pp 1-2

["JEZ" report: "Danes Want To Tie Swinoujscie to Mainland: Tunnel or Bridge?—Sole Control of Ferry Crossing—Tickets at 200,000 Zloty a Head"]

[Text] "We must make up our minds: Either we link Swinoujscie with the mainland or the Germans will snatch it from us." This was the most extreme opinion I heard during my visit to the island of Uznam. Unfortunately, this view is not altogether groundless. The city has virtually exhausted its capacity for development, and unless it is given a new transport connection network, it will either die away or turn to partners who can offer it better treatment and new prospects. Even today the Mecklemburg authorities are proposing to carry out a substantial scheme whereby Swinoujscie should constitute the terminal station in a projected railroad line linking Berlin and Volgast with our own "pearl of the Baltic."

According to our plans, the projected new border crossing which the Germans have long striven to establish at Kaminke must not under any circumstances be linked with Swinoujscie via a new highway continuing across the border from Germany. This means that the only open traffic route to and from Swinoujscie would be to the South, and that the city could be reached only on foot—provided, of course, that the already overloaded ferry boats are able to cope with increased passenger intake.

So much for the pessimistic projections. Now let us announce the latest and more promising development on the Swinoujscie front. The authorities responded with much interest to a recent proposal by two Danish companies offering to link Swinoujscie with the mainland by means of a fixed crossing. The options considered are a tunnel, a drawbridge, or a "high-rise" bridge. There is a choice of two possible sites: one placed close to the ferry boat harbor currently under construction, and the other several kilometers further south. In the case of the first option, only a drawbridge or a tunnel would be feasible.

Even this most cursory information makes it obvious that the planned fixed crossing, as opposed to the present ferry boat crossing, will make the Swinoujscians' route to the mainland considerably longer, even to the point of making it necessary to commission additional bus services to carry passengers from the crossing point to the "Odra" Plant or the Marine Repair Shipyard. In any case, if the project is to be realized, it will require major changes in the city's entire infrastructure—not just the

access road network. Who can tell whether such changes would not, for example, clash with those for the construction of the ferry boat harbor?

The argument in favor of the Danish offer (incidentally, the Hoejgaardand Schultz company built the city of Gdynia for us before World War II) is that the Danes are prepared to invest ready money into the construction of the fixed crossing, and that they can be relied on for a prompt execution of the project. There are, however, several reservations concerning their proposal. For instance, not only do they expect to own the lease on the crossing for 20 years following the project's completion, but they also demand 20 years of monopoly rights on the service provided thereby. This precludes the construction of any other crossing between Swinoujscie and the mainland over that period of time. Even today it seems that this condition stipulated by the Danes is wholly unacceptable. The more so as, at today's rates, the toll fees for the use of the future tunnel or bridge would range from 50,000 zlotys [Z] per person crossing on foot to Z100,000-200,000 per vehicle. In the circumstances, Swinoujscie authorities would have to subsidize the crossing fees for its citizens. The current funds allocated by the ministry for this purpose amount to Z40 billion. However, it is unrealistic to expect that this level of subsidy will be maintained in future. The city or, worse, individual enterprises would have to allocate additional funds to subsidize employees' bus transport to and from work places, which at today's rates would come to a monthly minimum of Z1.4 million per person. Could Swinoujscie afford this kind of expense? Even with the assumption that the city would enter into joint venture with the Danish investors and draw profits from the tunnel or drawbridge crossing venture?

Despite the above reservations, the Swinoujscie City Council continues to vest great hopes in the proposed partnership with the Danes. After all, whichever way you calculate the costs, the construction of a new ferry boat harbor will sink at least Z300 billion, and a fixed crossing (according to calculations made on the basis of nine other blueprints submitted for this project) could cost about Z1 trillion. Therefore they are justified to ask the question: Shall we spend less and invest in a temporary solution? Or spend more and solve the problem once and for all? On 14 February the question of the Danish proposal for the Swinoujscie-mainland crossing will be debated at the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economy.

German Border Cooperation Zone Plan Viewed

PM2802161292 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish 10 Feb 92 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Unacceptable: Excerpts From Prime Minister's Reply to Sejm Deputy Szmajdzinski's Parliamentary Question on German Proposal To Establish 'Odra Zone' Economic Region"]

[Text] In July 1991, in Warsaw, on behalf of the authorities of Brandenburg Land and Berlin, Brandenburg Prime Minister Manfred Stolpe presented Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki, Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski, and the secretary of state at the Central Planning Administration [CUP] K. Szwarc, with an extensive document containing a proposal to establish a preferential economic zone on both sides of the German-Polish state border, to be named "Oderraum" (Nadodrze) [Odra Zone].

The proposed preferential zone would extend 100 km into Polish territory and 50 km into German territory and comprise five Polish voivodships (that is, the four voivodships situated along the border and Legnica Voivodship) and several dozen kreise [counties] in the laender of Mecklemburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, and Saxony, inhabited by approximately 2.6 million people on the Polish side and some 2.3 million on the German side.

The core of the concept is the proposal to establish a Polish-German Development Bank. The projected bank would be set up by the governments of Poland and Germany and its aim would be to realize the development strategy in the proposed zone. The strategy in question would be drawn up by a Polish-German team comprising representatives of relevant Polish ministries and voivodships and also representatives of relevant FRG ministries, the three laender along the border, and Berlin authorities. The bank would not hold a monopoly position; it would finance only those ventures for which no other funding sources could be found. The principles of the regional development strategy would be passed on to the bank, which would then implement it on the basis of applied economic criteria.

The main aims of the bank would be as follows:

—to finance private investment through the granting of loans, purchases of shares in enterprises, and loans for the development of infrastructure;

—to offer advisory and technical services.

In addition, the bank would seek out potential outside investors (mainly in the FRG and Europe, but also in the United States, considering the "considerable interest in Poland" shown by that country), assess proposed investment projects, and initiate those which it deems feasible.

The bank's main shareholders would be the Polish and German Governments and—possibly—the European Investment Bank. The authors of the project leave the question of allowing private banks access to the shareholding scheme to be considered at a later date.

According to the proposal, the bank would hold at its disposal an initial capital of 500 million German marks [DM], of which DM100 million would be deposited by the two governments (70 percent by the FRG and 30 percent by Poland) and, possibly, other shareholders (for example, Scandinavian), while the remaining DM400

million would be guaranteed by the shareholders. This amount could then be borrowed in the private finance market. The bank could grant loans and purchase shares to the total value of DM500 million.

The bank's highest decision-making body would be the board of directors. The votes within the board of directors would be proportional to the capital assets contributed by the respective shareholders.

The proposed concept of assisting the economic development of the Odra Zone was the subject of consultations within the framework of the Polish-German Inter-Government Commission For Regional and Border Cooperation.

On 4 September 1991 a press conference devoted to the subject was organized by K. Szwarc, secretary of state at the CUP and Poland's delegate to the commission.

On 25 September the proposal was discussed at an intersectoral conference attended by representatives of the top executive echelons at the Council of Ministers Office, the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Polish National Bank, the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation, the CUP, and the voivodas of the five voivodships that would be included in the project (Szczecin, Gorzow, Zielona Gora, Jelenia Gora, and Legnica.) In addition, the chef of the Polish Army General Staff sent in his assessment of the German proposal.

The Polish side presented its position on the proposal at the second session of the Polish-German Inter-Government Commission, which was held 28-29 October 1991. In the assessment, the Poles conceded that the proposal indeed sets out to confront a number of existing problems. However, they also presented substantial criticism of many aspects of the proposed solutions. Many of these solutions are simply unacceptable to the Polish side (for example, the establishment of a bank in which the FRG would command a majority vote both on the board of directors and on the board of governors, the setting up of a major German investment project for the construction of hotel and tourist facilities in the Polish part of the island of Uznam, and so on.) It was stressed that the graphic presentation of the projected scheme for regional cooperation (the map of the preferential economic zone and the unclear criteria of the zone's territorial extent on the Polish side) caused considerable public unease and criticism.

On the other hand, it was also stressed that the Polish side was interested in finding additional resources for financing development in the border zone, either through financial operations of a joint bank or through cooperation between two existing banks, the German Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau and the Polish Development Bank. This question is currently under consideration. It has been decided that, once the banks involved have arrived at an agreement, the relevant recommendations would be submitted to the governments of both countries. According to information obtained from the German side, certain proposed concepts in the "Odra Zone" projects have been criticized also by the German Federal Government.

To conclude, the proposal to promote the development of the Odra region, commonly referred to as the "Stolpe Plan," and also described in certain press publications as the "Oderland Plan," is in no sense a binding document. Its nature is that of an initial working document containing a range of proposals of varying degrees of detailed elaboration, of which some are entirely consistent with regional development plans drawn up in Poland, others are unacceptable to the Polish side, and yet others could provide subjects for negotiation.

It is worth pointing out that the German proposal was submitted to the Polish Government not by the federal government but only by the prime minister of one of the German laender, as a project for subsequent discussion. Such discussion has been initiated within the framework of the Polish-German Inter-Government Commission for Regional and Border Cooperation.

In psychological terms, the German problem is especially sensitive and important to the Polish people. In the proposed plan for promoting the development of the Odra Zone, its very form as well as individual suggested solutions were unacceptable to the Polish side. However, Poland is already moving toward integration with the European economy. We need to overcome various civilizational differences which persist on both sides of the border, and also to take advantage of the incentives—inherent in the fact of our country's physical proximity to the outer edge of the EEC community—to jointly develop our border regions. This is why the question of the development of the Odra Zone must be regarded in terms of long-term strategies, while at the same time attention should be focused predominantly on the development and modernization of existing border crossing facilities and construction of new ones, as well as the expansion of regional transport infrastructure. For example, we cannot possibly approve the proposal of exclusive German rights to the development of facilities on the island of Uznam, or the concept whereby the whole Odra Zone would be treated exclusively as an area providing backup tourist facilities for Berlin. One element of the possible long-term plan could be a return to the concept of a joint bank whose headquarters would be based in Szczecin (two-thirds of the are of the proposed Odra zone lie on the Polish side), and which would be open to substantial capital involvement on the part of Scandinavian countries. Such a scheme would also be significant from the viewpoint of future cooperation between Baltic states.

There are no plans to create a permanent body to administer the implementation of the proposed program and the actual area covered by the program.

The parliamentary question submitted by the Honorable Deputy contains not only an enquiry about the Polish Government's position on the so-called Stolpe Plan, but

also a query about our own concept of promoting the development of the Western territories within the context of international politics, particularly concerning Polish-FRG and Polish-EEC relations.

The unification of Germany on the one hand and on the other hand the disappointment over the current progress of economic development in Poland—which has proved more troubled than was predicted at the time—have together produced the prospect of a dangerous imbalance between the economic and civilizational standards of the regions situated on both sides of the border along the rivers Odra and Nysa Luzycka. This situation produces new factors and circumstances which are even now influencing the development policy for Poland's western regions. We have devoted much attention to a thorough analysis of these factors and circumstances, working in close cooperation with academic circles involved in the study of this issue. To this end, among other things, we organized conference sessions with the State Economic Council, which is an advisory body set up to assist the minister—head of the CUP. The sessions were devoted to the following subjects:

—problems of economic development and environmental planning in Polish territories situated along the state's western border (March 1991);

—problems of development of the road and railroad transport sector in the context of Poland's links with the EEC and the question of West-East and North-South transit provisions (October 1991);

—problems of management of water resources, with particular emphasis on the River Odra drainage basin (December 1991).

A session on the future prospects for the development of water transport, with particular emphasis on the Odra-Nysa waterway and marine transport system, seen in the context of cooperation links with Germany, is scheduled to take place in March 1992.

Meanwhile, the CUP prepared a study paper entitled "Problems of Socioeconomic Development of Poland's Border Zones" (published November 1991), which discusses all of Poland's border territories, including regions situated along the western border. In addition, the CUP and the relevant sectors and voivodas coordinated their proposed action plans for the promotion of economic development of Poland's border territories, including the zone adjacent to our state border with the FRG.

The Polish-German Inter-Government Commission for Regional and Border Cooperation, together with its sub-committees and working groups, is currently involved in promoting closer and more intensive cooperation in and coordination of the campaign to develop the border zones in both countries.

The results of all the actions and campaigns listed above will be taken into account in the government's medium-term socioeconomic program which, in turn, will be submitted to the Sejm.

I should also like to stress that in our work on the state's projected long-term regional policy we do not envisage any plans to isolate Poland's border territories as a separate unit of the country's administrative division, nor do we intend to give it the status of a so-called "functional region." Consequently, we do not envisage the creation of a Polish project corresponding to the German "Odra Zone" proposal. Instead, we will continue to formulate our plans in relevant government and regional programs, drawing on the increasing store of practical experience in our regional and border cooperation with the German Federal Republic.

On behalf of the prime minister,
Jerzy Eysymontt,
Minister—Head of Central Planning Administration

Political Leaders Assess Local Election Results

AU2802125792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1146 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 28/2/1992—The daily "TINERETUL LIBER" goes on putting out opinions of political leaders on the results of the local elections held in Romania in the month of February.

Ion Manzatu, chairman of the Republican Party: I think a first genuine political step has been made in Romania towards democracy. The myth has been broken to pieces of a single ruling party. The National Salvation Front has been demolished to a great extent, as it has been natural after the serious failures in the national economy and the social life. The Republican Party is, at last, among the first ten political parties of Romania. That is one of the first tests for us and we hope that could be a good start for the general elections, to be held equally this year. Speaking of the present, the Front will, no doubt, be broken to pieces, in its turn, the Democratic Convention will not succeed, as it has been built on a structure which the Romanian people does not consider suitable. As for the future, we think Romania's present situation proves that the democratic forces are in the ascendant.

Rene Radu Policrat, chairman of the young wing of the National Liberal Party: I can and must consider the local elections both from the condition of a simple citizen and from that of a politician. As a citizen, I am glad a change has been made. But I must underline that is only a beginning. The next elections will prove if this start is a first significant step in tuning the power with its electoral image. As a politician, in spite of unjust united obstacles, we consider the results of our party to have been promising, proving once again that the new liberalism, characteristic of the end of this century, has many followers in Romania.

Daily Reviews Electorate Shifts in Opinion

AU2802125992 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1057 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 28/2/1992—A commentary in daily "ADEVARUL" on the fluctuations of the Romanian electorate's options from the 20 May 1990 general elections to the 9 February 1992 local elections shows that the National Salvation Front which was returned to parliament with a comfortable majority in 1990 got only 22 percent of the vote two years later. Romania's "historical" parties—the National Liberal Party—PNL, the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party—PNT-cd and the Social Democratic Party—PSDR—which won 8.1 percent of the ballots in 1990 did twice as well in 1992 when they captured 15.6 percent of the vote. Meanwhile the Hungarian Democratic Union—UDMR posted a retreat, from 6 percent to 4.55 percent of the vote, whereas the Romanians' National Unity Party—PUNR—increased its share of the ballot from 1.87 percent to 3.2 percent. The commentary also shows how other political parties have fared—the Democratic Agrarian Party—PDAR has been on the rise from 1.3 percent to 5.1 percent, the Ecology Movement—MER has slumped from 2.04 percent to 1.43 percent. Abstentions have increased 2.33 times.

The conclusion: The popularity of the PDAR has increased fourfold, that of the PUNR—1.7 times, while that of UDMR has dropped 1.3 times, of MER—1.4 times, of FSN—2.6 times. Historical parties contested local polls as a 14-party coalition.

Comparisons were made by taking as a basis percentages of the total electorate and a turnout of 85 percent on 20 May 1990 and 65 percent on 9 February 1992.

Second Ballot Begins in 22 Localities 2 Mar

Low Turnout Reported

AU0103145592

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 0500 GMT on 1 March carries a two-minute report on the localities in which second polls are going to be held today (covered by referent item) and at 1100 GMT carries a four-minute announcer-read report of the Central Electoral Commission on the current situation regarding today's polls saying that "today second polls are being organized in 22 constituencies in the following counties: Bihor, Dimbovita, Gorj, Giurgiu, Iasi, Mehedinti, Olt, Satu Mare, Teleorman, Vrancea, and Ilfov Agricultural Sector. Among the localities where second polls will be held today, there are also three municipalities that are county seats: Giurgiu, Drobeta-Turnu-Severin, and Slatina. The voting started at 0400 GMT, and, in accordance with the law, it will conclude at 2100, and where needed it will conclude at 0000. The results will be made known in the respective constituencies tomorrow. In seven constituencies in Arges and Mures Counties, second polls will be held on Sunday, 8 March, and in other 30 localities, local elections will be organized on 19 April."

The announcer reads reports of radio and ROMPRES correspondents saying that "Cornel Torescu reported that in constituency Number 1 in Drobeta Turnu Severin 80,600 citizens listed on electoral forms will vote for the position of mayor, electing one of the two candidates that remained in the race—Professor Ioan Moraru, of the National Salvation Front [FSN], and Engineer Arion Ionescu, of the Democratic Convention.

"In Slatina, as Liliana Branca informed us, since during the 9 and 23 February elections less than half of the voters cast their votes, a second poll will be held today. There are 59,447 citizens listed on the electoral forms who will have to choose between Mr. Liviu Mircea Dan of the FSN and Gheorghe Cean, of the CD.

"From Giurgiu, the ROMPRES correspondent reports that 53,590 voters are listed on the electoral forms. The position of mayor is disputed between Mr. Remus Tunaru of the FSN and Mr. Octavian Niculescu of the

CD, who, on 23 February obtained 41.5 and respectively 28.40 percent of the votes. Elections for the position of mayor are also being organized in the communes of Mihailesti, Baneasa, Colibasi, Fratesti, and Ungureni.

"Also from a ROMPRES report we have learned that in the communes of Galateni and Petrosani in Teleorman County, independent candidates were left to compete for the position of mayor in the second polls.

"All reports note that elections are taking place without incidents, but a low turnout in the voting during the first part of the day can be noticed."

However announcer adds that "a few minutes ago, our correspondent in Mehedinti reports that an increase in the number of voters at voting sections can be noticed. Except for Drobeta-Turnu-Severin, in this county voting will take place also in the town of Baia de Arama, where two independent candidates were left to compete for the position of mayor."

Giurgiu, Teleorman Cast Votes

AU0103190892

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 1800 GMT on 1 March carries a four-minute announcer-read report of the Central Electoral Commission on the names of counties where second polls are taking place today.

The announcer continues: "Here is some of the information received from our radio and ROMPRES correspondents on the way today's voting has been carried out. The data centralized at the local public administration at the Giurgiu Prefects' Office shows that by 1500 GMT, almost one-third of the citizens listed in the electoral forms cast their votes for one of the two candidates to the office of mayor in the county seat, Remus Tunaru of the National Salvation Front and Octavian Niculescu of the Democratic Convention. In the other localities, where the second poll is taking place today: Mihailesti, Baneasea, Fratesti and Colibasi, the turnout at 1700 was under 30 percent, our correspondent Stan Stefan informed us."

In connection with the votes in Drobeta-Turnu-Severin, the announcer says that: "Our reporter Cornel Florescu has informed us that the second poll for the election of the mayor of this municipality and county seat is characterized by a lower turnout than last Sunday in many polling stations. A few hours ago, the rate of turnout in many polling stations was between 18 and 20 percent out of the 80,700 citizens listed in the electoral forms. After the polling stations close and the vote-counting ends, the mayor of the locality will be announced, who will be one of the two candidates: Professor Ion Moraru of the FSN and Engineer Arion Ionescu of the Democratic Convention."

The announcer also adds that in Teleorman County, in the communes of Galateni and Pietrosani: "During the second part of the day, 21.3 percent of the voters and respectively 37.6 percent out of the total number of citizens listed in the electoral forms cast their votes at the polling stations."

The announcer concludes the report on electoral issues announcing that today the new mayor of Brasov, Adrian Morozu, took the oath and "Architect Corneliu Popa, member of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party member, candidate of the Democratic Convention, was elected to the position of deputy mayor of Brasov."

Drobeta Turnu Severin Ends Balloting

AU0103205892

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 2000 GMT on 1 March carries a three-minute announcer read report on voter turnout in Drobeta-Turnu Severin. The announcer says that "the results of the elections in the constituencies where second polls have been held today will be issued tomorrow" and adds that "our correspondent Cornel Sorescu reports that in all 51 constituencies in the Drobeta Turnu Severin Municipality activity has concluded and in accordance with the provisions of the law, after canceling the unused forms, the counting of votes started, an activity that is still in progress at this hour. The estimated data shows that out of 80,700 citizens listed on electoral forms, 23-25 percent cast their votes. We mention that Professor Ioan Moraru of the National Salvation Front and Engineer Arion Ionascut of the Democratic Convention are the candidates listed on the voting forms for the position of mayor of Drobeta Turnu Severin Municipality."

The announcer also mentions that "in seven constituencies in Arges and Maramures the second poll will take place on Sunday, 8 March and in the other 30 localities, local elections will be held on 19 April."

Article Urges Restraint in Disputes With Hungary

AU2802125392 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 25 Feb 92 pp 1, 8

[Dumitru Tinu article: "Blank Bullets"]

[Text] At a time when the greatest number of people would be watching television, the ministry of Romanian diplomacy broadcast a fulminating statement that seemed never ending. One was almost inclined to think that it would end with the announcement of general mobilization and that the Hungarians were already at Oradea's gates. In actual fact, this was just another installment of the series.... "Romanians Caught in Budapest's Net" based on an ingenious script by Gyula Horn, Lajos Fur, Geza Entz, and company.

Allegedly in Miskolc over the weekend, Mr. Fur, who is also minister of defense, proved his oratory skill by discussing all kinds of obsessions about the so-called "linguistic nation," about the mission of protecting the "Hungarians in the Carpathian basin as part and parcel of defending Hungarian

security," and other such ridiculous affirmations, which attest to the gulf between barrack-like education and knowledge of international law.

Taking blank bullets for genuine ones, our Foreign Ministry hurried to answer, point by point, by skillfully making reference to international agreements to which Hungary is a party, as if Mr. Fur was interested in what the documents contain. Moreover, Romanian diplomacy is caught in the net of a career military man and takes a defensive stance. Agreeing to comment on the affirmation about the "danger threatening the Hungarian minority," the authors of this unhappy statement desperately scream from their defensive position; "Such a way of thinking lacks any factual support!" They try to argue that "numerically, the Hungarian minority in Romania has constantly increased"... and that these compatriots "are actively present in our country's political arena."

Convinced that this aspect had been sufficiently clarified, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then proceeded to examine the delirious affirmations of a former inspiring customer of Romanian official declarations: Geza Entz, a secretary of state in the cabinet of the Hungarian prime minister. Entz goes even further than the minister of defense (who, as I said, feels responsible for the security of Hungarians abroad); he thought of a "diplomatic representation of the interests of Hungarians living outside Hungary's boundary." Do you believe that such an aberration is worth commenting on, even if it is just in a second-rate magazine? Maybe not, but once again, Romanian diplomacy comments on it explaining to the aforementioned state secretary everything in connection with generally accepted standards in Europe and referring Entz not to where he should be referred, but to the report of the CSCE experts meeting in Geneva, Chapter I, paragraph 6....

We would like to make it very clear that we by no means underestimate the seriousness of the positions held by certain hotheads in Budapest who are living in the past and refuse to accept facts. However, instead of treating their irredentist efforts in a detached way, I would even say in a superior way—because we do not have to explain to anyone whether the Hungarians in Romania "are an active presence in our country's political arena," which they are without being told how—such stupid attempts are taken seriously and thus we fall into the trap set by those politicians who are obviously more experienced. It seems that we are dealing with a crystal-clear scenario: 1) periodically, the government in Budapest solemnly declares that it has no territorial claims; 2) various politicians, including government members, also make periodical revisionist and provocative statements; 3) our Foreign Ministry conscientiously catches the ball thrown by Budapest and then laments that it is being provoked without any reason; 4) then a few parliamentarians—waiting for such opportunities—intervene and point their fingers to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; 5) and the problem (actually not a genuine one) gains international dimensions. And that is exactly what those who threw the stone wanted. For, a stone thrown from the other side of the fence and picked up here on the eve of elections, which are being watched by Europe, means that it hit the target. Mr. Manfred Woerner, who visited Bucharest at the end of the week, assured us in a paternal way that "NATO will exercise its alleviating influence" to solve....

To solve what?

Surely Romanian diplomacy should not stand by and indifferently watch our country being attacked. However, we believe that there are other, more intelligent—and more effective—means to counteract hostile propaganda. We should not use up genuine ammunition to respond to the cracks of blank bullets.

Ministry Issues Communique on Moldovan Border

AU2902200792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1904 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/2/1992—The Foreign Ministry sent ROMPRES a communique showing:

As part of the periodical consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Romania and the Republic of Moldova, under-secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry of Romania Adrian Dohotaru had an interview in Cahul on February 28, 1992 with Ion Esanu, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Moldova.

The interview was attended by prefects of Galati and Iasi Counties, representatives of the Ministry of Public Works and Physical Planning, of the Customs Duty General Direction as well as by Ion Bistreanu, charge d'affaires ad interim of Romania in Chisinau.

Practical ways were examined of easing passengers' traffic on either banks of the Prut in accordance with the agreement concluded between the government of Romania and the government of the Republic of Moldova on August 29, 1991.

Considering the importance of the persons' free circulation as part of the two Romanian states' integration and meeting the citizens' demands, it was covenanted to better the checkpoints' schedules.

In reference to the Galati-Giurgiulesti checkpoint, taking into account the present passenger traffic (between 80,000 and 100,000 a day), it was agreed upon the Moldovan representatives' suggestion that traffic through this checkpoint be suspended for one month starting March 2, 1992.

The communique specifies in the end that citizens of Romania and the Republic of Moldova can travel from one country to another only on the basis of their identity card. It also mentions that the crossing at the checkpoints between the two countries are to be made by the citizens of Romania and the Republic of Moldova all while observing the laws in force.

Interrepublic

Slovene-Croatian Talks on Traffic Detailed

92BA0514A Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 5 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Roger Gogala: "Croatian Road Across Slovene Territory"—first paragraph is DNEVNIK introduction]

[Text] A Croatian highway will cross Slovenia from Rupa to Kozina; also a railroad corridor; one joint border station instead of two.

Ljubljana, 5 Feb—Representatives of the Slovene and Croatian Ministries of Transportation and Communications met in Zagreb and took up the issue of new highway and railroad links between Istria and Trieste, and the issue of linking Zagreb with Austria through the Pyhrn road. The talks were successful, and Croatia will be able to build the Rupa-Kozina highway across Slovenia.

There is great interest in Croatia in the so-called highway corridor, through which the southern republic, more precisely Istria, would be directly connected with Trieste. The Slovene representatives promised their neighbors that no difficulties would be created for these Croatian plans, and an effort would be made to prepare project documentation for the proposed highway and also to purchase land for this purpose. Croatia has to find its own financiers for building the highway, since Slovenia is not capable of providing financial support for this project. Of course, Croatia will be able to collect tolls on this highway.

Our neighbors' other desire is for Istrian railroads to be connected with Trieste as well. For that purpose, they are prepared to build one more tunnel through Ucka. They are also planning to have other Croatian railroad lines connected with the new Rijeka-Trieste line. In connection with the construction of the already long-planned Pyhrn highway, it has been decided that the details will be agreed upon during the next 15 days.

There were also talks between the Slovene and Croatian Transportation Ministries about the border crossings. In this regard, the prevailing opinion was that we should no longer build two border stations, but rather just one, which would house policemen and other border officials from both republics, as is customary in Europe.

Croatian-Macedonian Talks on Cooperation

92BA0551C Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 18 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Edita Vlahovic Zuvela: "Someone Must Pay for the War"]

[Text] Zagreb—Stipe Mesic, chairman of the Executive Committee of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], yesterday met with Boris Zmejkovski, general secretary of the VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization], in Zagreb. The representatives of the two parties talked about mutual cooperation, between the parties and governments, as well as about the current political situation, newsmen learned at the unscheduled press conference yesterday.

Boris Zmejkovski thanked the HDZ for the way it had received him, on behalf of the VMRO he congratulated Croatia on recognition of its independence, and he expressed gratitude that it was among the first to recognize Macedonia's independence. The VMRO general secretary presented the view of his party concerning Macedonia's independence and requested assistance of the friendly party concerning recognition of Macedonia in Europe.

"Events are developing in Macedonia according to a scenario we have already seen," Stipe Mesic said. "Threatened Serbs have been found, and the rest of the scenario is clear. Macedonia's political leadership must be mindful of this and not fall into the trap. I believe in the maturity of the political leadership in Macedonia," Mesic said, adding that his party had presented its own experiences. Both parties, he emphasized, want to develop their own states as democratic states. Assessing the events in Serbia, Mesic said that soon there will be important developments there, especially between now and 8 March. "The imperial Serbian Army has been unsuccessful at everything it has wanted to do. I anticipate a conflict between the top military leadership and the Milosevic regime," Mesic said, and added that after 9 August the people now at the top will no longer be there.

The situation is such that someone must pay for this war, Mesic concluded.

There was also mention of a Croatian-Macedonian friendship society, which is enriching relations between Croatia and Macedonia, it was said, in the cultural, political, economic, and other directions.

Boris Zmejkovski announced that there was also discussion yesterday of specific forms of cooperation—providing space for that society, establishing a library, and the HDZ supported establishment of a Macedonian Orthodox Church in Zagreb.

Federal

Financing UN Peacekeeping Force Discussed

LD2802140492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1823 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 26 (TANJUG)—Member of the Yugoslav Presidency and President of the State Committee for Cooperation with Representatives of the United Nations Borisav Jovic met on Wednesday with head of the team of U.N. liaison officers in Yugoslavia, Colonel John Wilson. They discussed Yugoslavia's offer to contribute to a reduction of the cost of the U.N. peacekeeping operation

in Yugoslavia. The two sides also discussed the functioning of future U.N. centres in Yugoslavia, which are aimed at facilitating the operation.

Jovic reiterated Yugoslavia's readiness to contribute, in keeping with its abilities, to the reduction of the cost of the operation. However, he pointed out that Yugoslavia has not participated in the work on the project of financing the operation so far, and that objections addressed to it in view of the expenses were unjustified, but offered joint work on listing the expenses.

Under preliminary calculations, the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia will cost 634 million dollars for a year. Jovic especially pointed out possible negative political implications if the desire of some countries that national contingents be deployed in specific regions are met because that would be unacceptable for Yugoslavia and may alter the character and role of the U.N. peacekeeping force. As learned, Hungary [word indistinct] that French units be deployed in the border area of Baranja, which is also populated by ethnic Hungarians.

25 Countries Confirm Participation

LD2902224392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1621 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 28 (TANJUG)—Twenty five countries have so far confirmed that their troops will take part in the United Nations (U.N.) peace operation in Yugoslavia, TANJUG learned today at the operative headquarters of the Yugoslav State Committee for Cooperation with the U.N. Peace-Keeping Forces.

Twenty five of the 31 countries which have been asked by U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus Ghali to contribute troops to the peace operation in Yugoslavia have accepted the proposal. They are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Great Britain.

The list includes three of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—France, Russia and Great Britain, which is the first time that this has happened in the history of U.N. peace operations.

Government Devalues Dinar 29 Feb

LD2902135792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1315 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 29 (TANJUG)—One German mark will as of Sunday be worth 85 dinars, instead of the 65 it was worth until now, the Yugoslav government decided on Saturday. The government information secretariat said in a statement that the Yugoslav Central Bank will on the basis of this set the dinar exchange rate for other hard currencies sold and purchased on the foreign exchange market.

Presidency Member Lobbies for Serbian Krajina

LD2902200492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2106 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Feb (TANJUG)—The Republic of Serbian Krajina is Yugoslav territory where Serbians live, so Yugoslavia recognizes it simply by virtue of it being Yugoslav territory, Yugoslav Presidency member Borisav Jovic said tonight. Addressing the deputies of the Serbian Assembly, he said federal legislation would be enforced in this territory, but Krajina's legislation has to be codified like any other republic in the framework of Yugoslavia.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Electoral Commission Reports Poll Turnout

LD2902130992 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] According to reports from the republican electoral commission, more than 50 percent of voters have voted in Zepce; in Tesanj, more than 40 percent; in Prozor, 30 percent; in Prnjavor, 20 percent; in Odzak, 23 percent and in Orasje, more than 4,000 voters.

In Ugljevik and Derventa, in villages with Serbian population, polling stations have not been opened. There are 11 polling stations in Kupres instead of 36. In Nevesinje, only one of 20 polling stations is in the town, while others are in Muslim suburbs.

Several incidents occurred. Last night at about 0300 hours [0200 GMT] a bomb was thrown at the Bijela polling station in Konjic. The Ravni-Komar Road has been blocked since last night by unidentified people in camouflage clothes and masks. Taxi driver Bosko Zahara was killed and two people were wounded at that barricade last night. The masked people who have erected the barricades are demanding talks with Radovan Karadzic, chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party.

At about 1100 in the Kosevo local community in Sarajevo's Centar, Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic voted, remarking that the referendum will mean independence, freedom and liberation from the semi-colonial status in which Bosnia-Hercegovina finds itself.

Stations Close; Turnout 56 Percent

LD0103214992 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Report from Sarajevo by Slavko Rako]

[Excerpt] All 4,269 polling stations in Bosnia-Hercegovina closed at 1900 this evening after Bosnia-Hercegovina citizens gave an answer in the referendum to the question: Are you for a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Hercegovina as a state of equal citizens and nations, Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and others living in it?

The republic's electoral commission has already received results from 4,016 polling stations. This has enabled Mirko Boskovic, chairman of the republic's electoral commission, to state shortly after 1900 that the turnout in the referendum was 56.31 percent. This implies that the legal conditions have been fulfilled for the referendum vote to be considered valid. According to the results the highest turnout was recorded in the municipalities of Cazin—95.09 percent; Velika Kladusa—88.29 percent; Siroki Brijeg—84.55 percent; and Jablanica - 84.05 percent.

The lowest turnout was recorded in the municipalities of Sekovici—2.26 percent; Ljubinje—7.46 percent; and Srbac—8.47 percent. These are municipalities with a majority Serbian population. The republic's commission has had no report of any voting in the municipalities of Drvar and Bosanski Petrovac.

Initial results are expected tomorrow and the final count will be announced at about noon on Tuesday 3 March. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister on Republic's Future

AU0203101492 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Report on news conference with Haris Silajdzic, minister of foreign relations of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, vice president of the Republican Government by Marijana Jovovic-Bilandzic on 1 March; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Jovovic-Bilandzic] We are pleased that the number of incidents is small, which is the essential condition for the referendum to pass in a peaceful and tolerant atmosphere. This was heard at today's news conference on the referendum. In connection with this, it was stated that if irregularities were established in some communes, the republican electoral commission has the right to annul the results.

Journalists were most interested today in the international status of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, vice president of the Republican Government, expressing his conviction that the referendum will be successful, said the following:

[Mahmutcehajic] In the future, Bosnia-Hercegovina will certainly be an open and a free country, and thus ready to take part in creating links and bridges among the peoples, above all, within itself, and in its immediate neighborhood. As a European country, it will not be able to nor will it want to avoid all integrational processes.

The future of Europe also lies in the improvement of international, interethnic, and inter-state relations in the Balkans itself, where, considering its central position in the Balkans and experience of a multi-national community, Bosnia-Hercegovina will play an important role.

Speaking about Bosnia-Hercegovina and the EC, Haris Silajdzic, minister of foreign relations of Bosnia-Hercegovina, said the following:

[Silajdzic] Several members of the EC suggested that all new Yugoslav states be offered the status of an associated member of the EC. This idea exists. However, not all the members of the EC have agreed about this yet. What is wanted at present is to make the position of Bosnia-Hercegovina equal to that of the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland. It is thought that this would create a more stable situation in the southeast of Europe. What Europe needs is stability and peace in this part of Europe because of the connections with the East.

Answering the questions on possible EC conditions, Haris Silajdzic said:

[Silajdzic] I can say that cantonization, or any kind of division on a national basis, is a retrograde process for Europe. Europe is going toward integration and not disintegration. This will certainly not be a condition. Economic stability could be one of the conditions, but cantonization will never be.

SDS: Barricades To Protest Independence

LD0203095792 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 2 Mar 92

[Report from Sarajevo by correspondent Slavko Rako]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Sarajevo's Security Services Center has confirmed that the barricades are still standing on over 20 locations in the city. Correspondents of Sarajevo radio are filing reports of shooting on the barricades on the main road to Pale running through the city's outskirts. A report from Doboj has confirmed that its roads to Modrica have been blockaded, so the road link to Bosanski Samac and the Republic of Croatia has been severed.

Having managed to get in touch with the Sarajevo headquarters of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] a reporter of Sarajevo television has been told, and it has been confirmed to him, that the SDS is responsible for these barricades.

In this unofficial conversation the conditions for removing the barricades were set. An official SDS statement is being awaited. These conditions include an immediate end to all further activities geared to the declaration of Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence. An immediate continuation of the conference on the transformation of Bosnia-Hercegovina is also demanded, as is an end to the propaganda campaign waged by the media in support of the declaration of Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence. SDS representatives are also demanding unbiased reports about these events, a transformation of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the immediate arrest of the perpetrators of yesterday's murder in Sarajevo. Also demanded is an immediate end to the Yutel's [independent TV network]

activities. It is also demanded and requested of the Ministry for Internal Affairs not to carry out any violent action against the people manning the barricades. This is what Bosnia-Hercegovina's public has been told, that is what Sarajevo TV reporter has been told in his phone talk with the SDS HQ.

Barricades Hinder Traffic

AU0203093692 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 2 Mar 92

[Text] The barricades on a dozen or so intersections in Sarajevo and access roads to Sarajevo that were erected by armed groups of civilians around midnight have affected the normal functioning of the city traffic and inter-city transportation. Trains did not leave Sarajevo railroad station this morning either.

Teams of officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are trying to find a way of resolving this unprecedented case of traffic blockage in a peaceful way and without any consequences.

City dairies and bakeries have not been able to deliver their products to the shops up to now. Today's press has not reached newspaper stands either. The citizens of Sarajevo were asked by an independent television station, Good Vibrations, and by radio Sarajevo to remain calm and not to do anything without the knowledge of official organs.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina has issued a statement in which it informs the citizens that security in Sarajevo is under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and appeals to them to use free roads to get to their workplaces. The workers of the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are already on these roads.

The ministry has distanced itself from all appeals to the citizens not to leave their homes that were issued by the media this morning. The citizens are asked not to fall for rumors and various disinformation and to contribute with their general behavior to the calming of the situation in the city. This was stated by the Information Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

SDA Opposes Split Into Ethnic Cantons

LD2802145392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1623 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] Sarajevo, February 26 (TANJUG)—New proposals for Bosnia-Hercegovina's internal system will be made at a third round of talks among Bosnia-Hercegovina's three ruling parties, to be held under the E.C. auspices in Sarajevo on Thursday, Irfan Ajanovic, spokesman for the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which rallies Moslems in that Yugoslav republic, said today.

Ajanovic told a press conference that the SDA has explicitly opposed and remained opposed to an ethnic division of the republic.

Ajanovic expressed surprise at the European Community proposal on forming ethnic cantons in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which had been accepted by the leaders of the three-party coalition—which includes the SDA, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)—at a meeting in Lisbon last weekend. The talks were also attended by E.C. representatives.

The SDA believes that Bosnia-Hercegovina should be regionalized, but on the economic and geographic principle, rather than along ethnic lines, said Ajanovic.

SDS Assails Attack on Sarajevo Wedding Party

LD0103211492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2042 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, 1 Mar (TANJUG)—We have been shocked by an attack at 1600 this afternoon on a Serb wedding party outside Sarajevo's old Serbian Orthodox church, in which a wedding guest carrying a Serbian national flag was killed, the executive committee of the Serbian Democratic Party for Bosnia-Hercegovina [Srpska Demokratska Stranka—SDS] said in a statement this evening.

This unprecedented act took place at the time when two of the Bosnia-Hercegovina nations were expressing their will at a referendum. If the Serbian nation is not allowed to observe its national customs in present Bosnia-Hercegovina, what can it expect in the so-called independent Bosnia-Hercegovina which is offered so zealously offered by the other two nations, the SDS says. [passage omitted]

We most vigorously protest against this madness and this kind of democracy and will insist on the perpetrators being caught and punished in an exemplary way. Otherwise the path forward will be one of chaos, the SDS says in conclusion.

Serbian Assembly Approves Constitution

LD2902104492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0928 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 29 (TANJUG)—The assembly of the Serbian people in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which sat in session yesterday and last night in Sarajevo, adopted the constitution of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the constitutional law for its implementation.

According to the announcement issued this morning, after the assembly ended its session behind closed doors, the delegates also adopted a number of systemic laws—on state management, government, banks, internal

affairs and informing, as well as a decision on the founding of a TV of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Bosnia-Hercegovina is populated by three most numerous Yugoslav peoples—Serbs make up 31 percent, Croats 17 percent and Muslims 44 percent of the republic's population. These three constituent peoples live together in the republic. The Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina was proclaimed on January 9 in response to the request of Bosnia-Hercegovina's Croats and Muslims for Bosnia-Hercegovina's international recognition.

The Bosnia-Hercegovina presidency and government late last year requested international recognition of the European Community without the Serbian delegates' consent. Serbs are against Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence and they want to remain in Yugoslavia.

Under the valid Bosnia-Hercegovina constitution, decisions of vital importance for the republic's future can be adopted only by consensus of its three constituent peoples.

The Belgrade daily BORBA writes today that the constitution of the Republic of Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina "has no legal consequences and will not yet be proclaimed officially valid". BORBA says that its official proclamation depends on the further political developments in the republic.

Croatian Leader Comments on Bosnian Stability

92BA0530C Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 17 Feb 92 p 9

[Interview with Mato Boban, vice president of the Croatian Democratic Community for Bosnia-Hercegovina and president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, by A. Pehar and O. Vatric in Grude; date not given: "Both the Lamb and the Viper"]

[Text] Grude—We talked with Mr. Mato Boban, vice president of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] for B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina] and president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, about current political conditions in Bosnia and Hercegovina, especially in the light of the Sarajevo talks between representatives of the political parties and representatives of the European Community about the future of B-H, where Boban represented the HDZ and the Croatian people. We asked him whether after those talks Bosnia and Hercegovina was closer to peace or war?

[Boban] We preclude war, and we will do everything to keep it from occurring. I think that after Sarajevo we are closer to peace than to war, but at this point I cannot judge how far we are from war in B-H. Those who have begun wars lose most by them. It seems to me that this has been realized even by those in the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] in B-H. Their representatives in Sarajevo were demanding that a provision preventing secession be included in the laws of the future state of Bosnia-Hercegovina and placed under international guarantee. Perhaps they have learned that the territorial framework of Yugoslavia should be broken up according to the principles which the world recognizes, but certainly not by force, by war, and by destruction.

[VECERNJI LIST] Will the HDZ call out its membership and the Croatian people to vote in the referendum on the independence of B-H?

[Boban] I am convinced that the Croatian people will vote in the referendum. However, this referendum will not have any consequences at all without an agreement among the three nationalities.

[VECERNJI LIST] It is interesting that precisely during these crucial days there has been no representative of the Croatian people in the B-H Presidency: Franjo Boras is traveling in the United States and Stjepan Kljuic is in the hospital.

[Boban] Yes, that is true, but the B-H Presidency has not done anything up to now anyway, nor could it have, to prevent B-H from experiencing this kind of collapse, and in particular to prevent occupation, monetary aggression, and so on.

[VECERNJI LIST] Stjepan Kljuic is now the president of the HDZ who has resigned and is undergoing medical treatment. How is the HDZ of B-H functioning?

[Boban] The top leadership of the HDZ of B-H is the Presidency, and there are no differences in it whatsoever. You can look at all the minutes of the Presidency over the last year and see that we have been unanimous in all our resolutions. It is natural for anyone to have the right to his opinion in the debate. But in essence I would be so bold as to say that there is no party in B-H that has been more consistent concerning democratic principles than the HDZ.

[VECERNJI LIST] What is your comment on the assertions of certain media in B-H, but also in Croatia, that you are an agent of the KOS [counterintelligence service], which is also being said of Mr. Franjo Boras?

[Boban] Those are, of course, insinuations. You know, when a man takes a particular office they look at him through every prism. Someone needs those stories about the KOS and HOS [Croatian Armed Forces] to force one to abandon principle. These things are cooked up by one's political opponents. As far as I am concerned personally, it will not succeed. I have spent two years and two months in prison on a charge of which I was innocent, and after that I was released, but I am not broken. Accordingly, they can say that I belong to the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] and the CIA, but there is no way in which I will betray the interest of my people and the confidence placed in me.

The C oats Have Two Regions

[VECERNJI LIST] Quite a bit is being said about division of B-H. How is this viewed by the HDZ of B-H?

[Boban] Division is the worst thing that could happen to us in resolving this crisis. We want B-H to be an independent state community of the three sovereign and constituent nationalities. Those regions that ought to have quite significant autonomy would be defined by agreement on the basis of the well-known principles in effect in the world. We have also defined those principles (ethnic, cultural, historical, and economic), and on that point we have agreement between the Serbian and Muslim nationalities.

There is no region that can be counted on in advance, but in that context the Croatian people do have regions that satisfy those principles. Those are more or less the two areas in which the Croatian communities of Herceg-Bosna and Bosanska Posavina have been established. The Croatian people held those areas in 1941 when they entered the war.

In any case, we conceive B-H as a state community in which no nationality can be a minority. If you look at the ethnic map, you will see that 70 percent of the Croats live in the two Croatian communities: 410,000 in the HZ [Croatian community] Herceg-Bosna and 150,000 Croats in the HZ Bosanska Posavina. Those Croats who remain in other regions will have completely equal rights as all others will have who remain in the Croatian regions. This is our view, and we permanently stand by the demand that the rights of every person be recognized according to the principles of the Hague Convention (Articles 2 and 3).

[VECERNJI LIST] Have the views of the three ruling parties come closer since the conference in Sarajevo?

[Boban] Mr. Cutilhero said in Sarajevo that the options of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and SDS are opposed, and that what the HDZ is proposing is the essence around which a political solution should be built and that the other two parties should come closer to the view of the HDZ. In essence, neither of the parties has anything with which to reproach us. We are for B-H as a community of sovereign and constituent nationalities. To be sure, the SDA is saying the same thing, but they do not mention a community of nationalities, but of citizens. Those are differences that experts in constitutional law can perhaps define so that they are not differences. But the Croatian nationality in B-H is decreasing numerically, and we have to protect ourselves from majority rule.

A Border Without a Border

[VECERNJI LIST] If B-H is independent, how do you imagine the borders with Croatia?

[Boban] The Croatian ethnic areas in B-H mainly have Croatia in back of them, and I think that there will be no problem at all in this respect. I think that a few days ago the supreme commands of Croatia and Slovenia gave us in B-H an example of what this should look like. That is, a border without a border. Let it be the kind of border that there is between France and Germany, or Belgium and Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, let it be two states without borders. The world is well aware how they can prevent bad things from passing from one state to another, and it is not good to stand in the way of what is good.

[VECERNJI LIST] Some people say that you favor annexation of western Hercegovina to the Republic of Croatia. How much truth is there in that?

[Boban] Western Hercegovina is a homogeneous area with a majority Croatian population. This is the area whose inhabitants are lambs, the viper (poskok), and man. That western Hercegovinian, in essence, by his nature, in his respect for other people, is a true lamb, but he can also be a viper if someone rubs him the wrong way. If the Croatian right in B-H were reduced to western Hercegovina, then that would be a sign that someone has other intentions contrary to those of the Croatian people. The intention of the Croatian people in B-H can only be for all three nationalities to reflect and represent their interests to others on an equal footing, to reconcile those interests and find the optimum that will guarantee the sovereignty of all three nationalities in the state of B-H.

[VECERNJI LIST] Finally, your view of the Army in B-H, and what is the situation in Hercegovina at the moment?

[Boban] The Army must leave B-H. At the moment, there are about 100,000 soldiers here who have withdrawn from Croatia and Slovenia or were mobilized in Serbia and Montenegro. The position of the HDZ of B-H on this is well-known. The situation in Hercegovina is most closely bound up with resolving the problem of the Army. That Army has stationed huge military forces against the Croatian people in Hercegovina, and to a large extent they are also threatening the Muslim people, but they are not threatening the Serbs. If the influence of military power on political solutions is excluded, we would probably arrive at a joint agreement much more quickly. However, there is another problem here. The Muslims, who also do not have the highest opinion of the Army, are nevertheless proposing that it remain in B-H, in the strength that it had before the war in Croatia. The SDA, to be sure, is also demanding its quantitative and qualitative change, but it continues to think that the Army should remain in B-H.

At the same time, the Army is an occupation army for the entire Croatian people. It has shown itself to be that in Croatia, but also in Hercegovina, in Ravno and also in another 13 villages in Trebinje Opcina. If the Army tries to repeat that, the Croatian people, be certain, will rise up in defense and will defend every village and every

house; in any case, the presence of the Army in Mostar and Hercegovina represents a terrible pressure on the Croatian people.

Croatia

Government Stand on Helsinki Watch Report

LD2802213992 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] At this morning's session, the Croatian Government adopted a stand on the Helsinki Watch report on the situation in Croatia. The government established the crimes cited by the Helsinki Watch. The government's stand was announced by Vice President Milan Ramljak:

One can feel, while reading that report, that there is in it a dose of Greater Serbian propaganda, that there are some citations which are not correct, and that there are some lump assessments which cannot be accepted. Somewhere deep below these facts, we can see countours of a mild accusation that the Croatian authorities and government are guilty of what has happened, in connection with these facts, and even that their guilt comprises some elements of intention. The government has resolutely distanced itself from that.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia did not tolerate such phenomena, none of its ministers, nor the government as a whole, have ever made statements which would in any way encourage such activity, nor will the government tolerate such phenomena in future. The government has done, is doing, and will continue to do what is within its power to shed light on these phenomena, to eliminate them or reduce them to, under these conditions, minimal possible extent.

The Helsinki Watch report was the first and the only item on the agenda at today's session of the Assembly's committee for human rights. The ministers of internal affairs, defense, information, public prosecution, and the president of the Assembly, Zarko Domljan, were present.

Paraga Unhurt in Vinkovci Bomb Attack

AU0103190292 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 1830 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] An attempt was made on the life of Paraga, chief of the extreme-right Croatian party, in Vinkovci yesterday. Three people were killed and seven injured. Paraga himself was not hurt. He came later than expected to the meeting place. APA got the information on the bomb attack on the Croatian extremist leader from one of its contributors who referred to a hospital employee.

Mesic on Croatian Stand on Bosnia-Hercegovina

LD2902000392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1318 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Zagreb, 27 Feb (TANJUG)—In principle, we are in favor of an integral Bosnia-Hercegovina, that is, in favor of holding the referendum, said Stjepan Mesic, chairman of the executive committee of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], at today's news conference.

We advocate that the sovereignty of the Croatian nation should be built into the future sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Croatian nation in Bosnia-Hercegovina must be given precise guarantees about this before the referendum, Mesic said.

Concerning the alleged announcements that "a pure HDZ government will be formed in Croatia," Mesic said that no changes have been announced in that respect. "We are still adhering to the concept of a government of democratic unity of Croatia. The party has been and still is for a government consisting of competent people regardless of which party they belong to," Mesic said.

Mesic denied certain claims that the ruling party has in effect opened the preelection campaign at a recent ceremony for the second anniversary of the General Assembly. "It is too early to start a preelection campaign," Mesic stressed.

In reply to a question about why Crotia has not recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina but has recognized Macedonia, Mesic said that "nobody has officially requested the recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina since Croatia was internationally recognized." However, he did not specify whether Croatia would have done this if a request had been sent, but he said that Bosnia-Hercegovina would probably send a request after the referendum.

Tudjman Criticizes 'Wrong Ideas about Democracy'

LD0103193892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1549 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] Zagreb, March 1 (TANJUG)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has stated that some people in Croatia, especially intellectuals, have wrong ideas about democracy which, according to them, also includes anarchy. In an interview to the Zagreb daily VJESNIK, Tudjman says that some intellectuals are "too obsessed" with his authority. Challenging his critics, the Croatian president goes on to say that, to his knowledge, not a single symphony or novel has ever been written by more than one person. I don't know what those who criticize the Croatian radio and television for not being "sufficiently open" really want, says Tudjman, adding that democracy certainly does not mean anarchy too.

All Croatian media are subject to censorship regulations introduced by the Croatian president. On claims that the church has become too involved in politics in Croatia,

Tudjman says that Croatia would not have won had it not "coordinated its political programme with the role of the church." "There will be no such thing as clericalization of the Croatian state," he claims.

In Tudjman's view, the idea to form a Yugoslav state which appeared in Croatia at the beginning of this century was justified at the time because it had saved Croatia from German influence and Italian and Hungarian imperialism. Unification with Serbia during the First World War saved Croatia from parceling and enslavement, he says. "Were it not for the unification with Serbia, the Western allies would have used Croatia to satisfy Italian and Serbian demands after the First World War. Italy would have occupied Dalmatia, and Serbia would have probably gained all the territories it wants to conquer now," he adds.

In both world wars, Croatia sided with the losers, while Serbia fought along with the allies. Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia unified in 1918 to form the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. The Croatian communist movement also played a significant role in rescuing Croatia from what could have happened to it because of the existence of the independent state of Croatia (a Nazi puppet state created during World War Two), says Tudjman. In conclusion, the Croatian president says that unification with Serbia was justified because it was useful, but that Serbs and Croats cannot live together because they belong to different civilizations.

Reservist Demobilization To Begin Soon

LD2802173592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1324 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Excerpts] Zagreb, 28 Feb (TANJUG)—The implementation of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's order on the demobilization of 20,000 reservists of the Croatian Army will begin in five to six days. According to information made public so far by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia, 20,000 reservists are to be released in about 10 days. [Passage omitted]

In all this, attention should be drawn to the fact, which was officially confirmed and made public last week, that a total of 150,000 soldiers have been mobilized in Croatia. Furthermore, Croatian press claims that about 80 percent of reservists are unemployed civilians. This is certainly a strong reason against demobilization, but it is assessed in Croatia that the beginning of the process of demobilization is "a sign of goodwill for peace" before the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces.

M-84 Tank Parts Production Continues

LD2502182192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1229 GMT 25 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, 25 Feb (TANJUG)—Components for the M-84 tank which is exported to Kuwait are arriving normally from factories in Croatia as well, TANJUG has learned in the Federal Directorate for Trade in Special Purpose Products. Deliveries of tanks to Kuwait, which began before the Gulf war, have not been suspended, and they have not been hampered by the war in Yugoslavia either. The federal directorate stresses that less than one fifth (about 17 percent) of the tank is produced and assembled in Croatia—a tank, it is well known, for which there is great interest on the world armaments market, especially in the wake of the Gulf War.

About 1,000 factories from all parts of the Yugoslavia which existed until now are involved in the production and assembly of the M-84 tank. The directorate says that key components of the tank, which give it exceptional quality, are not produced in "the crisis areas of Yugoslavia." There are alternative factories in other parts of Yugoslavia for all the other parts essential for the manufacture of the M-84 tank, which are in no way a technological secret, and they can also be produced abroad without any great problem.

The tried and tested quality and favorable price of the M-84 tank are the main trump cards of the military industry in the struggle to find foreign purchasers. The Yugoslav tank, for example, is almost twice as cheap as the German Leopard, the price of which is about $2.5 million. The Federal Directorate for Trade in Special Purpose Products believes that the Yugoslav military industry, linked by numerous commercial and manufacturing threads, will not disappear. They are convinced that business ties will be continued both on current and on future projects. After all, the independent parts of Yugoslavia have neither the money nor the time to enter into the risky business of developing a national military industry.

As proof of this claim, the Federal Directorate cites the fact that by the end of this year the G4M aircraft will be completed, while work is also going ahead smoothly on the Vihor tank project, the V2001. This new tank will have about 20,000 components and about 50 tonnes of the best quality steel. About 80,000 working hours should be required for its manufacture. It should be recalled that are only six countries manufacture tanks throughout the world [as received]. The Yugoslav military industry, associated in the Community of Armaments (Industries) and Military Equipment of Yugoslavia (ZINVOJ) is made up of 56 enterprises with about 72,000 workers, 1,500 subcontractors, and a further 200,000 workers and about 8,000 researchers in institutes.

Babic Forces, Opponents Clash at Petrinja

LD2602115392 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 26 Feb 92

[Text] According to information provided by the command of the Third Operations Group of the Croatian Army for Sisak and Banija, the biggest armed clash between the Chetniks and members of the occupying Yugoslav Army took place last night in occupied Petrinja. Before the armed clash, tanks were moved from

the Vasil Gacesa Barracks toward the town center. Several strong blasts reverberated in the town and shooting from infantry weapons was heard.

Croatian Army scouts reported that searchlights were trained on the town center. They notified the movements of personnel, transportation and emergency medical aid vehicles. The command believes that the clash was between supporters of Milan Babic and his opponents, i.e. between those who favor the arrival of UN forces and those who are oppose it. Although there is no firm information about the outcome of last night's clash, the Croatian command assessment is that several Chetniks and occupation army members perished and that about 10 were injured.

Hydroelectric Plant Near Sijn 'Destroyed'

LD2802173192 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 1305 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Prime Minister Franjo Greguric sent a letter to the head of the EC monitor mission in Croatia, Joao Guerra Salgueiro, informing him that the hydroelectric works of the Peruca power plant near Sijn were destroyed yesterday. At 1530 yesterday afternoon two or three explosions were heard and a thick cloud of smoke sighted over the dam. The result was a subsequent increase in the water level and an increase in the flow of oil, believed to have been deliberately released by Yugoslav Army forces in control of the dam. Greguric called on the EC mission to try and prevent further destruction and to halt the flow of oil. The Croatian prime minister warned that if the oil spill continues it will float downstream where the water is used for drinking.

JNA Denies Existence of Prison Camps in Krajina

LD2902171992 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1548 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Bihac, Feb 29 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) today denied claims by Croatian authorities about the existence of prison camps in parts of Krajina controlled by the JNA Bihac Corps. Allegations that thousands of Croats have been taken prisoner are the result of the Croatian side's reluctance to admit to the public in large that it has sustained massive losses in combat, the Bihac Corps says in a statement.

The Croatian media, whose reports are subject to censorship regulations introduced by President Franjo Tudjman, put the casualty figure between 5,000 and 20,000 people. The JNA Bihac Corps says that there are only two small prisons in the territory it controls—in the towns of Glina and Korenica—and that "a limited number of prisoners there are waiting to be exchanged." Croatian authorities have been advised to publicly present evidence for their allegations and to invite European Community observers to inspect the alleged facilities. The JNA has also offered to publish the lists of all prisoners in Glina and Korenica.

Krajina Minister Bans Borovo Selo Assembly

LD2902224192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2023 GMT 29 Feb 92

[Text] Knin, 29 Feb (TANJUG)—In connection with the forthcoming session of the Krajina government elected at the Borovo Selo Assembly, Slavko Ozegovic, minister of internal affairs in the government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina which was elected in Knin, issued the following order this evening:

"According to some reports, the illegal and unconstitutional self-styled government from Borovo Selo headed by Goran Hadzic has called a session to be held in Knin. In order not to raise unnecessary alarm in the public, or cause detrimental consequences and endanger peace and citizens' safety the announced session is hereby banned. "As for the beginning of a course for policemen, it will be regulated by a special law in accordance with the law on internal affairs. "The ministry calls for the observance of this order in order to avoid possible unrest and conflicts," the order says in conclusion.

Krajina Leaders To Remain After UN Arrival

LD2402152192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1411 GMT 24 Feb 92

[Text] Vrgin Most, Feb 24 (TANJUG)—Mile Paspalj, president of the assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), has confirmed that the current authorities, from local to republican, will remain in office and the existing regulations continue to be valid on the territory of RSK after U.N. peace-keeping troops arrive. Speaking on the radio station the Voice of Petrova Gora yesterday, Paspalj described as "irrelevant" the speculations and statements of Croatian leaders according to whom the Croatian authorities "will set up their rule on our territories after blue helmets arrive." Paspalj recalled that the peace plan of special U.N. envoy Cyrus Vance was quite clear on that point.

The peace plan envisages that the current authorities in the Republic of Serbian Krajina continue to function after the arrival of blue helmets, which the Croatian authorities dispute. The Serbs created their own republic out of the parts of Croatia where they constitute a majority after Croatia broke away from Yugoslavia and the new Croatian authorities reduced Serbs to a national minority.

Paspalj said that, since the Vance plan calls for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the demilitarization of the Republic of Serbia Krajina, "Krajina will be defended by its people which will only lay down arms." Paspalj said that the Republic of Serbian Krajina would continue to invest efforts for "a peaceful solution of the conflict" with croatia, under U.N. auspices.

The assembly president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina set out that the local police forces "will most likely include honest Croats, who are even now included

in the defense system" of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. He specified, however, that that would not be the case with those who "have participated in Croatian para- military formations."

Croatia Fears Losing Krajina to UN Deployment

92BA0530B Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 92 p 14

[Article by Milan Jajcinovic: "Croatian Fears About the Arrival of the Peacekeeping Forces"]

[Text] Two fears have wormed their way through Croatia in the last month or two. Both have an ethnic coloring. And they are related to the possible arrival of United Nations troops. Generalizing, one can say that the Croats are afraid that arrival of the men with the blue helmets will result in breaking away the "Krajinas" from Croatia, while the Serbs take the opposite view—that this is precisely what will not happen. Are these fears well-founded?

In the Croatian public, there have long been things that were not clear, stories, uncertainties, suspicions, and fears related to what Cyrus Vance's plan will bring. That is always the way it is when there is a shortage of information and an abundance of interpretations, as has been the case with the peace plan. The Croatian side has been telling its story, and the Serbian side its own. After the television program "The Big Picture," many dilemmas vanished, it turned out that the UN document has most frequently been interpreted any way the interpreter wanted. Nor was the Croatian side free of these dislocations of the Vance plan. On the contrary, until just two day ago the possible arrival of the peacekeeping forces was interpreted only in Croatia's favor. But the Serbian side spoke of this document in its own way and in its own favor. If the Serbian "reading of Vance" can be reduced to a lie as a "Serbian metaphor," then the Croatian reading can be referred to as normative optimism.

The Reading of Vance

For Croatia, the Vance plan, in spite of the suspicions accompanying it, was never in question in and of itself. Croatia itself was calling for the peacekeeping forces to come, trying in this way to obtain peace and control over the occupied regions. Suspicions of something being "loaded," of certain political deceptions, actually a plot, which supposedly was directed against Croatia, arose after the arrival of special UN emissary Marrack Goulding and the report of Boutros Ghali. After all, the papers of both went below the level of Vance's document. Goulding and Ghali in that way only fed the suspicions. Especially Goulding, who brought into the political negotiations—along with Croatia, Serbia, and the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]—a fourth side as well—the "Krajinas." Having turned the political triangle into a quadrangle, the special emissary gave rise to uncertainty, fear, rejection, and even revulsion toward the plan.

For Croatia, the biggest problem is whether it will have authority or not in the present occupied territories when the UN soldiers come. The interpretation has long been that it will. Only the television statement of the Croatian prime minister and two deputy prime ministers cleared up the speculation about Croatia's powers in the new situation. With his statement that with the arrival of the peacekeeping forces Croatia is temporarily losing control where they go, Dr. Milan Ramljak quite certainly disappointed many people, embittered others, and perhaps even placated some.... But in spite of the diversity of impressions, it is only after Ramljak's statement (and what was said by Dr. Franjo Greguric and Dr. Zdravko Tomac) that a sense of reality unambiguously returned. That sense which the Croatian public and Croatian policy needs so badly. That is, not excessively great expectations, nor a priori rejection.

A Sense of Reality

The UN forces are not coming to Croatia so that they themselves might protect the Serbian "Krajinas," to sanction the status quo established "with guns," as Branko Kostic, Borisav Jovic, and Blagoje Adzic would like to represent. If the arrival of the soldiers with the blue helmets is only what they are saying, then Milan Babic quite certainly would not be so much against their disembarkation. If their arrival is only supposed to seal the separation of the "Krajinas" from Croatia—as Jovic and Kostic say—why would Babic and those who think like him oppose their deployment in the regions under their control? Why, then, is Babic seeking a referendum on the Vance plan?

There are passages in the Vance plan which are unclear, unclarified, and obtuse. This especially applies to the definition of local authority and police. This is probably what caused the differing and actually contradictory interpretations, interpretations consistent with the principle that "the world is what I want it to be and how I conceive it." On both sides. Milan Babic showed that he is not an advocate of that kind of solipsistic view of Cyrus Vance's proposal by seeking a referendum on the Vance plan. His referendum questions actually leave no room for any dilemma—because if someone is in favor of the Vance plan, then he is in favor of the "Krajina" within Croatia, the departure of the JNA, and the laying down of arms, while if he favors a "modified Vance plan," then he is for the "Krajina" outside Croatia, for the JNA to remain, and for the retaining of weapons. Who among those who vote in the referendum will vote for the original plan of the American diplomat and not be called a traitor?

War and Peace

The West has been talking unceasingly about human and minority rights, often turning toward Croatia, expecting

it to follow the political holies of the West as far as the Serbs in Croatia are concerned. It fails to see that the renegade segment of the Serbs is not concerned with any human rights, nor rights of any other kind. They want their own "Krajina," even though they have no rights whatsoever within it. For them, the arrival of the blue helmets—as one of the "officials" of the so-called SRK [Serbian Republic Krajina] Lazar Macura said the other day—signifies "occupation in the name of Croatia." For that reason, in spite of the real or fictitious pressures of the top Serbian leadership, it is not very likely that the Krajina people will consent to the UN soldiers being deployed through their "state," even in spite of the epic glibness of B. Kostic, who is saying that "what has been gained by war can now best be kept by peace."

Nevertheless, it is possible that a big game is being played here, that Babic and his partners have the task—agreed to in the recent Belgrade "pan-Serb meeting"—of provoking the Croatian Army to go into action by their refusal to consent to the arrival of the peacekeeping forces. The consequence would be charges against Croatia for breaking the truce and for committing "aggression" against the "Krajina." That possibility, to whatever extent it seems like nothing more than speculation, is perhaps suggested by the statement of Blagoje Adzic, that in this case a military strike by his army would be justified. Because Serbia is increasingly alone and isolated, because the JNA is economically exhausted and in a state of internal disorder, the Army and the top Serbian leadership need a breather and an opportunity to represent themselves to the world as possible "defenders" and "peacemakers."

The Military Option

Although Vance's plan envisages demilitarization of the regions where the peacekeeping forces are supposed to go, it is not certain that this will happen, and even if it does, that this will be a simple and easy matter. This can be judged from the statements of certain "Krajina officials." For example, the former president of what once was Titova Korenica, and now probably some of the numerous ministers of the "SRK" have said that there can be no departure of the Army from the regions of the "Serbian Republic Krajina," because this is not some army that has come from elsewhere, but an army consisting "90 percent of people from the Krajina." If we add to this the recent statement by Andrija Raseta, the odd army negotiator, that the JNA does not intend to withdraw from those regions of Croatia "where the Serbs represent 2 or 3 percent," it is obvious that on the army-Serbian side they have not given up the military option for splitting off the "Krajinas" from Croatia and rounding out a new Serbian state, which would continue to be called Yugoslavia.

But if the peacekeeping helmets arrive in what is now the occupied area of Croatia, the first question that will arise is the return of the refugees. American ambassador Warren Zimmerman recently spoke about this as a priority issue. How this would be achieved remains unknown, and it is generally known that everything new and unknown is feared. That fear is particularly justified and magnified in those who have been driven out, who have witnessed the abuse and even killing of their closest relatives, who have witnessed the atrocities of those who until recently were their acquaintances and neighbors. How are they to be persuaded to return to the place from which they were driven? How are they to be won over to voluntarily place themselves again under the authority of those who abused them and ultimately made them poor and homeless?

The Status Quo

Maintaining the status quo, as envisaged by the peace plan, will probably not encourage many people to return without fear to the place they had to leave against their will. There will be great uncertainty about returning, because actually there are few who can imagine how life will go on in a territory that is supposed to be controlled by the blue helmets. There are those who think, and whose opinions are turned into suspicion, that actually no one knows what actually will happen with the borders, that actually everything is still an open political question. Serbian propaganda is launching precisely such an assertion, that the arrival of the United Nations soldiers constitutes only a "freeze" of the present arrangement in the "Krajinas," which later will quite certainly result in their gaining "the right to self-determination" and their annexation to Serbia.

All the relevant European documents speak about the impossibility of changing borders. All of the most influential European and world politicians are also saying that they cannot recognize any border changes brought about by war. But even the Badinter Commission and especially official American policy—for all the respect paid to that principle—are also allowing an additional possibility—that borders "may be changed by agreement." The Croatian fear of Croatia's political future—in spite of all the assurances that there will be no changes of Croatian borders—derives in fact from such a possibility. The fear also arises from the United States' delay in recognizing Croatia and its indirect talk about an "overall solution of the Yugoslav crisis." Certain unclear things in the Vance plan and the Ghali modification have only increased the spheres. Which is what makes the question relevant: What are the blue helmets bringing?

Tudjman's Adviser on Acceptance of Vance Plan

92BA0551D Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Dr. Mario Nobilo, adviser to the president of the Republic for foreign policy, by Vasva Mazele, excerpted from a conversation on the radio program "Let's Get It Straight!" in Zagreb on 14 February: "Would Armored Trains Be Better?"]

[Text] [Mazele] Following the immoderate and hasty statements made by certain leading Croatian political figures, it is fairly difficult to persuade the ordinary Croat that the UN peace plan, or more simply, the Vance Plan, is not harmful to Croatia, but beneficial. Or at least that the benefit is incomparably greater than the harm. Last Friday, on the program over Croatian Radio entitled "Let Us Get It Straight!" Dr. Mario Nobilo, adviser to the president of the Republic for foreign policy, provided some answers about the reasons why the peace plan had to be accepted. When two or more conflicting parties decide to resolve their conflict by peaceful means, then this also presupposes that they are ready for certain compromises. And that is why in this conversation we are not looking for the defects in the Vance Plan, which undoubtedly exist. We are not asking Mr. Nobilo what will happen when the blue helmets come to Croatia, but we are asking the much more important question of what would have happened if Croatia had rejected the UN peace plan?

[Nobilo] What certainly would have happened if Croatia had rejected the peace plan (although it cannot be altogether satisfied with one part of it, because it does not resolve all its problems at the very outset, but certainly does so through a process) is that Croatia would have been accused of obstructing peaceful processes, of blocking the peace conference, and of wanting a continuation of the war following international recognition. The second consequence would have been that Croatian territory truly would have been liberated, but perhaps with another 50,000 dead, which is a great responsibility that someone would have to assume, together with the responsibility for the utter destruction of the remaining industrial capacity and cities in Croatia. We would have caused our friends great difficulties, and we would have had difficulty explaining why we entered upon such a risky undertaking. I think that we then would have been accused of doing it in order to start a war in Bosnia, because it probably would have been a consequence of continuation of the war in Croatia. It would have been hard to contain that conflict, to localize it in Croatia. Accordingly, immense risks for Croatia would have come out of that.

Cooperativeness Has Paid Off

[Mazele] Why is there distrust of the peace plan?

[Nobilo] I do not understand why the public is so very distrustful. Much the same is true of the Hague Conference. Diplomacy has its definite stages and sequences. It was always said "they will deceive us, they will never recognize us," yet nevertheless that did happen. The Palestinians have been fighting for decades just to get to the negotiating table. I would like to emphasize how important it is for us to be cooperative in that process, even when we think that to some minor extent it does not even do everything to accommodate us. That is, the arrival of the peacekeeping forces automatically raises the question of American recognition, American recognition raises the question of membership in the United Nations, the IMF, and elsewhere. Further, it makes it possible for the peace conference to continue, along with all those things favorable to the Croatian side opened up by the completion of the peace process. Accordingly, compared to the real gains of the Croatian state and Croatian interests, it is not an essential concession at all if in coming months, until certain elections take place, until that peacekeeping operation is completed, we approach this with the same flexibility and cooperativeness that we showed at the Hague Conference. This has certainly paid off, and it culminated in international recognition.

[Mazele] Actually, the greatest problem is the territory of Knin, it is felt that nothing will change if authority is established according to the prewar ethnic composition, that the war criminals will "preserve" peace and order wearing official insignia, and that that situation could persist for a long period of time.

[Nobilo] Look, if the army pulls out with its equipment, if the Serbian paramilitary forces are disarmed, along with all those "white eagles" and the rest, if there remain there only a few hundred policemen under the direct supervision of representatives of the United Nations, who, then, would be directly part of their patrols, then one can hardly expect any very serious incidents. We will, of course, try to get as many "normal" people as possible in that local police during this transitional period, rather than psychopaths, but this again depends on how the entire model functions. But the most essential thing is that you have thousands of UN soldiers there who are monitoring transportation routes, who are present everywhere. I believe that more and more of those most radical Serbs, the leaders and the rest, will immediately or gradually withdraw to Serbia. Viewed over the long run, I am not worried, but, of course, we have to get through that period until Croatia's sovereignty over those areas is finally restored and certain new relations are brought about both with the Serbs, those who will remain in those regions, and also with Serbia. We have to take the long view, not over five months, but over 50 years into the future.

Learning Democracy

[Mazele] Should not public statements concerning a matter so decisive for us as the Vance Plan is now be made more cautiously? What is the advice of the adviser in this respect?

[Nobilo] I advise caution, of course, but it is difficult to control, and in general there is not even any need for control. This is a matter of everyone's responsibility, because you cannot issue daily instruction on what they can and cannot say. Often it is not a question of bad intentions. It is simply a question of insufficient knowledge of the facts, because so much of this has been happening rapidly that it is difficult to have all the information. And the information changes from hour to hour. That is one thing, and another thing is that there is a great deal of emotion in those statements. Now this is

counterproductive, because Croatian policy is read above all from the statements of its leaders, regardless of who is in question, and then mistaken assessments and forecasts are made, people start marking every word, and so on. That is why we should be open to the media, but we should above all deal with the facts, with arguments. Everything else, everything at the level of emotions, statements such as "they do not have as many Chetniks as we can kill," has an adverse effect on Croatian policy. The less emotion there is in the statements, the better it is, I think, for the Croatian side.

[Mazele] Nevertheless, the assessments and comments are often made with a speed inappropriate to the event. That is why the public's general impression of the Vance Plan should be corrected now, subsequently.

[Nobilo] We are a young state and a young democracy, and I think that we are all learning those mechanisms. Some of the foreign services on the soil of the former Yugoslavia have quite a bit of experience in this regard and know when they should and when they should not comment on certain things. But, I repeat, the war is on our side, the war is not being waged in Serbia, it is being waged here, and under those conditions it is difficult to make judicious and well-controlled statements, over a distance of time and measured. Everything will fall into its place, and I think that, taken all in all, it did not seem as terrible as it might have been, given the conditions under which people were operating. But I agree with you that we should sleep on it before we go into details. There are a great many things which complicate our position because of such statements, because then people fix onto details.

The EC Is Already Preparing Assistance

[Mazele] How much has international recognition helped Croatia, and in what way?

[Nobilo] International recognition has strengthened the Croatian position exceedingly, not only morally, but also politically. I repeat, Croatia must accept the rules of the game that are valid in the world and behave cooperatively even when it is not altogether satisfied with certain elements and when it thinks that certain things ought to go faster. Let me reveal just one detail. If after international recognition Croatia had behaved crossly, all forms of bilateral and multilateral aid would have been frozen, especially that of the European Community, which already has a plan prepared in this regard. And that is not even to mention how complicated Croatia's political position would have become. What is the point of risking everything Croatia has just gained because of impatience, because of a desire for revenge? It is the moral victor of this war, it is also the military victor of this war. But it must capitalize on that now, over the next year. Everyone knows about Croatia now. And we must make maximum use of that moral capital which we have in the world for aid, for investments, for the reconstruction of Croatia.

[Mazele] Not only ordinary people, but politicians, still do not know that politics is not fair. So it is no wonder that the public is convinced that the Vance Plan is not sufficiently fair toward Croatia.

[Nobilo] Anyone who has illusions that politics is conducted according to certain sympathies, antipathies, and great principles and so forth is not cut out to be a politician. You have to know how to take maximum advantage of your strength, your knowledge, your geopolitical position, and the constellation of international powers, which change from day to day. That is the art of diplomacy. And only then come certain principles to which you appeal, or you must satisfy a certain minimum of democracy if you are to play that game at all. But above all, reaction is based on interests, and only afterward on principles. The Kurds are the best example of that: When they were necessary to a particular policy in their region, then they were encouraged to rebel. When they were no longer necessary, then conscience was salved with food packages which were dropped down to them from airplanes so that then they would kill each other over those packages. This is the cynicism of world politics, and one needs to have both strength and organization if he is to defend his own interests on such principles. But in and of itself it is difficult to realize the right of the Kurd people through any charters or by appealing to charters.

The Peacekeepers Are Better Than Repression

[Mazele] The lesson is that politics is the art of the possible?

[Nobilo] Many people make a mistake, especially those who by their statements encourage the attitude that the process can begin repressively. Those processes, military and political, cannot be "cooled off" by arresting as many Serbs as possible. Those who personally, regardless of military regulations and regardless of the laws of war and humanitarian laws, killed innocent civilians will certainly be brought to criminal prosecution. But it is certain that relations should be built on certain new foundations, and time is absolutely working in favor of stabilization in this area. I assume that the peacekeeping forces can do this far better.

Imagine the situation if we had gone into Knin, if we had defeated Knin militarily, if pockets of resistance had remained there. Just how, what armored trains would be able to go through that kind of Knin? This way, we will nevertheless have thousands of UN soldiers in that area who will be patrolling, who will be preventing incidents. And time will do the rest.

JNA Interference Cited in Croatian Islands

92BA0551A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Zoran Franicevic: "Lastovo and Vis—Croatian Falklands?"]

[Text] Vis—The wind called the "jugo" has begun on the occupied "Croatian Falklands." Vis and Lastovo, the Adriatic's strategic "Siamese twins," are as far from one

another as two satellites of the same planet, connected only by mere gravity. To get from Komiza to Lastovo (via Split), one needs to travel 15 hours by land and sea, but during the blockade and tension there was no way to do it. To think about Vis during the occupation is also to think about Lastovo, but also about Palagruza, Bisevo, and Svetac.

Last night, I visited the cafe "Bane" on Komiza; its owner, whose family is from Svetac, commented on the fact that the people "best off" in this war are his grandmother Jurka (82) and his Aunt Antonija (65) on Svetac, 14 nautical miles west of Komiza in the direction of Italy. It is always the same for them whether it is communism or democracy, whether it is war or peace. Look at the map and find Svetac or Sveti Andrija.

Palagruza, which is 42 nautical miles from Komiza and 24 from Italy is nevertheless Komiza's, i.e., Croatia, because the Komiza fishermen have fished there for centuries. Three families of lighthousekeepers "on the outermost rim of the Adriatic" watch only the regular news programs on television, because they receive only enough fuel to run the system, the amount it takes to heat three offices in the building of the harbor master's office in the port of Split.

Alive With the Aid of St. Nicholas

What do Jurka and Antonija on Svetac and the families of Palagruza and Aunt Dina, alone on the Bisevo plateau, think about the parishes, the election law, what do they think about the war?

Goran Fadic, a fisherman from Komiza, has not been lucky during the past year, but then again it is only by luck that he has stayed alive. First, his boat sank, then a destroyer near Svetac shot in his direction during a drill (!?), and then a few days ago they opened fire on him and his "mate" Josip Tipic from an emplacement near Smokovo, on the southeast side of Vis. Tipic was wounded in the arm. Goran stepped on the gas and under a rain of bullets, with the help of St. Nicholas, fled around the point in the direction of Milna. While the destroyer near Svetac was firing on these fishermen, Jurka and Antonija hid in a cave, thinking that the army was attacking Svetac.

Officers in a Carob Mill

The Komiza cooperative is run by a managing board on which the three key men average 70 years of age. Nevertheless, the carob mill did start up. They bring the locust pods from other islands and areas. I do not know another Adriatic island where the carob mill is still operating. Komiza carob is too meaty, so they mix it with the others. There are four lads working the mill, former officers of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. They all served on Vis, they all married women from Komiza, and they all "deserted" long ago, on their own or at the call of the Croatian government. It is certain that the glance of one of them rises quite frequently toward Hum Mountain, immediately above Komiza, toward the military observation post and the radar, the point from which the Adriatic can best be seen. He worked up there. Now he is in the carob mill, dusted from head to toe with the finest carob flour.

What do the former officers of the former JNA think about the occupation of Vis? What does a man think after 19 years of service on Vis, when he obtained a place to live in Komiza, and now, a Muslim from Bosnia, he has fallen in love with a woman from Komiza, he is having problems with his citizenship and all the rest? He registered with the employment office, he got the job in the mill, yet he is a military radar specialist. People are not in the mood for taking pictures nor for public statements. There had been two local boys working in the Komiza carob mill, but they could not stand the noise. The former officers obediently obeyed the notice from the employment office and they slave away all day for 10,000 dinars.

Murdered Islands

People brought up in the city cannot easily recognize what a murdered island looks like. The mainland has no feedback on how the system is functioning at the outermost edges, which are marginal, but it should realize that what is peripheral can very easily become central. Lastovo is sinking by its own weight, but the Yugonavy is like a millstone around its neck. These two islands are a paradigm of the main problem of East Europe: What to do with the exceedingly cumbersome communist army?

As someone who lives on Komiza, for whom this archipelago is not just a flag on a military chart, I am free to make the remark that Vis, which has already earned the epithet "Adriatic Gibraltar," "little Malta," "England in the Adriatic," is close to becoming the Croatian Falklands. Except that Croatia does not have Margaret Thatcher and the British Royal Navy. It was not for nothing that the crowned heads of France, Austria, Italy, and England have waged war for Vis.

In a time of epochal changes, once or twice in 100 years, Vis ceases to be the periphery and suddenly people begin to think about it at a high international political and military level. The Croatian government will not solve this problem in negotiations with General Raseta in the foreground and Admiral Mamula in the background. Nothing could come of that. As I write this, the circle has been closed: Momir Bulatovic has announced over the "News" on Croatian TV that Prevlaka was never Croatia. So, the issue of Vis and Lastovo has been clarified: It will not be easy to get Mamula's soldiery out of this part of Croatian territory! Croatia cannot wait as long as Mamula and his vanity would like.

Adm. Letica is threatening to drive the Yugoarmada out of the Croatian section of the Adriatic by hook or by crook, because Croatia cannot wait forever. The Croatian Indians on the reservations of Vis and Lastovo

have fewer and fewer chances of solving their problem by peaceful political means. The occupier h begun to dig in.

What Mr. Vock Will Say

The Croatian government does not have too much time to think about the occupied, but still not drastically affected, people on Vis, Komiza, and Lastovo, much less about Jurka, Antonija, Dina, and the families on Palagruza. Mr. Klaus Vock is coming to Vis this evening from the German Committee for Human Rights and Democracy. He is being escorted here by Tonci Kuzmanic of the Ljubljana Peace Institute, who comes from Vis. A few of the remaining young soldiers from Vis will try to help Minister Separovic, who comes from Korcula, to lift the problem of Vis and Lastovo to the level of the European Parliament. They have established contact with Greenpeace, with the Italians, Dr. Stambuk, who is from Brac, and Count Doimi de Lupis (Frankopan), who is from Vis, in London.

If Bisevo, Svetac, and Palagruza are mentioned in Strassbourg, we will know that we have made the impossible connection. But then it was not so very long ago when the recognition of Croatia seemed impossible.

Macedonia

President Meets with Russian Ambassador

LD0203000892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1937 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] Skopje, Feb 28 (TANJUG)—President of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov today met with the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Yugoslavia, Gennadiy Shishkin. During the meeting, Gligorov said that recognition for this Yugoslav Republic was crucial to peace and security in Europe. Ambassador Shishkin paid a one-day working visit to Macedonia at the invitation of Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Denko Malevski.

The Republican Foreign Ministry says in a statement that President of the Macedonian Assembly Stojan Andov told the Russian Ambassador that the two sides should establish closer parliamentary ties. The statement adds that in their meetings with the Russian Ambassador, Macedonian Premier Nikola Kljusev said that Russia and Macedonia had not explored all the potential for economic cooperation, and Foreign Minister Malevski said that it was necessary to recognize the right to self-determination to the Yugoslav Republics which had sought international recognition.

Macedonia is one of the four Yugoslav Republics which have applied to the European Community for international recognition. Greece has vetoed Macedonia's application on the grounds that this Yugoslav Republic cannot use the name of Macedonia because it implies territorial claims on Greece.

There is a region in northern Greece which is called Aegean Macedonia. Macedonia has so far been recognized only by Turkey and Bulgaria. Ambassador Shishkin said that the leadership of the Russian Federation was closely monitoring developments in Yugoslavia. The Russian Federation has recognized the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia, but it has repeatedly stressed the need for preserving Yugoslavia. Preservation of Yugoslavia is the aim also of Serbia and Montenegro which have reached agreement to this effect. Serbia and Montenegro are the only two Yugoslav Republics which were internationally recognized at the time Yugoslavia was formed in 1918.

Montenegro

Over 50 Percent Vote in 'Successful' Referendum

LD0103185192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1758 GMT 1 Mar 92

[Text] Titograd, 1 Mar (TANJUG)—The referendum in Montenegro on the future state and legal status of the republic has been successful. According to the republican electoral commission, nearly 208,000 citizens of Montenegro, more than 50 percent of the electorate, had cast their votes by 1700 [1600 GMT]. Thus, the main requirement for a successful referendum has been met.

Serbia

Support for Bosnian Krajina Republic Questioned

AU2802155692 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Feb 92

[Text] The news has spread that the Republic of Bosnian Krajina is being proclaimed today. This has caused a fair amount of excitement, but not one single legitimate organ is supporting it. Branislav Bozic reports from Banja Luka:

[Begin Bozic recording] It is true that some 20 people are meeting behind closed doors at the Bosna Hotel in Banja Luka today. They are mainly former leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party who lost their places in the party on various occasions. They are the ones who spread the news that the Republic of Bosnian Krajina is being founded here.

Neither the regional committee nor any communal committee of the party are supporting this move. The meeting is not attended by deputies of the regional assembly nor the republican parliament, who were elected at the elections.

Therefore, we are talking about people who are not authorized to make such a decision. Actually, they are part of the Serbian National Council, which was founded about one and one-half years ago but has not met since the founding of the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Bosnian Krajina, which has virtually taken over the role of parliament for Krajina.

All Bosnian Krajina deputies are attending the session of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina in Sarajevo. The Regional Assembly session is scheduled for tomorrow. The assembly is supposed to resolve the political riddle of Bosnian Krajina. [end recording]

Croats Order Destruction of Serbian Houses

LD2802154192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1608 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Text] Belgrade, February 27 (TANJUG)—The Association of Serbs from Croatia announced today that the top representatives of Croatian authority Stjepan Mesic, Josip Manolic and Slavko Degoricija, during their recent stay in Daruvar, "ordered the 121 Ustasha Battallion to blow up the remaining Serbian houses in the Daruvar community, (in western Slavonija)." This action was aimed at preventing refugees of Serbian nationality from the Croatian region of western Slavonija, of ever returning to their homes.

Towards the end of last year and at the beginning of this year, a large number of Serbs fled from this area under pressure from the Croatian authorities and Army. The announcement issued by the association of Serbs from Croatia says that the following Serb villages have been destroyed: Batinjani, Donja Vrijeska, Gornja Vrijeska, Donji Borci, Gornji Borci, Veliki Bastaji, Korencani, Brdjani, Bijela, Lisicine, Pivnice, and other villages.

The house of Rade Radosavljevic (a Serb by nationality) in the Croatian town of Daruvar, was blown up two nights ago. Rade Radosavljevic, his wife and two under age sons were killed, announced the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] Banja Luka Corps Information Service. Members of the Croatian paramilitary arrested 25 villagers in the village of Imasovac near Daruvar on February 19 and accused them of possessing weapons, which however, were not found.

They searched all the Serb houses in the village and brutally beat up and abused the unarmed serbs, writes the Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI today. Three villagers from Imasovac aged 16 to 18 were arrested on February 25, two of whom suffered heavy bodily injuries, add VECERNJE NOVOSTI.

Albanians To Vote on Autonomy 1-2 Mar

LD2402180492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1729 GMT 24 Feb 92

[Text] Presevo, 24 Feb (TANJUG)—Albanians living in the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedje in southern Serbia will vote on their territorial and political autonomy at a referendum planned for 1 and 2 March, it was stated at today's press conference in the municipal committee of the Party for the Democratic Activity of Albanians [Stranka za Demokratsko Delovanje Albanaca] in Presevo. Ibrahim Kadriu, president of the referendum commission, spoke about this to journalists from Pristina and Skopje, as well as a few reporters from Presevo. According to organizers, in the local communities of the Presevo municipality inhabited by Albanians, about 45,000 voters registered on the territory of this municipality will vote at 71 polling stations. Albanians temporarily working abroad will also be able to vote on territorial and political autonomy.

Foreign Minister Jovanovic Addresses Assembly

AU2902185992 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1655 GMT 27 Feb 92

[Speech by Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic at the extraordinary session of the Serbian Assembly in Belgrade—live]

[Text] Respected people's deputies, Mr. President, considering that several questions concerning our foreign affairs activities either abroad or in Yugoslavia have been raised during the discussion, I consider it my duty, as well as necessary, to explain some things since I assume that the greatest number of these questions and criticisms are the result of the insufficient knowledge of the problem as a whole, that is to say, a lack of understanding of some aspects of this problem.

On the other hand, after that I would also like to add something to the speech made by the president of the Republic about our foreign affairs activities, because in my view this is necessary if one is to understand better and more correctly the extent to which the activities of our republic are important at this stage of our struggle for breaching the political-information blockade and affirming our total policy, both internal and foreign, as a peace- loving, constructive, and democratic policy.

Regarding the questions connected with the blue helmets and whether they can be transformed into intervention forces, there is nothing unclear about this, because the blue helmets are peacekeeping forces that represent and carry out peace operations of the United Nations, and not the forces that make peace. They safeguard the peace that has already been established and make sure that clashes are not renewed. They are not intervention forces that would fight the sides involved in the conflict and impose peace. This is the essential difference.

The United Nations had the job of making peace only once, in Korea. However, there were different conditions for this, and different decisions were made. In this case, this possibility does not exist at all, and these forces are not even armed for any other kind of job except to preserve peace and the freedom and safety of the population as the precondition for the continuation of the negotiating political process aimed at overcoming the total Yugoslav crisis.

Regarding the destroyed cultural monuments and churches of the Serbian people in the Serbian Krajinas, I would like to inform this distinguished assembly that the government made sure that UNESCO was informed in time about details and facts of all this at its annual

meeting. A special document was also submitted. A member of a delegation, who comes from our republic, spoke about it at one of UNESCO's working sessions.

The blue helmets and the arrival of foreign troops are also two different things. There is no contradiction in our principled and continual rejection of the demand to accept foreign military presence and our initiative, I say our initiative because it came from our republic, that the United Nations send blue helmets to ensure the truce and consolidate peace in the sense I spoke about. Foreign military forces belong to national states or groups of states. The United Nations does not have military forces in the classical sense of the word. It only sets them up ad hoc, up to a certain level and for a certain task. Therefore, our traditional understanding of freedom and independence never went together with any kind of compromise regarding the undesired, uninvited presence of a foreign military force, whatever this military force may be.

The continuity of Yugoslavia and independent Serbia. [sentence as heard] I think that in this respect we all hold the same view and all want to protect the same, except that we are expressing ourselves differently. Sometimes the impression is created that we want different things. I do not doubt that all the citizens of Serbia want the national and state interests of Serbia and the Serbian people as a whole to be protected as much as possible, in the fullest possible way, if this is possible. In this respect, Yugoslavia as the framework that most completely ensures both the national right of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia to live in a common state and the possibility to fight for this right if developments inhibit some sections of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia, is an achievement that has never been an improvisation of any generation, including the previous. Yugoslavia is simply the result of the struggles of the generations over several hundreds of years that was handed over to us and that we cannot throw away nor deprive future generations of the advantages of this achievement. This is simply a political, historical, moral, and national capital that we must take into consideration in the formulation of any national policy of any party, whether it is in power or not. This is what is relevant in this situation.

The reason is very simple, because the Serbian people in Yugoslavia can express their right to self-determination only in relation to something. This something must exist. This something is their common state. This is Yugoslavia. If Yugoslavia did not exist, if we abandoned it, then the Serbian people would simply not be able to express their right to self-determination, their loyalty to their common state in which they live and in which they want to stay.

Therefore, this is the reason for the Serbian people. Regarding practical, material, political, and legal advantages, it is not necessary to talk about them because they were mentioned on many occasions.

This is primarily helping us in the sense that we do not have to go through the procedure of recognition and face various other humiliating or difficult situations vis-a-vis foreign factors. On the other hand, this is automatically ensuring us the continuation of presence in international organizations, the use of advantages of more than 7,000 signed international conventions and agreements, and, of course, the material advantages that automatically stem from this. If we abandoned this, this capital, we would automatically join the camp of the secessionists and make it 100 percent easier for them to solve their problems. We would also make our situation equally more difficult and would simply make senseless the struggle of previous generations for Yugoslavia, and our persistent, principled, and absolutely justified struggle for loyalty to the country to which we belong, and for its preservation as an expression and synonym for the preservation of our own interests.

As you know, there have been several agreements on truce. The latest, the 15th, is the only one that was really effective. During the discussion some remarks were made that by signing these agreements the president of the republic admitted that Serbia was one side in the war. This is not correct, because facts simply do not confirm this.

The last truce was signed in Geneva. The text explicitly stated that Serbia, although not a side in the conflict, extends political support to the signing of the agreement on truce, because, as the biggest, the most influential republic, it has the greatest potential of enabling the United Nations and its special envoy with its political support to establish the soonest-possible cease-fire. From the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, since the beginning of the war, the cease-fire suited our policy on the settlement of all problems of the Yugoslav crisis in a peaceful and political way within the legal institutions and on the basis of the federal constitution which guaranteed the procedure for resolving of all aspects of the Yugoslav crisis.

Therefore, none of these agreements, especially the last one, can be interpreted directly or indirectly as the acceptance that Serbia is one side in the conflict. None of international factors, the EC, and the United Nations never considered Serbia to be that.

Regarding the United Nations and the Krajinas, the question was asked whether there was a danger of the Croatian armed force one day setting off toward the military vacated regions of the Serbian Krajinas. This is, of course, theoretically possible, but not feasible. There has be no case in the UN practice of a UN peace operation being endangered or prevented because of such an attempt by a military force to deny the UN supreme authority in such regions and try to impose its own will and law. There were individual incidents during which two, three, or five soldiers were killed, but this is all. All those who know what the United Nations mean and what it means to challenge the UN forces are more than sure that there is no state in the world that would be

prepared to make such a suicidal move. Finally, even if this were done, the Croatia would automatically very quickly, with the almost lighting speed, find itself against all countries of the world, the United Nations, with all its capability to mobilize a military force and reject the aggressor.

A question was raised of how the Serbian Krajinas will join Yugoslavia and Serbia. We have never worked toward the Serbian Krajinas joining Serbia because we have never had territorial and other pretensions. From the beginning, our aim has been—and remains and will continue to be—to offer consistent principled unhesitating support for the exercise of the basic national rights of the Serbian people in these krajinas for freedom and security. This was the point of the beginning and end of our entire involvement as a republic in the crisis that arose, as we have heard here and as U.S. Secretary of State Baker stated, because the secessionists in the north used force in order to achieve their aim.

Therefore, the solution for the Krajinas is not in the question of whether they will accede, when and to what, but whether, when, and to what extent they will exercise the legitimate rights they have on the basis of the Constitution of Yugoslavia and on the basis of international legal and political documents and on the basis of self-determination, which is the essence of the proposed document on the so-called special status. This status will be agreed upon by the direct representatives of the Krajina [as heard] and Croatia and, of course, the population will finally be consulted and will have the last word on how they imagine their future: whether they will want to adopt this kind of proposed special status or whether they will ask for something else.

In essence, this involves a way of expressing the right to self- determination, which can be called either a plebiscite or consultations depending on what is agreed upon by the sides negotiating this.

Some republics have their embassies, some do not. We, as known, do not have our embassies, just because we support the legitimacy of Yugoslavia and federal institutions. We support them just because we want to defend our basic national and state interests to the end. This is providing us with some advantages, but this also has some shortcomings. We are aware of both. Meanwhile, in this interregnum we are trying to use and increase our advantages as much as possible, and to protect ourselves from the deficiencies of such a situation as much as possible.

In the meanwhile we are involving our own diplomatic service in a mobile way to fill the gaps in this interregnum and prevent it from causing any serious damage or consequences for our interests and our position in the world.

One esteemed deputy has made a procedural objection to the part of the president's speech in which he cited several times the statements he made about two or more years. I have understanding for this procedural observation, but one should look at the text and understand the reasons for the quote. The quote was only meant to remind, confirm, and affirm the principled, consistent, and energetic efforts by our republic with the support and help of this distinguished assembly, which was extended several times to defend and promote our stands in our republic, in Yugoslavia, and abroad.

In this respect, this reminder was absolutely necessary and useful for us here and for the world to know that our policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis has never been some kind of improvisation, but has always been principled and calculated policy that never demanded for Serbia and the Serbian people what we were not ready to recognize in other constituent peoples in Yugoslavia.

The withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army from the zone that will be under the protection of the United Nations is not a military defeat nor the admission that the Yugoslav People's Army was an alleged aggressor. This is simply a logical fact of the traditional stand and practice of the United Nations that in all such peace operations, there must be a total demilitarization of the area in question because the supreme authority of the United Nations would not tolerate any other kind of parallel authority. This is a principle of the work of the United Nations to which there have been no exceptions in any actions by the United Nations so far in similar cases.

This is also being done according to Cyrus Vance's plan. This essentially means that the federal Army, which has so far had the task of protecting the freedom and security of the biological survival of the Serbian people in these Krajinas, will this time be replaced in this role by the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations. It is much better and safer for freedom and security to be defended by the United Nations and 180 countries of the world rather than by the army of only one country. Finally, this is confirmation of the correctness of our entire stand throughout this entire period that the situation there in these Krajinas involved organized state and military violence against the civilian Serbian population and if this were not the case, if this were not true, the United Nations would not have found it necessary to now send its own forces to replace the federal Army in extending this essential protection to the Serbian population in these Krajinas.

Respected deputies, regarding our foreign affairs activity, we have to remind ourselves once again that it has been conducted and is still being conducted under extremely complex conditions at home and abroad. The starting point was the most unfavorable for our republic because at one time our republic was the only republic that was defending principles, legality, objectivity, and what is even more important, the peace order in this part of Europe and in Europe as a whole. Because of this position, because of this policy, we were exposed to enormous pressure, which has not quite stopped yet, because it was the expressed interest of internal forces in

Yugoslavia and their foreign helpers to, as we know, wipe out Yugoslavia from the political map of the world and to easier achieve secessionist aims and consolidate the gains that would come out of it. Our principled conduct and persistence at the end breached this blockade and the policy of negating Yugoslavia.

As the president said in his speech, we are receiving daily new signals and proof that the entire Yugoslav reality is increasingly being recognized and accepted, and not only the half of that reality, the secessionist half that tried to impose itself on the entire country and the international community. In this context we have reasons to believe that the continuation of the Brussels conference will bring about positive changes regarding the key issues that have so far prevented us from making progress in settling the total Yugoslav crisis, and to further affirm the position and policy of our republic as the policy that is indeed based on reality, on the will of the people, and on the power of law, and not the fiction of the power of political might.

In this context, our struggle for the continuity of Yugoslavia is increasingly close to the acceptance and sanctioning of the international community. The continuity of Yugoslavia, as the president said in his speech, is the synonym for stability in both this region and Europe. Taking everything into account, stability is, after all, the top priority of all, except those for whom the disintegration of Yugoslavia is the absolute priority. There are only few of those and in terms of number and influence, they are, after all, a negligible factor in relation to the interests of a larger and more responsible countries that are increasingly recognizing the meaning of a country with 10 million people, with its stability, consistency, and principles, the country that could again become the pillar for strengthening the total stability in the Balkans.

This turnabout in the thinking and assessment of other countries is the new emerging reality on which we will be able to count more in our peace and political efforts to settle the Yugoslav crisis without the need to sacrifice our own principles or to abandon the option given to us by history and that offers us the firmest ground not only to protect the maximum of the national and state rights and interests in this crisis, but also to ensure to the Serbian people throughout the present-day Yugoslavia chances and opportunities to live in a common state or the continuation of efforts that promise that this will be achieved later.

In this way we are defending the European order of peace, because we are defending the system of peace agreements in the world. This system of peace agreements, the Versailles and other agreements, is being openly attacked. When a founding stone is pulled out of this building of peace agreements, on which European relations are based, the entire European peace order is endangered. In this respect other countries are beginning to realize that what we are fighting for, and we are fighting for the respect of agreements, law, and legality in the broader international context, is also in the interests of other countries. In the period ahead we will have more and more understanding and support for such a stand as ours.

We have included everybody in our political activity with direct political contacts and various forms of bilateral cooperation with all neighboring countries apart from Albania. I say, apart from Albania, because it has directly sinned as regards the basic principles of international law and the norms of good-neighborly relations because it dared to commit the greatest crime in international relations and recognizes the illegal act of setting up the independent state of Kosovo. This will be a subject of international attention at CSCE meetings and other meetings, because this is obviously conduct that is absolutely below all standards and that should not be taken on board or accepted and supported as a possible precedent.

We are, of course, ready to develop good-neighborly relations with Albania because it is a neighboring country with which we have had a lot in common throughout history. We are ready to do this on the principles of good-neighborliness, reciprocity, mutual respect, and non-interference. We should first be given proof that Albania advocates these same principles, and then we will be ready to improve relations and develop cooperation in all spheres with it. Our contacts and cooperation cover most European countries, including all important factors in the Yugoslav crisis and all big countries and international organizations—the EC and the United Nations—and some leading countries in the Nonaligned Movement. We also plan to intensify contacts at different levels, including the highest ones, with a number of other influential countries in the world and in connection with our crisis.

One could conclude from this that the problems that Serbia experiences in the Yugoslav crisis and with many other countries do not lie in the fact that one party is in power or that the president of the republic at the moment is Slobodan Milosevic, but because there exists a clear strategic orientation—in the present assault against Yugoslavia made in an attempt to retailor it—toward making for Serbia the narrowest and tightest coat possible. In this respect, the foreign factors interested in this are completely disinterested in the party in power and the person being the president of the republic. This is confirmed by the fact that even in the past, when we had some obedient groups in power, there was the same pressure and the same strategic aim of breaking Serbia into pieces, weakening it, and keeping it in a powerless and subservient position.

Therefore, in these times of the historic [Jovanovic corrects himself] Yugoslav crisis, we all, as the people, as the citizens of Serbia, whatever position we may occupy, have the same historic responsibility to understand that we are going through very important historic times that demand responsibility in our behavior, our moves, and our mutual relations.

We have all—completely honestly and unreservedly—decided in favor of democracy as a form of life and development, and we must know that democracy can be developed and strengthened only under the conditions of stability and prosperity. Where there is no stability or where stability is called into question, it is impossible and unrealistic to think about strengthening democracy or to expect it to strengthen. Due to this joint interest in putting these democratic institutions into people's conscience and into practice more and more, it is necessary for us to contribute to this greater stability and a greater prosperity in Serbia with our own behavior and our own beliefs. This, however, turns us back to that old sign on our coat of arms that tells us that in all moments of trial and at historical crossroads we must stick together much more than usual and not allow individual or group interests to separate or distance us from this most important goal.

In this respect, our foreign policy should more and more become a policy of national consensus. This is the goal, and this is the reality of all developed democratic countries. The more we achieve this, the more we serve these basic national state interests. In this respect, the government is open to cooperation with all potentials of our society and state and of course, above all with the Parliament and the opposition parties. We are also going to initiate new moves in this respect and are also ready to carefully examine the initiatives and moves that may come from other sides and to adopt a constructive attitude toward these initiatives and moves. We believe that it is only in this way, when we all—the Parliament, the public, and parts of the same political establishment—commit ourselves to this same task, that we will be able to serve the interests of our country in the best way and to make our foreign policy really serve our joint interests in the national sphere.

I would like to thank you. [applause]

Division of Kosovo Considered Possible

92BA0549B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Feb 92 p 10

[Interview with Shkelzen Maliqi, leading Albanian intellectual in Kosovo, by Blazo Davidovic; place and date not given: "'I Am Not Afraid, But I Am Troubled'"]

[Text] Shkelzen Maliqi is one of the distinguished Albanian intellectuals in a fairly recent wave, a category of politicians that arose out of the Kosovo crisis. By contrast with certain other figures on the Albanian alternative political scene, Maliqi is not a lover of nationalistic passions wrapped in the cellophane of epic rhetoric. He does not want to be a leader, but he refuses to be led without his own consent. He resembles Marx in his physiognomy; he is always rational in expression of lucid thoughts and witty comparisons. Maliqi was a student at Belgrade University (philosophy), and was born in 1947 in Orahovac, near Prizren. For a time, he was secretary in the Department of Albanology in the School of Philosophy, and then a staff member in the republic Bureau for Culture, where he worked on conservation of monastery frescoes! He was also on the editorial staff of the journal FJALA, and the Albanian public associates his name with opposition to the pseudointelligentsia. He says of politics that it is "mainly trash," that he lives from his "mother's pension and a bit of writing," and that the Kosovo crisis can be understood by anyone who wishes to and anyone who lives here.

"Nothing new is happening in Kosovo," Maliqi says, "except that the disenfranchisement of the Albanians as a nationality has been intensified and the total polarization of the political programs of Belgrade and the Albanians is still more obvious. Nothing is left of autonomy; last year about 100,000 Albanian workers were driven from their jobs, and we lost the most important and largest independent system that we had; that is, the school system, which involved about 40,000 people. This is an 'either-or' situation, a kind of overture to war. There is a large number of Albanian refugees. People flee not only the consequences of the Serbian policy in Kosovo, but also the possibility of being mobilized and sent to the Croatian front in the ranks of the federal army. In recent months, intensive raids have been conducted in cafes and other public facilities. Many Albanians are going away to foreign countries and seeking political asylum there. I think that Serbia is exerting the strongest pressure on Kosovo through its impoverishment. To be sure, there is a large potential here. I am referring not only to the mentality of the Albanian in general and the Albanian peasant, but also the entrepreneurial spirit of the private operators, aid from abroad in various ways, and also, most important, a majority nevertheless lives off the land."

The Law of Large Numbers

[Davidovic] I do not question that the Belgrade methods are dictatorial, but it seems to me that the Albanian alternative, with its behavior and political conceptions, has not left the impression that it is ready for compromise either.

[Maliqi] Our assessment is that there is nothing to talk about with the present Serbian regime. That is why there has been a change in the Albanian political platform since last year. Now we are seeking the way out not only within the framework of the Serbian state, nor even within the framework of any Yugoslav community. For us Albanians, it has suited us up to now, if Yugoslavia survives, for us to obtain the status of an independent republic. However, even that option has fallen. The Albanians now cannot find themselves in Serboslavia. Kosovo will be an independent political and territorial creation.

[Davidovic] Serbia, however, will not allow that.

[Maliqi] I do not agree with you. Perhaps it will not allow it, depending on how the process of the crisis in these parts develops, and also the way it is resolved, under the supervision of the European and world institutions and

communities. Kosovo is costing Serbia a great deal, and costing it more and more every day. That economic factor is very rarely mentioned in the media, but it is essential, almost decisive. There are two million Albanians on the southern slopes of the Serbian state, and Serbia will soon have to openly say to its people how it intends to solve this "problem" of the Albanian population and birth rate.

[Davidovic] Still, this is only the law of large numbers.

[Maliqi] That is a strong law.

[Davidovic] Would not a territorial division of Kosovo into Serbian and Albanian parts be dangerous? Does not that mean war?

[Maliqi] That solution is delicate, but not unfeasible. This is only one of the rational options being put forward.

[Davidovic] The Albanian opposition is turning toward Tirana to an ever greater extent and more and more frequently. Does this mean recognition of the diplomatic failure at the international level, or is this the beginning of defining the pan-Albanian program?

[Maliqi] The disintegration of Yugoslavia raises many questions, it is not just Kosovo, but also the question of revising many other borders. Then there is also Macedonia, toward which Greece has certain aspirations.... In that sense, it is much easier now to advocate unification with Albania than it was before. Certain Albanian parties have already incorporated this into their programs, and soon this will become the leading option here. Nevertheless, I think that ultimately we should not be in a hurry with all that.

[Davidovic] Albanian unification inevitably signifies a territorial attack on Macedonia. That is, there are a considerable number of Albanians living there, and they could not stand to one side in that pan-Albanian unification. As things develop further, it turns out that there could be a large-scale Balkan war.

[Maliqi] It is difficult to forecast that now, many things are now in the process, we have to see how the political situation develops. I doubt that there could be a Macedonian-Albanian war. Neither Albania nor Macedonia could support that war.

[Davidovic] Let us get back to Kosovo. Internationalization of the Kosovo problem has not improved the situation in this region at all.

[Maliqi] I agree, but much has been done at the diplomatic and international level. I do not think that it was a mistake to internationalize the Kosovo issue. But we could not have expected that the attention of the world political public would be directed so suddenly to Slovenia and then to Croatia. That was all shocking, although I feel that Serbia, through Kosovo, in fact prepared the war in Croatia, which is actually a war for Bosnia. That is simple and dirty mathematics.

Southern Front

[Davidovic] The Albanian media speak about the Gandhian policy of their leaders, that is, of the parties. I do not believe in Gandhi in Kosovo, this is rather mere phrasemaking and a part of political rhetoric. So, is it the same with the southern front?

[Maliqi] There are many reasons for that. First of all, we are neither militarily nor organizationally up to that, at least that has been the case up to now. What is more, the Americans have asked us not to undertake anything reckless. The paradox is that a war in Kosovo would be an internal affair of Serbia. Milosevic's regime needs war booty, that regime must vent its anger somewhere, explode, vent its war passions. If that is not achieved in Croatia, then there is Bosnia, if it fails even there, there always remains Kosovo. What is more, why should the Albanians begin a war when it suits Serbia, that is, Milosevic? War will begin when it suits the Albanians, if there is no other solution, but I hope that there will be. Perhaps some kind of peaceful and political way will nevertheless be found. I think that all of this will end in civil war in Serbia.

[Davidovic] You say that with quite a bit of certainty.

[Maliqi] I think that civil war is a very real thing in the near future for Serbia. To be sure, at this point Milosevic is still playing his game skillfully. He is a strong political figure, regardless of the dangerous and insane political program which he advocates and is shaping, he is not to be underestimated. Nevertheless, he has passed his peak, he is on the decline, and if Draskovic were a slightly stronger political potential, if he had known how to take advantage of the demonstrations in March, Milosevic would no longer be there. Serbia is isolated, it is now without allies, but Milosevic has control over the military, police, and bureaucratic apparatus. It is only a question of how long. Serbia must clear that up on its own.

[Davidovic] What will happen after the pan-Albanian congress in Tirana?

[Maliqi] That political move signifies that there is no longer an Albanian political emigre community, that there are no longer enemies within the Albanian nationality. People no longer count or even remember who was a Partizan and who was a Balist. And no longer are people classified as to whether they are more Albanian or less Albanian.

[Davidovic] Are you frightened by all these predictions of war?

[Maliqi] No, but I am troubled.

Number of Albanians Registered Said Falsified

92BA0551B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 92 p 10

[Article by R. Kovacevic: "How Many Skipetars Really Are There"]

[Text] The police found no fewer than five identity cards on a certain Remzi Hodza, a 30-year-old from a village near Podujevo. The same name, the same photograph, just a different registration number, and a hundred opportunities for various combinations involving the phantom "five" from evading a wide variety of obligations and misappropriations involving checks, all the way to ordinary theft.

Three Decades of Chaos

"Chaos has prevailed for three decades in the opstina administration," they say in the Podujevo SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs]. "The record books were intentionally kept very carelessly, so that now they are in a real mess, and it will take the experts quite a bit of time to straighten them out. There are people who have regularly been receiving a pension although they have not been among the living for 20 years or so! Just as newborn infants are reported several times, in the town where they see the light of day, in the father's and then the mother's home town, and finally where the family is living at the moment, so aggrieved families do not report those who have died either! Much the same is true of passports issued on the basis of multiplied identity cards and issued two or three times with the tacit consent of the authorities. We also have quite a bit to do with those who have obtained 'travel papers' from the Croatian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. When we ask: 'How is this possible, when you are still registered here?' they reply with a shrug of the shoulders."

Then the police put the logical question: How many Skipetars actually are there in Podujevo? We heard similar reactions in Urosevac and Djakovica, and in other places as well. There really is confusion after the boycott of the last census, even with all due caution concerning the destructive effects of the demographic explosion which is evident in Kosovo and Metohija even to the naked eye, as to how many Skipetars there really are.

Momcilo Trajkovic, deputy in the Serbian parliament, says: "According to some estimates, there are just less than 50,000 newborn infants. That is every year for an entire city!"

Vladan Malesevic, a worker from Kosovska Mitrovica, says that in his neighborhood there happen to be an equal number of Serbian, Montenegrin, and Skipetar houses. "All of them always seem to have a little baby crying, children all over the place. Yet we, you know, have only one or two."

Clever Tricks

In the absence of accurate statistics, the provincial authorities are relying on an estimate which, it is said, was produced by applying well-known scientific methods, and according to it there are slightly more than 1.6 million Skipetars in Kosovo and Metohija. Intellectuals in Pristina find that number particularly disturbing. A great number of people you talk to will tell you that it is not only excessively high, but also, willy-nilly, an extension of those manipulations and forgeries from the years when the strategy of the "standard-bearers of Albanian expansionism," as it is called by the Kosovo journal LIDER, was taking shape.

Now all the phases of the deceptions practiced in the province since 1948, when slightly fewer than half a million Skipetars were recorded in Kosmet by the census, and that included the Turks who were not recognized as an ethnic minority, are being unriddled. The greatest breakthrough of political demography took place in the province in 1971, right after the period of the purges that were initiated by the Brioni Plenum. Analysis of certain cases that belong in the tragic past, such as the blows to Kadri Reufi, to the integrity of the Goranci and Muslims, and also the blame put on "the policy of Serbian expansionism" in connection with the problem of the Gypsies in the province, is now parting certain strange waves, and more realistic conclusions are finally being drawn. The falsification of demography was put at the service of ethnic majority rule, says Dr. Lazar Stojanovic, who is concerned with these problems. The unscrupulous false figures, he adds, provided an inexhaustible arsenal not only for pressures on the Serbs and Montenegrins to move out, but also to obtain immense funds for investment and the budget, and here it was Serbia that was turned to (most naturally) as the donor. The consequences are manifold, but they can be felt most easily in the neighboring region of Toplica: This purely Serbian region, whose development has been neglected, has been living through a democratic agony, also for decades.

Only the next censuses in Kosovo can show how many Skipetars there really are in Kosovo, but only if respect is paid to the professional aspect and under the protective authority of the law-governed state. It is difficult, however, to speak about the disastrous consequences of a mindless policy without those who are reproducing, but that already is part of the enigma of the "Kosovo silence."

Kosovo Editor Sees No Long-Term Serbia Solution

92BA0549C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Feb 92 p 7

[Interview with Bierim Shala, editor in chief of ZERI I RINISE, by Nadira Avdic-Vllasi in Pristina; date not given: ""Serbia Is Certainly Losing in Kosovo""]

[Text] Pristina—Bierim Shala, editor in chief and managing editor of the best newspaper and only weekly in the Albanian language, ZERI I RINISE [VOICE OF YOUNG PEOPLE], has behind him at the age of 28 six years of work as a journalist, two in political activity: The Serbian police have arrested him twice and called him in six times for informative talks in the state security service of Serbia. In Kosovo, he is thought to be the best journalist in the young generation.

Newsmen in Kosovo, in the shadow of what is happening in Croatia, have become a target for the revenge of the Serbian authorities. They are called in, they are mistreated, they are convicted because of what they publish. At the end of last year, in violation of its own Law on Information, Serbia sentenced Bierim Shala to two months in prison, and then released him after 23 days. Now, however, Sanija Gashi, editor in chief of the Albanian women's magazine KOSOVARJA, is serving this so-called instant sentence for Albanian intellectuals in the Mitrovica prison.

Real Journalism

[Avdic-Vllasi] It seems that all those who advocate more vigorous democratic forms of resistance are victims of Serbian repression, especially among intellectuals.

[Shala] I am convinced that this is the case, because they want to block everything that falls outside that nonsensical logic of passive resistance, which is actually not resistance. They let it be known publicly and internally that that passivity suits them.

[Avdic-Vllasi] What brought on such interest of the Serbian authorities in Albanian journalists? They are no longer organizing big political trials, but pronouncing misdemeanor verdicts and often calling them in for so-called informative talks.

[Shala] Precisely in a period when journalists are writing without that earlier emotion, the newspapers are beginning to have a more considerable influence in shaping public opinion and not just following the activity of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, journalists are becoming the target of still stronger repression. I have the impression that the Serbian state is extremely bothered by the real journalism, which is telling the truth about Kosovo. ZERI I RINISE has a special place in that regard.

[Avdic-Vllasi] Does that mean that every issue of your newspaper is problematical, and that you can always anticipate another 60 days in prison?

[Shala] I think that all those threats should not be taken too seriously, that one should not refrain from protest or writing because of them. Unfortunately, there are cases when journalists are getting killed at the front, which is a tragedy for every one of us in this profession. They are being killed in trying to write the best possible story, but what is happening to journalists in Kosovo is unique in the world.

[Avdic-Vllasi] At the end of last November, you were suddenly arrested, sentenced for a misdemeanor to 60 days in jail, and you served 23 days. What happened that time, and how did it happen?

[Shala] My turn came on 28 November, when an issue of ZERI I RINISE came out with a title page that showed a two-headed eagle, the Albanian symbol, of course, without the red star. Supposedly, they were also punishing me because of certain articles and publishing the ethnic map of the regions in which Albanians lived as some kind of expanded Albania. As a matter of fact, a map of expanded Serbia and expanded Croatia was also published in the same issue, because that was the topic of the article. But the charge for the misdemeanor said that I had been charged because the newspaper was banned. In the Pristina prison, they immediately shaved my head, it was cold, I was not given even the minimum conditions, not even a bed, I soon became infested with lice, and got sick.... I was released when the verdict was set aside. If I had remained the full two months, it is some question whether I would ever have recovered my health.

[Avdic-Vllasi] What are the differences in defensive strategy among Albanian political representatives?

[Shala] There are two extreme versions. Passivity and a waiting strategy on the one hand and total warfare on the other. There are no advocates of war within the political parties. Albanians have neither their own police nor army. However, the space between these two extremes has long been incompletely filled. The Democratic Alliance of Kosovo believes that something can be done with weekly press conferences. I think that this is extremely difficult. And also that diplomatic activity is not on the level it should be.

Passive Resistance Is Not Resistance

[Avdic-Vllasi] From time to time, the public gets reports that there are disagreements among those who speak in the name of the Albanians.

[Shala] There is no active resistance, positions have been lost that we had with the international public in 1990, we were neither in the Hague nor in Brussels, nor are there peacekeeping troops that intend to come to Kosovo. That is the basis of the conflict among Albanian representatives. We have only the democratic option—a democratic option which presupposes two alternatives: either by way of democracy to freedom or by way of freedom to democracy. This is not a play on words, because we feel that through democracy we cannot arrive at the Republic of Kosovo. There is also another group which thinks that we should first arrive at a republic by means of an illegal proclamation.

[Avdic-Vllasi] Are the Kosovo Serbs satisfied at least?

[Shala] I do not believe so. They see that they have never had less authority in Kosovo, because Kosovo is being run by the police, the Serbian state security service, as

though power had been handed over to a receiver. Last year, Bogdan Kecman declared that it was possible to mobilize 63,000 Kosovo Serbs for the front in Croatia. However, when the command of the Pristina Corps announced a competition for volunteers with a great deal of fanfare, about 100 Serbs applied.

[Avdic-Vllasi] Recently, there have been attempts at dialogue between Serbs and Albanians?

[Shala] They launched the thesis that Albanians were advocating a southern front, and we rushed to persuade them that we were not. At the time, the war was escalating in Croatia. Serbia was so weak that a southern front would have been disastrous for it.

[Avdic-Vllasi] Does the Serbian opposition want that historical agreement with the Albanian opposition, and why?

[Shala] In this period, they want some kind of peace with the Albanians. That suits them more than it does us. Serbia is falling apart in a crisis of governmental identity, and they want to cover it, as Draskovic has said, with the shroud of Yugoslavia. I do not think that they want to achieve a historic agreement, which is not even possible, but they want to gain a little time. In addition, there is a common interest in the fall of Milosevic. It suits us to have dialogue, which could achieve a minimum of existential facilities, because we have neither hospitals nor schools....

[Avdic-Vllasi] What will be the outcome of that struggle?

[Shala] In my opinion, Serbia is certainly losing in Kosovo whichever way you look at it.

[Avdic-Vllasi] To what could the moderate Serbian opposition agree?

[Shala] I would put it this way: Kosovo is Albanian, but it must remain in Serbia! You will get all rights, but remain in Serbia! They are aware that Albanians are demanding power, that the Serbs in Kosovo can gain civil rights twice as great as they are entitled to on the basis of their percentage in the composition of the population. There are also those that would go further: For Kosovo to be a republic, but to remain in the federation, that is, in a "new" expanded Serbia or Yugoslavia, as they call it.

[Avdic-Vllasi] Does the Parliamentary Party suppose that a solution can be arrived at in that way?

[Shala] Over the long run, there is no solution for the Serbian side in Kosovo. You have to realize that Kosovo was annexed to the first Yugoslavia (and not to Serbia), and then to the second Yugoslavia, and it is evident from the documents that Kosovo entered Serbia after it entered Yugoslavia. From the beginning and in all versions, it has been a federal unit. Now Yugoslavia no longer exists, and it would have to be recognized, as the American Congress and European Parliament have done, that Kosovo, as a federal unit, has the right to self-determination even under the 1974 Constitution. The last referendum showed what the people of Kosovo want. It is impossible to remain in Serbia.

[Avdic-Vllasi] Do you think that a Republic of Kosovo is a realistic option?

[Shala] I do not think so. The only real option now is an international protectorate, because under these conditions it is not possible to make Kosovo a republic. Nor is unification with Albania anything like a realistic option, even though that would be a state with a 93-percent Albanian population.

[Avdic-Vllasi] An inevitable question is the place of Albania in what is happening in Kosovo.

[Shala] Albania cannot play the role of West Germany.

[Avdic-Vllasi] You speak of an international protectorate, but the international factor seems to have forgotten both Kosovo and the Albanians "out of love" for Serbia.

[Shala] I do not believe that we can be forgotten. Although it is unfavorable for us, the parallel is constantly being drawn with the so-called krajinas in Croatia. That special status means that we are not gaining much, but the Serbs are losing everything, because if the contours of an independent judiciary, police, and government are created here, then I do not know what Serbia would do here any longer. In that case, the flag of the international community would fly over Kosovo.

[Avdic-Vllasi] Does this nevertheless mean that not much depends on the Albanians?

[Shala] On the contrary, we must be ready for anything. If war began here, it is clear that it would not be waged only between Albanians and Serbs. Serbia can start a war here anytime it wants. All it has to do is to go into any village and kill 100 Albanians, and there is no longer any political force that could prevent the conflict. However, Serbia does not want war now after everything it has done to the Albanians.

UN Peace Mission Seen as Political Compromise

92BA0566A Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Feb 92 p 5

[Article by Ivan Matovic: "Without Making a Misstep"]

[Text] Step by step, from the East River on the other side of the Atlantic to our own Sava, from Geneva on 23 November of last year to the present, in compliance with a precise and strict procedure, responsibly, cautiously—the Security Council has been moving to carry out the plan "UN Peacekeeping Operation in Yugoslavia." As it moves, it is aware that this operation is too serious, a difficult test, the stakes too great, and the warnings from the past too eloquent for the top leadership of the world organization of 167 countries to be able to allow itself

even the least inconsistency, indecisiveness, vagueness, and haste, whose result would be a misstep ["walking violation" as in basketball—translator's note] with possible grave consequences.

The Security Council is bound to the precise and strict procedure by the very fact that full unanimity of UN members has been achieved at the time of becoming involved in each of the peacekeeping missions undertaken since the Golan Heights (1974), by contrast with certain earlier ones (the Congo in the 1960-64 period, when 234 members of the "blue helmets" were killed out of 19,832 involved), and the judgment is that that unity in efforts to reestablish disrupted peace in any part of the world would be a pledge to the undoubtedly successful outcome of those missions. This procedure is not contradicted by the unified commitment of the present members of the Security Council, following the careful assessment of all the relevant facts, consent of all the principals in the crisis, and adoption of the decision to send the "blue helmets" to the Serbian Krajinas, to shorten the usual process by which they reach the crisis areas, and to hasten the placement of those territories under UN protection, even though at the beginning this bears the risk of "crossfire," because the danger threatens that the Croatian army could radically disrupt by a flagrant violation the truce that has held consistently since 2 January, but with difficulty. Not only would this signify continuation of the war with unforeseeable consequences for the Serbian and Croatian people, but for the United Nations it would be a warning that all caution in assessing the situation and making decisions and indeed even tolerance toward the various principals in the crisis in order to persuade and bind them to be cooperative has limits beyond which it could quite easily become its opposite, with an outcome that could compromise the world organization because of postponement of the beginning of the peacekeeping mission.

Every step taken so far from the UN headquarters has resulted in new changes for the better, to the benefit of peace. All three basic conditions have thereby been secured for undertaking the peacekeeping operation in the Serbian areas: first—consent of all the parties involved in the conflict; second—broad agreement of the international community; third—readiness of the UN members to make their personnel available. As for the first condition, it was achieved with certain efforts by a number of leaders of the Serbian people in the Krajinas and especially official Croatia, which was obviously dissatisfied with extending the mandate of the "blue helmets" to at least one year and with the clear warning by the Security Council that Croatian legislation would not be in effect on the territory of the Serbian Krajinas, and it is also important that all the principals in the crisis realize what is meant by the phrase "territories under UN protection." The second condition has also been secured: Judging by the activity on the international scene, the broadest consent has been achieved among the countries of the world we live with that Yugoslavia is being offered effective aid in reestablishing peace and creating conditions under which overall political solutions will be arrived at through talks, negotiations, and agreements, at the outset within the framework of the EC under UN supervision. It is now quite certain that when the vote is taken on the decision to carry out the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia, there will be a unanimous "aye" from all five permanent members and at least as many of the other members of the Security Council, which is the basis for adoption of that fundamental document, which, we repeat, also has broad support of the UN membership. The third condition was achieved as soon as the operation seemed certain: More than 30 countries offered their personnel to man the contingent of 14,000 soldiers and civilians, which is a condition that itself offers the possibility of meeting all the basic criteria for its composition—geographic, ethnic, racial, religious, political, and also for respecting the consent of both the Serbian and Croatian sides as to the choice of the countries which will send their personnel to the Krajinas under the UN flag.

The fact that both sides expressed certain anxieties at the very outset lies in the domain of prejudices and groundless suspicions: the Serbian side—that in the ranks of the "blue helmets" from certain countries of South America, Australia, indeed even West Europe there might be the sons and grandsons of those who in 1941 committed genocide against the Serbs within the borders of the NDH [Independent State of Croatia]; the Croatian side—that the national contingent from countries that had proven to be friends and admirers of Yugoslavia and opponents of secession in their own and other states would include people, and especially commanders at various levels, who would be biased in favor of the "Serbian side" as victims of secession. It should be pointed out as an argument to oppose such reasoning that the multinational units will be deployed according to a precisely determined plan over a broad area from Dubrovnik to Beli Manastir and so intermixed that individuals and little groups, even assuming they are committed to destruction, will not be able to bring it off, and at the same time, in keeping with past experience, there will be quite frequent replacement of personnel and also cooperation among unit commands, local bodies of government, and police stations. Cooperation of both sides with the Security Council and their prior consent to the decisions of the secretary general is taken for granted, and so is trust in the good intentions of the United Nations.

The UN peacekeeping mission should be viewed as a political compromise in which no party to the conflict has obtained what it firmly believes it is entitled to, but what it gains is a peace that brings with it the hope of a permanent settlement of the crisis. We go out to meet the UN peacekeeping mission with trust in the people carrying it out and with belief in its successful outcome; we do so reasonably, with respect and words of welcome, mindful that the "blue helmets" are coming on the recommendation of our country's Presidency, that by

their operations, however many people are involved, however lengthy or expensive they may be, they have not resolved the essential problems which led to their being invited, but they have brought about the conditions for those problems to be settled successfully and permanently, but only where the hosts themselves so desire and to the extent that they desire it. To be sure, the "blue helmets" are coming here to areas that have been devastated by war and are geographically difficult terrain, with a disrupted system of government, with a breakdown of legal regulation, with many refugees and people under arms burdened by the tragic consequence of the volcano of war that has just been extinguished, so that the beg.nning of the peacekeeping mission will be to that extent more difficult, and its developments more complicated, but the "blue helmets" are also coming to restore order on what were battlefields until yesterday, to strengthen the peace, to protect human life and property, to guarantee the national rights of all, and to create conditions for settling essential and vital problems and for guaranteeing the historical interests of the Serbian people.

By way of conclusion, we offer the reader a datum from the history of the NARODNA ARMIJA newspaper publishing house—that 31 of its staff members (including the author of these lines) have served peace under the UN flag as military newsmen, photographers, editors of newspapers of the peacekeeping forces, communications officers, members of observer missions, etc.—all over Africa and Asia, but most of all in the threatened areas of the Near East, beginning with the Sinai in 1956 and over the 35 years that followed. They are therefore in a way crown witnesses of the constructive missions of the "blue helmets," of their unbiased efforts to secure the peace and to achieve beneficial cooperation with local and government authorities. We are profoundly convinced that the "blue helmets" deserved the Nobel Peace Prize that they were awarded in 1988, and these military newsmen and Yugoslavs, taking part of the credit for our army and for ourselves, unreservedly believe in the worthwhile nature of the upcoming peacekeeping mission in our region of those 14,000 citizens of countries on five continents. Aware of the great importance of this first peacekeeping operation of the United Nations on the continental part of Europe and the world's second largest with respect to the number of troops involved, they also realize that its price of $500 million a year is exceedingly high for a world that is already overindebted, but also that war and the violation of human rights are the most expensive. And this is the occasion to put an effective stop to that. Here and now.

Offering this less as a guarantee to our own people and more as our own experience and truth, we hope that we—amid the circumstances that any hesitation runs the risk of a resumption of the war—have the occasion in our next issue to record with our pen and camera the arrival of the advance unit of this complicated peacekeeping operation.